Hudspeth v. Blue Bar Taxicab & Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1925
• Docket Number: Civil 2306
• Citation: 237 P. 382,28 Ariz. 440
• Parties: ALICE E. HUDSPETH, as Guardian of the Person and Estate of WILLIAM C. HUDSPETH, an Incompetent Person, Appellant, v. BLUE BAR TAXICAB & TRANSFER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

237 P. 382

28 Ariz. 440

ALICE E. HUDSPETH, as Guardian of the Person and Estate of WILLIAM C. HUDSPETH, an Incompetent Person, Appellant, v. BLUE BAR TAXICAB & TRANSFER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee

Civil No. 2306

Supreme Court of Arizona

June 27, 1925

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Pima. S. L. Pattee, Judge. Affirmed.

Messrs Richey & Richey, Mr. Kirke T. Moore and Mr. Elwood B Frawley, for Appellant.

Mr. R E. Sloan, Mr. C. R. Holton, and Mr. Greig Scott, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, J.

In November, 1920, Alice E. Hudspeth, as guardian of her husband, W. C. Hudspeth, an incompetent person, filed suit in the superior court of Pima county for damages for injuries sustained by her ward, while a passenger in one of appellee's taxicabs. She recovered judgment in that court, and defendant appealed. The case was reversed here in Blue Bar Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Hudspeth, 25 Ariz. 287, 216 P. 246, and the case remanded to the trial court, but no specific direction was given as to what action it should take after the remand.

In January, 1924, the defendant company moved for judgment in its favor in the trial court on the opinion of this court, which motion was duly granted, and, from this latter judgment this appeal has been taken.

It is, of course, apparent that we may not in this particular proceeding consider the merits of the original case, or reconsider our former decision. The law laid down therein was binding on the trial judge, and it was his duty to take such proceedings as were in accordance with that opinion. The decision turned wholly on whether or not plaintiff's incompetent knew the driver of the taxicab had no authority to go out of the city with the car. If he did, under the law as we therein determined it, defendant could in no way be liable; if he did not, there was a case for the jury.

We held there was reversible error in letting the fact that defendant carried some form of liability insurance become known to the jury, and that such error would require a new trial, and also that a certain instruction refused by the court should have been given. Had these been the only matters determined by the opinion, the trial court should, and doubtless would, have granted a new trial, but in addition to this, after stating that defendant was not liable for the acts of the driver outside the scope of his employment, if Hudspeth knew he was acting...