Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 94-2030-RCN.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-2030-RCN.,94-2030-RCN. |
| Citation | 883 F. Supp. 1469 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | Prudence HUFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. ACE ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Fred Spigarelli, Pamela G. Phalen, Spigarelli, McLane & Short, Pittsburg, KS, for plaintiff Prudence Huffman.
Garry W. Lassman, Wilbert & Towner, P.A., Pittsburg, KS, James Allan Smith, Daniel F. DuPre, Dan T. Carter, Smith, Currie & Hancock, Atlanta, GA, for defendant Ace Elec. Co., Inc.
This retaliatory discharge case was tried to the court on October 3, 1994. Plaintiff presented her evidence and rested. At the close of plaintiffs case, the defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law (doc. 60). The court took the motion under advisement. The defendant presented its evidence and rested. At the close of the defendant's case, defendant renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court took this motion under advisement. The court has now reviewed the law and the evidence and is prepared to rule. This Memorandum and Order shall constitute the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant in its production plant in Columbus, Kansas, on March 17, 1981, and continued her employment until she was terminated on September 18, 1992. Prior to her termination, plaintiff was employed as a parts assembler. There is no dispute but that plaintiff's work for the defendant had, at all times material, been satisfactorily performed. Throughout her employment plaintiff had suffered various work-related injuries and other medical conditions for which she was off work for periods of time. However, until May 23, 1990, plaintiff had not filed a workers compensation claim. Commencing in 1986 or 1987, plaintiff began suffering certain pulmonary problems for which she received medical treatment. She was off work for substantial periods of time, but returned to work in August 1988, after several months of absence. During this period, her leave was considered medical leave unrelated to her employment and she received temporary disability payments under the employer's disability policy at the rate of $125.00 per week.
In November 1989, plaintiff developed a persistent cough. On December 5, 1989, she consulted her personal physician, Rick L. Scacewater, M.D., who advised her not to return to work for approximately two weeks. This leave was further extended and plaintiff returned to work on January 22, 1990, with a release properly executed by her physician. After several days, plaintiff's cough recurred and on January 29, 1990, plaintiff left work and went to the company physician, R.L. Andreasen, M.D., who took her off work. She again saw Dr. Andreasen on February 9, 1990, and repetitively thereafter, who recommended that she remain off work for an indefinite period and that she consult with an industrial specialist. On February 19, 1990, Dr. Andreasen noted that he was then waiting for defendant to notify him as to a lung specialist, after consulting with Gallagher Bassett, the claims adjusting firm who handled defendant's workers compensation claims.
On March 20, 1990, the defendant filed an Employer's Report of Accident with the Workers Compensation Director, noting that Dr. Andreasen, the company physician, had advised plaintiff that her cough might be work related. Plaintiff's medical records were sent to the defendant by Dr. Andreasen on March 22, 1990, with multiple notations that he was waiting on defendant to select a consulting physician. On April 11, 1990, plaintiff was referred by Dr. Andreasen to Dr. Harold W. Barkman, a pulmonary specialist, for consultation. Plaintiff saw Dr. Barkman on April 18, 1990, who opined that plaintiff had a work-related cough. Dr. Barkman recommended that plaintiff not return to the "specific environment" in which she had previously worked, and suggested that she might be moved, administratively, to another area of the plant. His recommendations were communicated to Dr. Andreasen by letter dated April 19, 1990.1
Plaintiff contacted the defendant about returning to work numerous times between February and April 1990. Each time, plaintiff was told that she would be required to produce a physician's release prior to returning to work. In May 1990 plaintiff again contacted the defendant concerning her return to work. She was advised that prior to returning to work she would be required to have a physician's release by the company doctor. Since Dr. Andreasen had left Columbus, Kansas, and was no longer available to handle matters for the defendant, plaintiff was told that it would be necessary for the defendant to contact Gallagher Bassett concerning the assignment of a new physician to examine her, on defendant's behalf Plaintiff was also told that the Gallagher Bassett claims adjuster who had previously handled her claim had left the company and that a new adjuster would be designated. Defendant advised plaintiff that, as a result of these changes, it would be at least 45 to 60 days before a physician could be designated to examine her to determine her ability to return to work. Plaintiff was told that she did not need to contact the defendant again, but that the defendant would contact her when a new physician had been designated.
On May 23, 1990, plaintiff filed a claim for workers compensation which has been contested by defendant and remained unresolved at the time of trial. Plaintiff did not return to work due to the defendant's instructions and the company policy requiring that plaintiff be released to return to work after examination by the company physician. Plaintiff remained off work until her employment was terminated on September 18, 1992.
At all times during plaintiff's employment, the defendant had a written policy related to medical leave which was contained in an employee handbook distributed to employees at the time of their employment. It provided for a maximum allowable medical leave of twelve months. It further provided that the company may require its employees to submit to an examination by a physician other than the one selected by the employee and to submit a written release from a physician before returning to work. Employees returning to work after a six-month absence would be reinstated into any open position for which the employee was qualified. This policy was consistently applied prior to plaintiff's termination as related only to non-work-related injuries or illnesses. Employees who were off work due to work-related injuries or illnesses were not terminated. Rather, when employees had disabilities due to work-related illness or injury, defendant made every effort to accommodate their physical limitations and find suitable work for them within their restrictions. Plaintiff was aware of this policy.
Linda Freeman, the employee-relations manager from 1990 to 1992, testified that it was the company's practice not to terminate employees who were off work on medical leave until it was determined whether their medical condition was work related. So long as the diagnosis was unknown, the employee was retained. Ms. Freeman testified that when she left the company, plaintiff's situation had not been resolved as it was unknown whether plaintiff's condition was caused or aggravated by her work. At that time, the company had no medical evidence that plaintiff's condition was not due to or aggravated by her work. Ms. Freeman further testified that had she confirmed that plaintiff's condition was related to her work, she would have tried to keep plaintiff as an employee. Company policy, generally, prior to plaintiff's termination, was to offer available clerical jobs to production employees before seeking new employees. In the opinion of Ms. Freeman, plaintiff had adequate skills to perform certain of the office jobs which had been available between May 1990 and March 1992 when Ms. Freeman left the company.
There was also evidence that plaintiff's disability could have been accommodated by the use of a mask. This issue was not explored by defendant.
The Echlin Company, defendant's parent company, also had policies and procedures which it distributed to its subsidiaries related to medical leave and long-term absences which were effective after July 1, 1982. Policy No. ERP-22 related to long-term absences provides:
Policy No. ERP-20 related to medical leave provided:
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