Hudson v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 5560.)
• Citation: 81 S.E. 362,14 Ga.App. 490
• Parties: HUDSON. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

(14 Ga.App. 490)

81 S.E. 362

HUDSON.

v.STATE.

(No. 5560.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 18, 1914.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Contracts (§ 35*)—Binding Effect.

A contract signed by one of the parties only, but accepted and acted on by the other party to it, may be just as binding as if it were signed by both parties, if the obligations of the parties are mutual.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 171-185; Dec. Dig. § 35.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 753*)—Directed Verdict —Refusal.

It is never error to refuse to direct a verdict in a criminal case..

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1713, 1727-1739; Dec. Dig. § 753.*]

3. Master and Servant (§ 67*)—Contract of Employment—Advances Fraudulently Obtained—Evidence.

The evidence was insufficient to support the inference of a present fraudulent intent at the time of the advancement alleged to have been made to the accused, and therefore legally insufficient to authorize the conviction of a violation of the provisions of section 715 of the Penal Code of 1910.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent Dig. § 75; Dec. Dig. § 67.*]

Error from City Court of Sparta; R. W. Moore, Judge.

Jule Hudson was convicted of obtaining money under contract of employment with intent to defraud, and brings error. Reversed.

T. M. Hunt, of Sparta, for plaintiff in error.

R, L. Merritt, Sol., of Sparta, for the State.

RUSSELL, C. J. [3] This is the second appearance of this' case before this court The evidence upon the trial now under review differs from that contained in the record of the former trial (Hudson v. State, 12 Ga. App. 535, 77 S. E. 828), in that in the record sub judice there is no reference to the testimony adduced upon the former trial to the effect that the advance of $1.05 was made in response to the demand of the laborer for an advance of $10.80, and, in fact, the prosecutor, in testifying in the instant case, denied giving the testimony attributed to him in the brief of the testimony of the former trial. Regardless of this variance, however, we deem the case absolutely controlled, as was held when it was here before, by the ruling of this court in Mulkey v. State, 1 Ga. App. 521, 57 S. E. 1022, which amounted to a finding of not guilty as to the first count, and placed the case solely upon the allegation that the accused obtained articles of the value of $1.05, with the intent not to perform the services contracted for, and with the intent to defraud the prosecutor. However, all the evidence shows that the $1.05 would not have been advanced, except for the contractual relations existing between the prosecutor and the accused. The advancement depended wholly upon the original contract, or else the whole amount advanced is a mere ordinary debt upon open account. It was the only contract which called for the performance of services by the accused for his employer, and the advancement cannot be separated from the original contract, because it is not claimed that any fraudulent representation was made for the specific purpose of inducing this advancement.

This being true, the inference that the defendant did not intend to carry out his original contract, at the time this advancement of $1.05 was made, cannot be...