Huestis v. Aetna Life Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 24 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,505 - (150) |
| Citation | 155 N.W. 643,131 Minn. 461 |
| Parties | SADIE HUESTIS v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Otter Tail county to recover $5,400 upon defendant's policy of accident insurance. The answer among other matters alleged that the insured had not paid any premiums since April 1, 1913; that he came to his death by wilful and voluntary self-inflicted injuries and that his death was due to wilful and voluntary suicide which was not covered by the policy and specifically exempted from in the provisions thereof. The case was tried before Roesser, J who at the close of the testimony denied defendant's motion for a dismissal of the action, and a jury which returned a verdict for the amount demanded. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Insurance -- death from accidental means -- evidence.
1. The evidence sustains the verdict to the effect that an accident insurance policy was in force, when the insured died, and that his death was through accidental means.
Admission of evidence.
2. No rulings upon the reception of evidence reveal prejudicial error.
Anton B. Thompson and James A. Brown, for appellant.
N. F Field and M. J. Daly, for respondent.
The action is upon an accident insurance policy, renewable from time to time upon payment of a stipulated quarterly premium. The defense was that, for nonpayment of the premium, the policy was not in force when the insured was killed, and that the insured did not die an accidental death, but committed suicide, which is not covered by the policy. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.
Hilton & Thompson were defendant's agents at Fergus Falls. Quarterly, and a week or ten days before the date on which any accident policy would expire unless a renewal premium was paid, defendant would forward to Hilton & Thompson a receipt for such premium, signed by its president, to be countersigned by the agents and delivered to the policyholder when paid. Hilton & Thompson would at once countersign and mail the receipts, before the premium came due, to those policyholders whom they trusted. Afterwards they would collect. The agents accounted to defendant every month by forwarding the cash for the amount represented by the receipts sent them by the company and which they had countersigned and delivered to the policyholders. Those not countersigned and delivered -- that is not collected -- were returned. In this particular instance Hilton & Thompson had remitted for all the premiums due upon the policy so that it was in force, and had delivered to the insured the receipts, properly countersigned by them. However, the insured had not paid Hilton & Thompson for the last four quarterly premiums remitted to defendant. In other words, the agents had advanced and paid to defendant, out of their own funds, the renewal premiums on this policy and had charged the amounts thereof on their books to the insured. The defendant had received and accepted the stipulated premiums. Where the money came from is no concern of defendant. No question of waiver by agent is involved. The defendant received the premium in proper time. We think a bare statement of the undisputed facts leads to but one conclusion, namely, the policy was in force when the accident befell the insured. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Willey, 80 F. 497, 25 C.C.A. 593. An attempt is made in the brief to challenge the court's instruction upon this subject; but no exception was taken to the charge when given, and no error was assigned thereon in the motion for a new trial, nor in this court. We therefore cannot consider the matter. We may say the instruction accorded with the opinion in the case above cited.
The insured, Mr. Huestis, was killed by the discharge of a shotgun. The court instructed, in conformity to the terms of the policy, that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove that death was accidental, and also that it was not incumbent on defendant to establish that Huestis committed suicide. The charge was acceptable to both parties and was in line with these cases cited by defendant: Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 149 N.Y. 45, 43 N.E. 405; Laessig v Travelers' Protective Assn. 169 Mo. 272, 69 S.W. 469; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Weise, 182 Ill. 496, 55 N.E. 540. The policy insured Huestis "against liability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, suicide (sane or insane) not included." The charge being correct, we can only inquire whether the proof fairly supports the verdict to the effect that the death of the insured was accidental. The defendant contends that not only has plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof, but that the insured appears conclusively a suicide. In this we think...
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