Hudson v. Iguano Land & Mining Co

• Citation: 76 S.E. 797,71 W.Va. 402
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Decision Date: 03 December 1912
• Parties: HUDSON. v. IGUANO LAND & MINING CO.

76 S.E. 797

71 W.Va. 402

HUDSON.

v.IGUANO LAND & MINING CO.

Supreme Oourt of Appeals of West Virginia.

Dec. 3, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Judgment (§ 713^*)—Merger and Bar— Causes Merged.

When the cause of action in a second suit is the same as that in a former one and the parties are identical, both are concluded by the judgment or decree in the former suit, not only as to what was actually decided therein, but likewise as to everything the plaintiff could have adduced in support of his claim and as to everything the defendant could have relied upon in defense. The cause of action is merged in the judgment or decree.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1063, 1234-1241; Dec. Dig. § 713.*]

2. Judgment (§ 720*) — Conclusiveness — Matters Concluded.

When the causes of action are different, the former decision is conclusive only as to questions, rights, and facts actually decided therein, and nothing more.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1251; Dec. Dig. § 720.*]

3. Judgment (§ 654*)—Merger and Bar-Dismissal—Title to Real Property.

Dismissal of a bill to remove cloud from title to real estate, for failure of the plaintiff to prove good title, does not preclude his defense of an action of trespass or bill for an accounting for timber and coal taken from the land, subsequently brought by the defendant in such former suit.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1165; Dec. Dig. § 654.*]

4. Judgment (§ 743*)—Merger and Bar— Dismissal—Title to Real Property.

In such case, the causes of action are different, and, as the former decision does not adjudicate title or possession in the defendant, but only lack of title in the plaintiff, it is notres judicata as to the matters involved in the subsequent suit.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1253, 1275-1277; Dec. Dig. § 743.^2-*]

5. Injunction (§ 35*)—Subjects of Relief —Trespass.

In the absence of disclosure of good title in the plaintiff, or an action at law to settle the title, brought or about to be brought, equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin a trespass to real estate.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 77; Dec. Dig. § 35.*]

6. Equity (§ 15*)—Jurisdiction—Remedy at Law.

Except in cases of an equity of some sort, conferring jurisdiction, courts of equity will not determine questions of fact peculiar to the jurisdiction of the courts of law.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 27-36; Dec. Dig. § 15.*]

7. Account (§ 12*)—Jurisdiction—Accounting.

Necessity of computation of the quantity and value of coal mined and timber cut from land by a trespasser confers no right to an accounting in equity.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Account, Cent. Dig. §§ 62-70; Dec. Dig. § 12.*]

Brannon, P., dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Putnam County.

Bill in equity by Mary Patton Hudson against the Iguano Land & Mining Company. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, injunction dissolved, and bill dismissed without prejudice.

Brown, Jackson & Knight and J. H. Nash, all of Charleston, for appellants.

Enslow, Fitzpatrick, Alderson & Baker, of Huntington, for appellee.

POFFENBARGER, J. A former adjudication set up here brings into this record that of Iguano Land & Mining Co. v. Jones et al., heretofore decided by this court, and reported in 65 W. Va. 59, 64 S. E. 640. The opinion in the report of that decision recites at length and minutely all of its material facts and the proceedings therein. Reference to it will therefore be sufficient for the purposes of this opinion, in so far as it deals with the force and effect of the former adjudication, and also in a large measure for inquiries extending beyond it.

Mrs. Mary Patton Hudson, who was a party to that cause, having procured the rights of all persons associated with her in interest, after the decision thereof, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill of the Iguano Land & Mining Company, brought this suit for an accounting for timber cut from the land and coal mined therefrom by the Plymouth Coal & Mining Company, lessee of the Iguano Company, during the pendency of the former litigation, making the Iguano Company and the Plymouth Company parties defendant. Demurrers of both defendants were overruled, and the cause went to a final hearing on answers, replications and proof, resulting in a decree declaring Mrs. Hudson to be the owner of that portion of the Lockhart 200-acre survey which lies within the boundaries of the 2, 500 acres claimed by the Iguano Company, and entitled to the rents, issues, and profits thereof, enjoining the defendants from the further mining of coal therein, declaring her right to compensation for the coal already mined and timber cut therefrom, referring the cause to a commissioner to take, state, and report an account, and consolidating with this cause the old suit of State of West Virginia v. R. A. Jones et al., in which Mrs. Hudson and her associates attempted to redeem the land from forfeiture, and in which such redemption was temporarily enjoined in the cause lately decided by this court, as above stated.

