Hudson v. Pioneer Service Co.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1959
• Citation: 346 P.2d 123,218 Or. 561
• Parties: William H. HUDSON, Appellant, v. PIONEER SERVICE COMPANY, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 123

346 P.2d 123

218 Or. 561

William H. HUDSON, Appellant, v. PIONEER SERVICE COMPANY, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 8, 1959.

Decided Nov. 12, 1959.

Robert E. Jones, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Anderson, Franklin & O'Brien, Paul D. Hanlon, Portland; and Thompson & Sahlstrom, Eugene.

Sidney A. Milligan, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Milligan & Brown, Eugene.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and LUSK, O'CONNELL and REDDING, JJ.

REDDING, Justice pro tem.

This is an action for libel, based upon a printed report published and distributed by the defendant, in which the plaintiff was listed as a delinquent debtor. The case was tried to a jury, and at the close of the evidence the court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff has appealed from that ruling.

The defendant, Pioneer Service Company, Inc., is an Oregon corporation engaged in the business of credit reporting to paying subscribers to its service. On or about January 5, 1955, the defendant printed and distributed to approximately 200 of its subscribers in Eastern Oregon a certain commercial and professional report which listed debtors as delinquent, giving the amounts of such delinquencies. Included in the 200 persons, firms and corporations engaged in business in Eastern Oregon to whom this report was sent were 13 paying subscribers in John Day and one nonpaying subscriber, the Grant County Bank in John Day, Oregon. The plaintiff's name was listed in this report under the heading of Canyon City, and the report stated that the plaintiff was delinquent in the amount of $31.95 on an account incurred in John Day.

The copy of the credit report listing the plaintiff as a delinquent debtor which was sent to the Grant County Bank was observed by plaintiff's wife on the mail desk behind the counter, where two other employees were looking at it.

As a result of the publication plaintiff alleges he was very upset, shocked, angry and humiliated.

The plaintiff had been a resident of Canyon City for approximately nine years prior to the publication complained of. He was in business as a wholesale bakery goods distributor to start with, later he was employed by an automobile dealer, after which he went to work for the Edward Hines Lumber Co. at Seneca as a logger and was so employed for approximately three years. This employment continued for more than a year after the publication.

In passing upon defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge found that the evidence when considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff was sufficient to sustain a finding that the report listing plaintiff as a delinquent debtor was inaccurate, and that it had been published recklessly. Assuming without deciding that the trial judge was correct in so holding, it becomes necessary to here determine whether the publication was libelous per se, and, if so, whether the publication was privileged.

There is neither allegation nor proof of special damages. Under such circumstances no cause of action is stated, unless the publication is libelous per se. Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252; Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publishing Co., 122 Or. 408, 259 P. 307, 311, and cases therein cited.

In Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publishing Co., supra, this court approved the following definition of libels actionable per se '* * * defamatory words to be libelous per se must be of such a nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned and avoided.'

See also Reiman v. Pacific Development Society, 132 Or. 82, 284 P. 575; Marr v. Putnam, 196 Or. 1, 246 P.2d 509.

Can the court presume as a matter of law that a writing charging one who is not a trader or merchant or engaged in any vocation where credit is necessary for the proper and effectual conduct of his business with being a delinquent debtor will tend to disgrace and degrade him or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule or cause him to be shunned or...