Huff v. State Election Bd.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1934
• Docket Number: 25524.
• Citation: 32 P.2d 920,168 Okla. 277,93 A.L.R. 906,1934 OK 307
• Parties: HUFF v. STATE ELECTION BOARD.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

32 P.2d 920

168 Okla. 277, 93 A.L.R. 906, 1934 OK 307

HUFF v. STATE ELECTION BOARD.

No. 25524.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

May 18, 1934

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A person may, at common law, change his or her name in good faith and for an honest purpose, by adopting a new name and transacting his or her business and holding himself or herself out under the new name, with the acquiescence and recognition of his or her friends and acquaintances, and this right is not abrogated by the Constitution or any statute of this state.

2. The record in this case shows that in 1913 the petitioner was married to I. L. Huff, and that at that time she adopted the name of "Mrs. I. L. Huff," and ever since said date she has in good faith and for an honest purpose transacted her private and official business and held herself out under the new name with the acquiescence and recognition of her friends and acquaintances and the public officers appointing and commissioning her to public office. Held, that under the circumstances she has the lawful right to have her name printed on the official primary ballot as "Mrs. I L. Huff."

Original mandamus proceeding by Mrs. I. L. Huff against the State Election Board, composed of J. William Cordell and others, to compel respondents to cause the name of petitioner to be printed on the official primary ballot as "Mrs. I. L Huff."

Writ granted.

Mrs. I L. Huff, pro se.

J. Berry King, Atty. Gen., and Randell S. Cobb, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

SWINDALL Justice.

Mandamus. The petitioner, Mrs. I. L. Huff, commenced this action against the state election board to determine her right to have her name placed upon the official primary election ballot as "Mrs. I. L. Huff," as a candidate for the office of commissioner of charities and corrections. Petitioner filed her notification and declaration in form as provided in section 1, c. 62, Sess. Laws 1933. There is a clause in that instrument reading as follows:

"For the purpose of having my name placed on the official primary election ballot as a candidate for nomination by the ............ (name of party) Party, I, ............ (name in full as desired on the ballot) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I reside at No. ...... Street, in the City of ............, State of Oklahoma, and that I am a registered ............ (party) voter in ............ precinct, City of ............. * * *"

Petitioner filled in the blank spaces giving her name as she desired it printed on the primary ballot as "Mrs. I. L. Huff," and gave her correct street and city address and registration as a member of the Democratic party and the number of the precinct where registered. Her constitutional qualification as an elector and eligibility to hold the office she seeks is admitted. She is registered under section 5655, O. S. 1931, in the name of "Mrs. I. L. Huff."

The state election board advised petitioner she would not be permitted to have her name placed upon the official primary election ballot as desired, but must become a candidate for said office as "I. L. Huff," or under one or more of her Christian names and the surname of "Huff," "I. L." being the initials of her husband. Petitioner contends that to refuse her request to have her name placed upon the primary ballot as "Mrs. I. L. Huff" will deprive her of the right to become a candidate in the name she adopted at the date of her marriage to I. L. Huff in 1913, and which she has ever since that date continuously for many years in good faith and for an honest purpose transacted her business and held herself out to her friends and acquaintances, with their acquiescence and recognition, and that she has held commissions from three Governors and transacted public business under the name of "Mrs. I. L. Huff," for the reason she is commonly known and identified by that name and has therefore lost her identity by her maiden Christian name. That statement of petitioner is admitted by the respondents. It is also admitted that no other candidate has challenged the right of petitioner to become a candidate under the name desired to be used by her. And admitted that the name was adopted by petitioner in good faith and without any intent to deceive or defraud the public or any third party. It is the contention of the respondents that "Mrs." is not a part of the full name of petitioner as contemplated by the Legislature in enacting chapter 62, supra, and for that reason only the state election board refused to place the name of petitioner on the official primary election ballot as "Mrs. I. L. Huff," and she has commenced this action to compel it to do so.

The sole issue for us to determine is the right of petitioner to have her name printed on the ballot as "Mrs. I. L. Huff" or must she comply with the demand of the respondents and have her name printed thereon as "I. L. Huff" or give one or more of her Christian names and not use "Mrs." as a part of her name. The clause of section 1, quoted herein, provides that the candidate shall insert his or her name after the capital letter "I, ............ (name in full as desired on the ballot.)" The information required to be disclosed by the candidate as to full name, residence, and registration was evidently required to be furnished so a proper investigation might be made by the election board or a candidate that might desire to challenge the filing of some other candidate for the same office within the time and manner provided by law.

This court in the case of Roberts v. Mosier et al., 35 Okl. 691, 132 P. 678, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 423, held that:

"Although the custom is universal for all male persons to bear the name of their parents, there is nothing in the law prohibiting a man from taking another name, if he so desires; nor is there any penalty or punishment for so doing."

In that case it was contended by the plaintiff in error, who held a second mortgage, that hers should be declared prior to that of defendant in error, Jacob Mosier, alias Fred Mosier, on the ground that the same was taken in favor of Fred Mosier in fraud of the revenue laws of the state, for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes justly due this state. It was the contention of Mosier that the mortgage held at that time was taken in his name, to wit, Fred Mosier, he at that time adopting the name of Fred Mosier for the purpose of transacting his business. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and a general finding made in favor of Mosier, obviously upon his theory and contention, and it was sustained by this court on appeal. In that opinion this court quoted at length from In re John Snook, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 566, which gives a very complete discussion of the origin and use of given and surnames. At page 575 of 2 Hilt. of that case we find the following language: "All that the law looks to is the identity of the individual, and when that is clearly established the act will be binding upon him and upon others."

The Snook Case is again mentioned by this court in the case of Bacon v. Dawson et al., 53 Okl. 689, 157 P. 1033, involving the sale of certain land of Henryetta Downing, a minor ten years of age, by her guardian. The petition to sell real estate by the guardian is entitled, "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Peggie Sanders, Minor," and commences with the following recital: "Comes now Joe Wolfe, the guardian of Peggie Sanders, * * * minor, and shows to the court," etc. From that time throughout the proceedings in the county court, including the issuance of the guardian's deed, whenever the name of the minor appears she is designated as "Peggie Sanders." In an action commenced in the name of "Peggie Bacon" for the purpose of canceling the guardian's deed, on account of the foregoing discrepancies, the trial court permitted the introduction of parol evidence which conclusively showed that Henryetta Downing, Peggie Sanders, and Peggie Bacon were but different names borne by the same person and that the person so variously designated was the same person for whom Wolfe was appointed guardian and was the owner of the land described in the guardian's deed. Held, not error. In the body of the opinion the court said:

"It seems to us, there being no fraud practiced upon the infant, and no irregularity in the guardianship proceeding, other than the one complained of, the

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