Pound v. Gaulding

• Decision Date: 16 March 1939
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 526.
• Citation: 187 So. 468,237 Ala. 387
• Parties: POUND v. GAULDING.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

187 So. 468

237 Ala. 387

POUND v. GAULDING.

7 Div. 526.

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 16, 1939

Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; Lamar Field, Judge.

Action under Employers' Liability Act by C. R. Gaulding against Murphey Pound. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

London & Yancey, Geo. W. Yancey, Fred G. Koenig, Sr., and Frederick Koenig, Jr., all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Longshore & Williams and Merrill, Jones & Merrill, all of Anniston, for appellee.

GARDNER Justice.

Plaintiff was in defendant's employ as a carpenter, and while engaged in his work on a scaffolding, under the direction of one Miller who had superintendence over him, the scaffolding gave way by reason of insufficient supports or braces resulting in plaintiff's fall and consequential injuries.

Plaintiff's suit (counts 2 and 3, upon which the case was tried) is based upon subsections 2 and 3 of section 7598, Code 1923 (Employers' Liability Act), relating to the negligence of superintendent Miller.

Conceding for the moment the applicability of the Employers' Liability Act, we find no ground of demurrer sufficiently specific (Section 9479, Code 1923; Gulf States Steel Co v. Carpenter, 205 Ala. 162, 87 So. 580) pointing out any defect therein and, indeed, we do not understand any serious argument is advanced against any ruling on the demurrer in this respect. Additional grounds of demurrer were interposed, however, challenging the sufficiency of these counts upon the theory the Employers' Liability Act (Code 1923, § 7598 et seq.) had been superseded by our Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1923, § 7534 et seq.), and that any injuries sustained by an employee are presumed to come under the latter act. Davis & Son v. Ruple, 222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772; Kaplan v. Sertell, 217 Ala. 413, 116 So. 112.

This is of course the general rule. But we think the averments of these counts suffice to present an exception thereto. They disclose that at the time plaintiff sustained his injuries he was engaged as a carpenter, assisting in the construction of a building at Fort McClellan, to be used by the United States government as part of its armory, arsenal or fort; that Fort McClellan is located near Anniston, in Calhoun County, Alabama, and was purchased by the United States in 1918, and prior to the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but at a time when the Employers' Liability Act, upon which this suit is founded, was in full force and effect; that said building and fort are included within the provisions of section 1505 of the Code of 1923. A reference to the Code provision discloses that the State of Alabama has ceded to the United States jurisdiction, in general terms of course, over this property, and the following section (section 1506) is to the effect the jurisdiction ceded continues so long as the United States remains the owner of the land, and shall be exclusive except for the service of process issued out of the courts of Alabama. It is the rule also that acceptance of the cession to the United States is evidenced by its purchase of the land and may be presumed. 65 Corpus Juris 1258; Atkinson v. State Tax Commission of Oregon, 303 U.S. 20, 58 S.Ct. 419, 82 L.Ed. 621; Bowen v. Johnston, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455; Webb v. J. G. White Engineering Corp., 204 Ala. 429, 85 So. 729.

Nothing to the contrary appearing, therefore, exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded, as to Fort McClellan, to the United States government. Such being the situation, it is the generally accepted rule that the municipal laws of the State, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the laws of the United States, remain in full force until abrogated by the United States. But this includes only such laws as are in effect at the time of the cession. And in the instant case, under this rule, the Employers' Liability Act remained in force. But the decisions are uniform to the effect that new enactments by the legislature of the ceding state, after the cession, do not take effect in the ceded area. Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 31 S.Ct. 416, 55 L.Ed. 491; Employers' Liability Ass'r Corp. v. Dileo, Mass., 10 N.E.2d 251.

Under this recognized principle, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State, having been enacted after the cession of this territory to the United States, did not take effect therein.

Defendant insists, however, that Congress, by the Act of February 1, 1928 (16 U.S.C.A. § 457) gave effect to our Workmen's Compensation Act. This statute reads as follows: "In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover on account of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be."