In addition to the former adjudication, the plaintiff in this bill relies upon a claim of possession of the tract of 85.5 acres, part of the Lockhart 200-acre survey, lying within the 2, 500-acre claim of the Iguano Company, at the beginning of the former litigation, and prior to the commencement thereof, as a basis for two separate and distinct contentions: (1) Adjudication in the former suit of possession on her part; and (2) bar of the claim of the Iguano Company to title to the forfeited Lockhart survey by transfer under the Constitution.

Her bill alleges her possession on or about the 23d day of August, 1899, the date of the award of the injunction against her, interruption thereof by the injunction, and subsequent possession by the defendants, to her exclusion, under the protection of the injunction. The brief of counsel for Mrs. Hudson charges an admission in the bill of the former suit of her possession of the land at the date of the filing thereof. That bill says R. A. Jones, Mary Patton Hudson, and Oliver A. Patton, at that time, were "unlawfully and vexatiously setting up and asserting title to the lands" and "proceeding to take possession thereof and cut timber and commit waste thereon" and "disturbing and disquieting the tenants" of the plaintiff upon said land "by notifying them of their claim of title and asserting title to said lands" and "offering to market said title" and "trying to find purchasers therefor." It charged "actual, exclusive, and continuous possession of the said 2, 500-acre tract since the year 1860 by E. G. Tyler and those under whom the plaintiff claimed." It also recited the institution of an action of ejectment in 1887 by Robert Patton and others to test the validity of the Middleton patent under which the defendants to the bill claimed and a judgment therein for the defendants, and then said, "since the trial of said ejectment suit nearly 19 years ago, no effort was made until lately, as hereinafter stated, by any one to assert title under said 1, 137-acre patent to any part of your orator's said lands, during which long period, as well as prior thereto, it and its said grantors have continued in the quiet and undisturbed possession thereof." These allegations seem sufficient to negative any admission of possession on the part of the defendants and clearly assert possession on the part of the plaintiff in said bill.

The answer denied possession in the plaintiff of any kind at any time. Its averments as to possession on the part of the defendant are as follows: "Respondents allege tbat the said four tracts of land claimed and owned by them as aforesaid consist mainly of wild lands, virgin forests, which are not susceptible of being held in occupancy of any one or in actual, exclusive and continual possession of complainants, as they allege, but respondents allege that they have been in exclusive continuous possession of said tracts ever since the accruing of their title thereto, to which they have never known of any denial or contrary claim until the bringing of this suit. * * * Respondents allege that while it is true that 'no effort was made until recently' to assert title to the 1, 137-acre tract of land by suit, they have never deemed it necessary under the laws to do so, as they were unaware of any adversary claimants thereto, or that their title to the same was in any manner questioned or disputed." Appellants in this suit say these averments of possession assert only a claim of legal or constructive possession conferred by title, and not actual possession, and that there is no assertion of actual possession in the answer.

If the former adjudication against the Iguano Land & Mining Company is conclusive in Mrs. Hudson's favor, as matter of actual decision or estoppel, what right, title, or possession any of the parties previously had is now immaterial. Hence disposition of the claims and contentions, based on that decision, is logically first in order, and decisive, if the theory of complainant's bill shall prove to be sound.

The former suit had a twofold object: (1) To have the Middleton patent declared invalid as against the title of the plaintiff and removed as a cloud thereon; and (2) to quiet the plaintiff in its possession by injunction against molestation thereof. All else was subsidiary. The injunction against redemption from forfeiture proceeded upon the invalidity of the Middleton patent and was an attempt to prevent the acquisition of further ground for the claim of title under it.

Regarding the former suit as analogous to our statutory action of ejectment and the decree of dismissal as the equivalent of a judgment for the defendant in such an action, agreeably to observations found in Mills v. Oil Co., 57 W. Va. 255, 50 S. E. 157, 4 Ann. Cas. 427, and Logan v. Ward, 58 W. Va. 366, 52 S. E. 398...