Huff v. CBS Quality Cars, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. COA12–1134.,COA12–1134. |
| Citation | 745 S.E.2d 374 |
| Parties | Horace Spencer HUFF, Plaintiff, v. CBS QUALITY CARS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 26 August 2011 and order entered 17 April 2012 by Judge Michael R. Morgan in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2013.
The Law Offices of Martin J. Horn, PLLC, by Martin J. Horn, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bachman & Swanson, PLLC, by Glen D. Bachman and Tonja R. Mettlach, for defendant-appellee.
Where the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to allow appellate review, where the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's request to admit a document at trial, and where the challenged conclusion of law is fully supported by unchallenged findings of fact, we affirm in part the judgment of the trial court. However, where the record does not contain a statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees, we vacate the order awarding attorney's fees.
On 3 September 2008, plaintiff Horace Spencer Huff and his wife, Debra Huff, purchased a 2004 Chrysler Pacifica (“the vehicle”) from defendant CBS Quality Cars, Inc. Plaintiff's name, as well as his wife's name, was listed and signed on the bill of sale for the vehicle as purchasers. The bill of sale contained the following language: “Dealer shall not be obligated to sell until approval of the terms hereof is given by a bank or finance company willing to purchase retail installment contract between the parties hereto based on such terms.” The loan paperwork authorizing the purchase of the vehicle was handled by defendant's business Finance Manager and was approved by the finance company, Coastal Federal Credit Union (“CFCU”), on 3 September 2008. Plaintiff and his wife took possession of the vehicle that same day.
CFCU purchased the Retail Installment Contract between plaintiff and his wife, as buyer and co-buyer respectively, and defendant as creditor-seller, for the purchase of the vehicle. The Retail Installment Sale Contract contained the following language:
You, the Buyer (and Co–Buyer, if any) may buy the vehicle below [used 2004 Chrysler Pacifica] for cash or credit. By signing this contract, you choose to buy the vehicle on credit under the agreements on the front and back of this contract. You agree to pay the Creditor–Seller [defendant] ... the Amount Financed and Finance Charge in U.S. funds according to the payment schedule below ... The Truth–in–Lending Disclosures below are part of this contract.
CFCU disbursed funds to plaintiff, in his name only, on 1 October 2008 in the amount of $15,546.00 for the purchase of the vehicle. Plaintiff as “Buyer” and his wife as “Co–Buyer” were to make 72 monthly payments of $354.56 beginning October 3, 2008 with $15,546.00 being the amount financed, $9,982.32 being the finance charge, and $27,028.32 representing the total cost of the purchase of the vehicle on credit. Plaintiff stopped making payments on the vehicle after 1 May 2009. On 14 September 2009, the vehicle was repossessed by defendant.
On 10 August 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for breach of contract, forgery of plaintiff's signature, and negligence. Plaintiff alleged that on 3 September 2008, defendant sent documents to CFCU without permission from either plaintiff or plaintiff's wife and without plaintiff's valid signature.
On 20 October 2011, defendant filed an Answer and Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following a bench trial held on 27 June 2011, the trial court entered judgment on 26 August 2011 in favor of defendant. The trial court concluded that regardless of whether plaintiff signed the paperwork associated with the purchase of the vehicle, plaintiff accepted the loan, took possession of the vehicle, made payments on the vehicle, and either drove the vehicle or allowed it to be driven for approximately 20,588 miles before it was repossessed.
9. Regardless of whether or not Plaintiff himself signed the Retail Installment Sale Contract, the loan paperwork associated with the vehicle transaction, or any other pertinent vehicle transaction paperwork regarding the purchase of the 2004 Chrysler Pacifica by Plaintiff and his wife, Plaintiff adopted and recognized the signatures as his own and ratified the terms of the aforementioned documents by (1) accepting the loan funds which allowed and enabled Plaintiff and his wife to purchase the vehicle from Defendant business, (2) taking possession of the vehicle upon Defendant business's fulfillment of its obligations pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract (3) initially fulfilling the obligation pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract to make monthly payments for the [vehicle] in compliance with the contract's payment schedule, and (4) operating, and/or allowing the operation of, the [vehicle] for a total of 20,588 miles between the date of taking possession of the vehicle as Buyer and the September 14, 2009 vehicle repossession date.