But we are of the opinion the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Murray v. Joe Gerrick, 291 U.S. 315, 54 S.Ct. 432, 78 L.Ed. 821, 92 A.L.R. 1259, is a refutation of this argument. In that case the court had under consideration the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Washington; and we are not unmindful of the defendant's ingenious argument as to the points of differentiation between the Washington statute and our own (71 Corpus Juris 226, under the heading "classification"), and the analysis of the Gerrick case in the light of these differences. We are persuaded, however, that these distinctions do not form the bases of that decision. Rather, we think, it is rested upon the broad foundation of the nature of the Workmen's Compensation statutes, which are sui generis, and are not actions at law in the sense of the cited federal statute. Workmen's Compensation statutes create rights and remedies and procedure all their own. Employers' Liability Ass'r Corp. v. Dileo, Mass., 10 N.E.2d 251. They are based on a new theory of compensation distinct from the previously existing theories of damages (71 Corpus Juris 232), and are not rested upon any theory of wrongful conduct or neglect on the part of the employer. 71 Corpus Juris 235; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc't Comm., 294 U.S. 532, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044.

But the above noted federal act discloses in its opening sentence that it has application only where "neglect or wrongful act of another" is involved. We are of the opinion that a careful study of the Gerrick case, supra, is persuasive that the court interpreted the federal statute of 1928 as having no relation to Workmen's Compensation Acts. And it is clear enough that Congress so interpreted the decision, as by the Act of June 25, 1936 (40 U.S.C.A. § 290) specific and emphatic recognition was given Workmen's Compensation laws of the several states as applicable in territory ceded to the United States, which lies within the exterior boundaries of any state.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act having been passed subsequent to the acquisition of this territory by the United States, and its exclusive jurisdiction therein, has no force in such territory. Murray v. Gerrick, supra. Plaintiff's injuries were sustained prior to the passage by Congress of the Act of June 25, 1936, and it is not seriously insisted that this Act has any influence in the instant case. Employers' Liability Ass'r Corp. v. Dileo, supra; O'Hara's case, 248 Mass. 31, 142 N.E. 844.

Defendant further insists that upon the principles of conflict of laws the complaint was subject to demurrer. The complaint discloses the injuries were sustained in the ceded territory of Fort McClellan. So far as concerns the question of conflict of laws, the ceded territory is to be considered upon the same basis as if the accident had occurred in another state.

So considered, plaintiff replies that where an injury is shown to have occurred in another jurisdiction or state, the presumption obtains that the liabilities, obligations and responsibilities of the parties are to be determined by the place where the wrong was committed. And this is the generally accepted rule. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803, 18 L.R.A. 433, 38 Am.St.Rep. 163; Caine v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876, 32 A.L.R. 793; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34 S.Ct. 955, 58 L.Ed. 1457.

But defendant answers that compensation statutes are founded on contract, and where accepted by the parties, the act becomes an integral part of the contract of employment. Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co., 111 Conn. 693, 151 A. 182; State v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comm., 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W.2d 897; Pederzoli's case, 269 Mass. 550, 169 N.E. 427. That presumably the contract of employment was made with reference to and subject to the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation statute,--section 7547, Code 1923,--and that recovery may be had though the injury occurred outside the State. Section 7540, Code 1923; Alexander v. Movietonews Inc., 273 N.Y. 599, 7 N.E.2d 712; Lynch's case, 281 Mass. 454, 183 N.E. 834, 86 A.L.R. 285; State ex rel. Loney v. Industrial Acc't Board, 87 Mont. 191, 286 P. 408; Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Dileo, Mass., 10 N.E.2d 251.

The Texas court in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. James, Tex.Sup., 118 S.W.2d 293, in reference to injuries sustained outside the state, limits recovery under the Workmen's Compensation statute of that state to accidents arising in work outside the state which is incidental to work for which he was employed within the state.

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