Hudson v. Milburn
| Decision Date | 22 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:11-CV-1103-NAB |
| Parties | GREGORY HUDSON JR., Petitioner, v. PENNY MILBURN, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Gregory Hudson Jr.'s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. [Doc. 1]. Respondent Jeff Norman filed a Response. [Doc 10]. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Hudson's petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
After a jury trial, Hudson was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action. State v. Hudson, 230 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). The evidence1 viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict established the following: On April 27, 2004, Ashley Arnold and Cortez Burton noticed Hudson, an acquaintance from school, waiting at a bus stop. State v. Hudson, 230 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). Arnold and Burton stopped and asked Hudson if he wanted a ride. Id. Hudson declined and told Arnold he had a ride coming, but he asked Arnold and Burton to wait for him. Id. A few minutes later Arnold and Burton sawHudson in the front seat of Jonny Washington's car fighting with Washington and the victim, Jarrett Williams. Hudson, 230 S.W.3d at 667. Burton tried to intervene, but eventually returned to the car with Arnold. Id. Hudson and Williams eventually rolled out of the passenger side of the car, and Williams began to run away. Id. Hudson then called Williams a "bitch," shot him in the back, turned to Washington and said, "I oughta shoot your old ass, too." Id. Williams died as a result of the gunshot wound to his abdomen. Id. Hudson then ran away and jumped into the back of Arnold and Burton's car as they drove away. Id. At an intersection, Hudson left the car and boarded a bus. Arnold and Burton drove to Bonnie Polk's apartment and told her they had witnessed Hudson shoot a man. Id.
Washington was unable to identify the shooter. Id. An eyewitness, Ronald Walter, saw the altercation and identified Hudson from a photo array and photographed lineup. Id. Walter also witnessed Hudson leave the scene and reported part of the license plate number to the police. Id. Homicide detective, Thomas Carroll found two cars matching the partial plate number, one of which was a Honda Accord registered to Polk. Id.
Carroll then telephoned Polk to question her about the vehicle and she stated that her friends, Arnold and Burton, had borrowed her car on the day of the shooting, and that she had not driven it that day. Hudson, 230 S.W.3d at 667. Burton and Arnold were with Polk at her apartment during the telephone call, and Arnold got on the phone and admitted to being at the scene of the shooting. Id. Burton was never handed the phone, but Arnold gave Carroll Burton's telephone number. Id.
Arnold agreed to go to police headquarters, but when she failed to appear for her appointment, police went to Polk's apartment and apprehended Arnold and Burton. Id. Arnold and Burton were placed in separate interrogation rooms and questioned about the homicide. Id.at 3. Neither gave police Hudson's last name name but they both identified Hudson's photograph. Id. They also both made videotaped statements to the police. Id.
Hudson was arrested and charged with first degree murder, two counts of armed criminal action, and attempted first degree robbery. Hudson, 230 S.W.3d at 667. Hudson was found guilty of first degree murder and one count of armed criminal action. Id. at 668. He was acquitted of all other counts and was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for life without parole and life. Id.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Hudson raises six grounds for relief. First, Hudson asserts that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by permitting the state to present the testimony of Bonnie Polk. Second, Hudson alleges violations of his 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution for the court's overruling of defense counsel's objection to improper comments made by Detective Carroll. Hudson's remaining grounds for relief allege ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("AEDPA") applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In conducting habeas review pursuant to § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings (1) resulted in a decision that is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determinationof the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2) (1996).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), "'federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,' refers to 'the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions.'" Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). To obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or applied unreasonably. Id. at 783 (citing Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006)).
A state court's decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [Supreme Court] cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent." Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). A state court decision is unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, "if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. "Even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable." Evanstad, 470 F.3d at 782. "A state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Id.
Hudson's first and second points of review challenge state court evidentiary rulings. "It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The federal habeas court can only determine whether the evidentiary rulings resulted in a constitutional violation. Bounds v. Delo, 151 F.3d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1998). "Not every trial error amounts to a constitutional deprivation." Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995). A state-court evidentiary ruling becomes a constitutional violation only when it is "so conspicuously prejudicial or of such a magnitude as to fatally infect the trial and deprive the defendant of due process." Bounds, 151 F.3d at 1119. "To carry that burden, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial- i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety the verdict probably would have been different." Anderson, 44 F.3d at 679.
For the first point of review, Hudson claims the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Bonnie Polk, and in so doing, the trial court abused its discretion. Hudson asserts that Polk's testimony was improperly admitted for the following reasons: (1) the statements were hearsay statements that did not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule; and (2) the alleged hearsay statements improperly bolstered Arnold and Burton's credibility to the prejudice of the petitioner. Respondent asserts that the testimony was admissible, and that the trial was fair.
Prior to Polk's testimony, Arnold had been cross-examined by defense counsel concerning her whereabouts, activities, and any discussions between herself and Polk and Burton following the shooting. (Resp't. Ex. A at 297-300.) Arnold testified that she returned to Polk's house with Burton and told Polk what had happened. Id. at 297. Arnold and Burton then remained at Polk's home for two days, with the exception of driving Polk to work. Id. at 298-300. Defense counsel questioned Arnold regarding her discussions with Polk and Burton about the shooting, but Arnold maintained they only briefly discussed the shooting on the day it occurred. Id. at 297-300.
Burton was also cross examined concerning his whereabouts and discussions after the shooting. Id. at 459-60. He was asked how long he stayed at Polk's apartment, but testified he could not remember. Id. at 459. Burton testified that he did not spend the night, and that he told Polk that Hudson had shot someone and he did not know why. Id. at 459-60. He also testified that Arnold told him that the the police were looking for him. Id. at 460.
At trial, the State called Polk to testify about Burton and Arnold's statements when they returned to Polk's residence on the morning of the incident. Defense counsel objected to this testimony on the grounds that this proffered testimony was not triggered by a prior inconsistent statement. (Resp't. Ex. A at 546.) The...
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