Huff v. State
Decision Date | 13 December 1999 |
Citation | 992 P.2d 1071 |
Parties | Mike HUFF, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appeellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.
Appellant Mike Huff appeals from his convictions for one count of defrauding an innkeeper and three counts of check fraud.
We affirm.
Huff presents several issues on appeal:
Huff rented a room at the Buffalo Motel for three weeks during September of 1997. The owner of the motel charged Huff $200 for the first week, and Huff wrote a check to the motel to pay for his accommodations. The check was returned to the motel because there were insufficient funds in Huff's checking account to pay it. The motel owner informed Huff that the check had been returned, and Huff gave her another check for $200. The motel owner called Huff's bank to verify that the second check would clear, and the bank informed her that his account did not contain sufficient funds to pay the check. Consequently, the motel owner did not deposit the check. She moved Huff to a different room and charged him $150 dollars for each of the remaining two weeks. Huff subsequently wrote a check to the Buffalo Motel for $500 to cover his entire stay at the motel. He post-dated the check for October 3, 1997.
Huff also issued checks to The Eyewear Gallery and the Donut Shop in Buffalo, and those checks were returned because there were insufficient funds in his account to pay them. On October 2, 1997, Huff was served with a notice of dishonor in which the county attorney demanded that he pay the first $200 Buffalo Motel check within five days. Huff did not make the payment, and, on October 3, 1997, he stopped payment on the $500 check that he had given to the Buffalo Motel. Huff was served with notices of dishonor concerning the $500 check to the Buffalo Motel and the checks to The Eyewear Gallery and the Donut Shop. He did not, however, pay the checks.
Huff was charged with three counts of misdemeanor check fraud and with one count of felony defrauding an innkeeper. A jury found him guilty of all four counts. He appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Huff asserts that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in Instruction No. 6 and Instruction No. 8A. The state argues that the instructions were correct. We agree with the state.
The trial court has wide latitude in instructing the jury. Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 674 (Wyo.1999). Reversible error will not be found "as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge to the jury adequately covers the issues." Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo.1995). The trial court's instructions to the jury should inform it about the applicable law so that it may apply the law to its findings of material facts. Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo.1998).
Huff was convicted of three counts of check fraud under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-702 (LEXIS 1999). That statute provides in relevant part: "(a) Any person who knowingly issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check." Section 6-3-702(a). "Knowingly issues" is defined as "issuing a check to obtain property or to pay a debt with intent to defraud or deceive any other person." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-701(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999).
The trial court gave Instruction No. 6 to the jury as part of its charge concerning the check fraud crimes. That instruction quoted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-703(a) (LEXIS 1999) in part as follows:
Instruction No. 6 (quoting § 6-3-703(a)). The words which the trial court redacted were "prima facie." The trial court remarked that it did not include the "prima facie" language in the instruction because it was a legal term of art and would be difficult to define. Huff argues that Instruction No. 6 contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption which required the jury to find that the intent element of the crimes was satisfied once the predicate facts that Huff did not have sufficient funds in his account and that he failed to pay the checks within five days after receiving notices of dishonor were proven.
Inferences and presumptions are commonly used in our adversary system of fact finding. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). Generally, there are two types of inferences or presumptions: permissive and mandatory. 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213; Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 754 (Wyo.1987). A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the fact finder "to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and ... places no burden of any kind on the defendant." 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213; see also Harley, 737 P.2d at 754
. A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, informs the trier of fact that it "must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact." Id.
It is appropriate to include a permissive inference in an instruction so long as "the inference to be drawn from the predicate facts is a rational one." Harley, 737 P.2d at 755; see also County Court of Ulster County, New York, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213. The United States Supreme Court and this Court have determined, however, that it is unconstitutional to incorporate mandatory presumptions into instructions in criminal cases. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)
; Harley, 737 P.2d 750. A criminal defendant's right to due process of law is violated when the jury is instructed with a mandatory presumption because a mandatory presumption has "`the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime.'" Harley, 737 P.2d at 754 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 312, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)).
In analyzing the propriety of Instruction No. 6, we must first determine whether the instruction incorporated a mandatory presumption or a permissive inference. Id. In determining the nature of the presumption, we consider how the instruction would be understood by a reasonable juror. Id. The verb used in the instruction is important in determining the nature of the presumption. 737 P.2d at 755. For example, the verb "may" connotes a permissive inference while the verb "shall" suggests a mandatory presumption. Id. In Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 668-70 (6th Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals reviewed the appellant's conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court in that case instructed the jury that the statutory presumptions concerning blood alcohol levels were evidence to be considered in the case. 958 F.2d at 664-65. In determining whether the instruction was constitutional, the court of appeals noted that the instruction was couched in mandatory language. 958 F.2d at 668. The court of appeals emphasized, however, that the jury was simply directed to treat the presumptions as evidence in the case; the jury was not told that the evidence established an element of the crime. Id. The court of appeals ruled, therefore, that, because the jury was aware that it was the sole judge of the weight of the evidence, the instruction contained a permissive inference rather than a mandatory presumption. Id.; see also United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1573-74 (11th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017, 113 S.Ct. 1813, 123 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993).
Returning to the facts of the case at bar, we note that Instruction No. 6 directed the jury to consider proof that Huff did not have sufficient funds in his account and that he failed to pay the checks after notices of dishonor as evidence of his criminal intent. Although Instruction No. 6 was framed in mandatory language, the trial court did not direct the jury that it must consider the intent element of the crimes as having been established once the predicate facts were...
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