10. Plaintiff accepted the benefits of the valid contract into which he and his wife entered with Defendant business, but did not perform the obligations of the burdens of the contract.
11. Since Plaintiff has not fulfilled his obligations of the contract into which he and his wife entered with Defendant business for the purchase of a used, silver ... vehicle, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover or receive any monies from Defendant business.
Costs were assessed to plaintiff, and defendant was awarded reasonable attorney's fees.
On 7 September 2011, plaintiff filed post-trial motions, moving the court for reconsideration of the 26 August 2011 judgment pursuant to Rules 60, 49, and 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On 23 September 2011, defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs in the following amounts: $500.00 for reimbursement of mediation fees; and $7,375.00 for reasonable attorney's fees.
On 17 April 2012, the trial court ordered that plaintiff pay attorney's fees and costs in the amounts requested by defendant and denied plaintiff's post-trial motions. Plaintiff appeals.
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Plaintiff raises the following issues on appeal: whether the trial court erred by: (I) failing to make additional findings of fact; (II) refusing to admit plaintiff's exhibit number seven; (III) entering conclusion of law number six; and (IV) awarding defendant attorney's fees.
It is well settled that
[o]n appeal from a bench trial, our standard of review is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment. Findings of fact are binding on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is evidence to the contrary.
J.M. Parker & Sons, Inc. v. William Barber, Inc., 208 N.C.App. 682, 685, 704 S.E.2d 64, 66 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support the 26 August 2011 judgment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have made additional findings of fact, as requested in his post-trial motions.
In his 6 September 2011 post-trial motions made pursuant to Rule 60, 49, and/or 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff requested that the trial court make the following additional findings:
1. That the Court make a Finding of Fact as to when the Plaintiff first became aware that the loan documents were allegedly signed in his individual name;
2. That the Court revisit its Finding of Fact Number 31 and find as a fact that the signature on the submitted paperwork (the financing paperwork given to [CFCU] ) contained signatures that purported to be the Plaintiff's, but were not in fact the Plaintiff's;
3. The Court enter a Finding of Fact that the paperwork with the alleged signature of the Plaintiff was in the sole and exclusive possession of the Defendant[ ] prior to its submission to the [CFCU];
4. That the paperwork with the alleged signature of the Plaintiff was the sole and only reason the financing was approved by the finance company, [CFCU] [.]
Plaintiff argues that without these additional findings of fact, the trial court's findings “are inadequate to decipher the court[']s rationale.” We disagree.
We are reminded that our review is limited to whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. J.M. Parker & Sons, 208 N.C.App. at 685, 704 S.E.2d at 66. Morris v. Y. & B. Corp., 198 N.C. 705, 716, 153 S.E. 327, 333 (1930) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant and concluded, in pertinent part, that:
9. Regardless of whether or not Plaintiff himself signed the Retail Installment Sale Contract, the loan paperwork associated with the vehicle transaction, or any other pertinent vehicle transaction paperwork regarding the purchase of the [vehicle] by Plaintiff and his wife, Plaintiff adopted and recognized the signature as his own and ratified the terms of the aforementioned documents by (1) accepting the loan funds which allowed and enabled Plaintiff and his wife to purchase the vehicle from Defendant business, (2) taking possession of the vehicle upon Defendant business's fulfillment of its obligations pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract, (3) initially fulfilling the obligation pursuant to the Retail Installment Sale Contract to make monthly payments for the [vehicle] in compliance with the contract's payment schedule, and (4) operating, and/or allowing...
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