Huffaker v. Beers

• Decision Date: 16 May 1910
• Citation: 128 S.W. 1040
• Parties: HUFFAKER et al. v. BEERS et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1040

128 S.W. 1040

HUFFAKER et al. v. BEERS et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 16, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Conway County; Hugh Basham, Judge.

Action by Mattie Huffaker and others against Emma Beers and others to probate a will. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Appellants were proponents of the last will of William Moore. Appellees contested the will upon the sole ground that the testator "did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will at the time he executed the will offered for probate."

The court granted the following prayers of appellants for instructions:

"(1) The contestants admit that the paper read in evidence as the will of William Moore was executed by him as his will; that it is in due form and was properly executed and witnessed, and should be sustained by you, unless the proof shows that at the time of its execution he was mentally incapable of making a valid will.

"(2) The law presumes that William Moore had sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will. And you should sustain the will, unless you find from the evidence that at the time he executed it he was incapable from mental weakness of appreciating and understanding the nature and character of the act.

"(3) One who has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the act has a right to will his property to whom he pleases, With the motives of William Moore, or with the justice or injustice of his acts, you have nothing to do. The sole question for you to determine is whether he had sufficient mental capacity to make a will. And, unless the proof shows that he did not have such capacity, you should sustain the will; the burden of proof being upon the contestants to show that he did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a will.

"(4) Old age, physical infirmities, and even partial eclipse of the mind would not prevent him from making a valid will, if, at the time he signed the will, he knew and understood what he was doing, if he could retain in his memory, without prompting, the nature and extent of his property, and comprehend to whom he was giving it, and be capable of appreciating the deserts and relations to him of those whom he excluded from participating in his estate, he had the capacity to make a will."

And the court also granted the following prayers of appellees:

"(1) Gentlemen of the jury, a paper has been offered for probate in this case which purports to be the last will and testament of William Moore, deceased. It is contended that this will is not valid because Mr. Moore at the time of its execution did not possess sufficient mental capacity to make a will. His mental capacity is a question of fact for you to determine from the evidence in this case." To the giving of which instruction the proponents at the time excepted.

"(2) The law provides that only persons of sound and disposing mind and memory can make a valid will. * * * What is meant by this is not that the testator shall at the time be actually insane. Weakness of intellect whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, from great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined or from other causes, when sufficient in degree may render a person incapable of making a will.

"(3) A person of sound mind within the meaning of the law in this case is one who has a reasonable knowledge of the act he is engaged in, a full knowledge of the property he possesses and its extent, and a reasonable perception and understanding of the disposition he desires to make of it, and of the persons he desires to be the recipients of his bounty, and a capacity to recollect and comprehend the nature of the claims and legal rights in his estate of those who are the natural objects of his bounty, of their relationship to him, and his obligations to them. Unless the testator in this case possessed this capacity, then in law he is not capable of making a will, and you should so find." To the giving of which instruction the proponents at the time excepted.

"(4) You are further instructed that the burden of proof is on the contestants in this case to show by a preponderence of the evidence that at the time of the making of the will the testator was of unsound mind and incapable of making a valid will; a bare preponderance, however, being sufficient." To the giving of which instruction the proponents at the time excepted.

After hearing the evidence and the above instructions, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees. Judgment was entered according to the verdict, and this appeal has been duly prosecuted.

Sellers & Sellers, for appellants. W. P. Strait, for appellees.

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Instruction No. 3, given at the request of appellees, did not give the jury the correct guide for determining testamentary capacity. It made actual knowledge, rather than capacity to know, the test. There is a wide difference between the two, and one necessary to be observed in order to correctly declare the law where testamentary capacity is the issue. A testator might not have "full knowledge of the property he possessed and its extent," and yet, if he has the mental capacity to know about it, his will in the absence of fraud would nevertheless be valid. One might not know...