Hudson v. Herschbach Drilling Co.
| Decision Date | 02 September 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 4635.,4635. |
| Parties | HUDSONv.HERSCHBACH DRILLING CO. et al. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; Bryan G. Johnson, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by C. B. Hudson against Herschbach Drilling Company, employer, and Associated Indemnity Corporation, insurer, to set aside a judgment for compensation previously entered and to reopen the case. From an order setting aside the judgment and reopening the case for new trial, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Where Workmen's Compensation Act makes no provision for increase of payments in case of increased disability after entry of judgment for compensation, courts are powerless to aid workman seeking increase except through procedure authorized by statutes or general law. Comp.St.1929, §§ 156-115, 156-124.
Hanna, Wilson & Brophy, of Albuquerque, for appellants.
Dailey & Rogers, of Albuquerque, for appellee.
The appellee Hudson, an employee of the appellant Herschbach Drilling Company, was injured on April 21, 1939, in Lea County, New Mexico, while performing labor in the course of his employment, and claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Comp.St.1929, § 156-101 et seq.
On July 31, 1939, there was filed in this cause, in the district court of Bernalillo County, a claim for compensation signed by appellee; an answer signed by appellants; a written compromise settlement signed by the parties hereto; a judgment of the district court in accordance with the compromise settlement, and a satisfaction of said judgment signed by the appellee.
On June 12, 1940, appellee filed an application to set aside the judgment entered in said cause and to reopen and try the case, alleging the incapacity of appellee to make a contract because of physical and mental infirmities. To this application an answer was filed by the appellants and the cause was tried upon the issue of whether the judgment should be set aside, and the case reopened for trial. Evidence was taken and the trial court concluded that the appellee had capacity to contract, and had been fairly compensated for his known injuries at the date of the settlement; but that the parties did not contemplate, have in mind, or take into consideration in entering into such settlement, that appellee's brain was injured, as now claimed. That there was a mutual mistake of fact established by evidence, that was unknown and could not have been discovered at the time of the entry of the judgment, which authorized the court to set it aside and grant a rehearing of the case on the question of appellee's brain injury and his right to compensation therefor. Thereupon the trial court treated the complaint as having been amended to conform with the theory of mistake of fact in making the settlement, and offered to give appellants time and opportunity “for the purpose of showing that the workman is (was) not under disability from the claimed injury to the brain.” Upon suggestion of appellants the trial court required appellee to file an amended claim for compensation. Appellant requested time to answer the amended claim, which was granted by the trial court, but no answer was ever filed.
An order was entered setting aside the judgment, and reopening the case for a new trial on the issue of appellee's brain injury and his right to compensation therefor. From that order this appeal was prosecuted. No trial was had upon the merits after the case was reopened.
[1] It is provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act that the employee may be required to undergo a medical examination subsequent to judgment, and Sts.1929, § 156-124.
This seems to present a glaring inequality, since there is no correlative provision for increase of payments in case of increased disability, as is provided for in the statutes of some other states. Yet this statute is the product of the Legislature and the courts are powerless to aid the unfortunate workman in such cases, except through some procedure authorized by the statutes or general law. It is to be noted in passing that the statute seems to refer to installment payments alone, and has no bearing, apparently, upon lump sum settlements.
The act provides: “Any and all such judgments [in compensation cases] rendered and executions issued hereunder shall have the same force and effect and be governed by the laws of this state as judgments or executions in civil cases.” (Emphasis ours.) § 156-115 Sts.1929.
We must look to the statutes and general law for authority to set aside a judgment in compensation cases if the applicant is the workman, but if the employer or his surety is the applicant, then provision is made therefor by the act itself.
[2] Workmen's compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights, remedies and procedure which are exclusive. They are in derogation of the common law and are not controlled or affected by the code of procedure in suits at law or actions in equity except as provided therein. Pound v. Gaulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468; Smith v. Kiel, Mo.App., 115 S.W.2d 38. But the New Mexico act provides that we must look to the code of procedure and general law for authority to set aside such judgments.
Interesting questions regarding the authority of the trial court to open or set aside judgments after the statutory time therefor has expired, have been raised.
It is provided by statute that final judgments and decrees entered by district court in all cases tried by them remain under the control of such courts for a period of thirty days after entry, and for such further time as may be necessary (not exceeding thirty days) to enable the court to pass upon and dispose of any such motions.
Default judgments may be set aside upon motion filed within sixty days of the date of the entry of such judgment upon good cause shown, 105-843; and judgments may be set aside for irregularity upon motion filed at any time within one year after the rendition thereof. 105-846.
There is no statute which authorized the trial court to set aside or open the judgment, as the proceedings were instituted more than sixty days after the entry of the judgment, and appellee does not claim that it was irregularly entered. Unless the judgment was void, then it could only be opened or set aside upon grounds authorized by the common law, or by an...
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Rue v. Johnson
...of the opinion that, as the right later to contest the question of a continuance of the disability is statutory (Hudson v. Hershback Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 128 P.2d 1044), it would exist even though a judgment is absolute in form. However, as it will be necessary to reform the judgment ......
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Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp.
...held that the court has inherent power to vacate a final judgment under its powers of equity. See Hudson v. Herschbach Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 332-33, 128 P.2d 1044, 1045 (1942). We have set no time limit on this power. In Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese, we vacated a 1978 judgment followin......
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...claims where the amendment is made before trial. Holman v. Oriental Refinery, 75 N.M. 52, 400 P.2d 471 (1965); Hudson v. Herschbach Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 128 P.2d 1044 (1942). Relationship of the Two The question now is whether there is a sufficient relationship between the two pleadin......
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...Tocci v. Albuquerque & Cerrillos Coal Co., 45 N.M. 133, 112 P.2d 515 (1941)--fraud or mutual mistake; Hudson v. Herschback Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 128 P.2d 1044 (1942)--incapacity to contract; Lance v. New Mexico Military Institute, 70 N.M. 158, 371 P.2d 995 (1962)--estoppel; Winter v. R......