Huelsman v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue
Decision Date | 04 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 80,545,80,545 |
Citation | 267 Kan. 456,980 P.2d 1022 |
Parties | Darin Lee HUELSMAN, Appellee, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under Kansas law, collateral estoppel may be invoked where the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity, and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.
2. While reasonable grounds is synonymous in meaning with probable cause, one may have reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating a vehicle under the influence but not have the probable cause required to arrest under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1001(b)(1). An arresting officer may formulate reasonable grounds sufficient to request a test under the statute before or after arrest and, under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1001(b)(2), without any arrest whatsoever.
James G. Keller, of the Kansas Department of Revenue, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Wm. Rex Lorson, of Salina, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This is an appeal by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) from the Saline County District Court's ruling that collateral estoppel barred the KDR from suspending Darin Lee Huelsman's driver's license under the Kansas Implied Consent Law.
Huelsman was arrested in Salina, Kansas, and charged in Salina Municipal Court with operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater or, in the alternative, with operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. When arrested, Huelsman failed a breath test, which was certified to the KDR pursuant to K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1002.
On February 20, 1997, the administrative hearing officer determined that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Huelsman had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and properly requested that Huelsman submit to an evidentiary breath test. The hearing officer entered an order suspending Huelsman's driving privileges for 1 year pursuant to K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1014(b)(2).
On February 28, 1997, the Salina Municipal Court suppressed the evidence because Huelsman was arrested without probable cause. That same day, Huelsman filed a petition for review that is the subject of this appeal. The petition for review was subsequently amended to claim collateral estoppel as a result of the Salina Municipal Court's holding that Huelsman was arrested without probable cause. Then, on March 25, 1997, the Salina Municipal Court, at the request of the City of Salina, entered an order dismissing the criminal charge without prejudice.
At no time while the criminal matter was pending before the Salina Municipal Court did the city prosecutor for the City of Salina contact the KDR and its attorneys regarding the case. The KDR and its attorneys were provided no notice of any of the proceedings in the criminal matter, including the motion to suppress. The city prosecutor did not inform or consult with the KDR or its attorneys regarding the outcome of the suppression hearing or the decision not to appeal the order issued by the Salina Municipal Court. The city prosecutor was not aware of the existence of an appeal by Huelsman from the administrative hearing order.
The district court determined that the City of Salina, in the criminal DUI case, and the KDR, in the appeal from the administrative hearing, were in privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel. The district court further determined that collateral estoppel should be applied to prevent redetermination of the reasonable grounds issue in the appeal from the administrative hearing, based upon the Salina Municipal Court's determination of the probable cause issue in the criminal matter. KDR appealed.
K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1001 is the implied consent law. K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1001(a) provides in pertinent part:
"Any person who operates or attempts to operate a vehicle within this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to submit to one or more tests of the person's blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs."
K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-1001(b) contains the "reasonable grounds" language and states:
"A law enforcement officer shall request a person to submit to a test or tests deemed consented to under subsection (a) if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, ... and one of the following conditions exists: (1) The person has been arrested or otherwise taken into custody for any offense involving operation or attempted operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both...."
Collateral Estoppel
In Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority, 242 Kan. 683, 690, 751 P.2d 122 (1988), the court stated:
Whether a party is in privity with another for purposes of collateral estoppel is a policy decision.
In its memorandum decision, the district court ruled that "reasonable grounds" in K.S.A 8-1001 et seq. has been equated with probable cause. The district court reasoned that in order to sustain the administrative finding that Huelsman's driver's license should be suspended, it must be shown that the arresting officer had probable cause to conclude that Huelsman was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The district court found that The district court further ruled:
The district court further reasoned:
We believe the trial court was wrong because of the privity issue and also because the disparity between the quality and extensiveness of the criminal and administrative procedures justifies an exception to the rule of collateral estoppel.
The term "arms of the same governmental body" first appears in Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 85, 434 P.2d 858 (1967), and was used to describe two arms of Leavenworth County--the sheriff and the county treasurer.
In State v. Parson, 15 Kan.App.2d 374, 808 P.2d 444 (1991), defendant Richard Parsons was convicted in a state court for operating an unregistered vehicle. Parson's employer had previously obtained a judgment in a declaratory judgment action against the Kansas Motor Vehicle Department that the vehicle was not required to be registered. The Court of Appeals' panel held the State, as a prosecutor, and the Kansas Motor Vehicle Department were both arms of the same government--the State--and, thus, in privity under Pierce.
The Court...
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Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 94,033.
... ... The panel focused on the fundamental differences between such an administrative proceeding and a criminal prosecution, noting in particular that the purpose of the former is remedial and the latter, punishment. 36 Kan.App.2d at 564-65, 142 P.3d 735 (citing Huelsman v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 267 Kan. 456, 457, 980 P.2d 1022 [1999]; Meehan v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 25 Kan.App.2d 183, 188, 959 P.2d 940, rev. denied 265 Kan. 885 [1998] ) ... The panel then turned to the language of K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2), evaluating it "[a]gainst this ... ...
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State v. Lemmer, A05-2481.
... ... But we do not believe that alone is determinative. See Huelsman v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 267 Kan. 456, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1999) ... ...
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State v. Smith, No. 118,042
... 462 P.3d 1217 (Table) STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Shawn D. SMITH, Appellant. No. 118,042 Court of Appeals of ... See Huelsman v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 267 Kan. 456, 464, 980 P.2d 1022 (1999) ... ...
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Bruch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 95,029.
... ... 1995 Supp. 8-1001(b)(1). An arresting officer may formulate reasonable grounds sufficient to request a test under the statute before or after arrest and, under K.S.A.1995 Supp. 8-1001(b)(2), without any arrest whatsoever.'" Huelsman v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 267 Kan. 456, 461, 980 P.2d 1022 (1999) (quoting State v. Counseller, 22 Kan.App.2d 155, 158-59, 912 P.2d 757, rev. denied 260 Kan. 997 [1996]) ... It is clear in this case that the PBT is relevant to whether an officer had reasonable grounds or ... ...
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Court Summaries
...to prevent the administrative hearing when irregularities occur in the criminal case. For example: * Huelsman v. Kansas Dep't Revenue, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025-27 (Kan. 1999), is a case where the evidence was suppressed for the DUI for lack of probable cause for stop, but that did not collateral......