Huffman v. City of Columbia

Decision Date24 July 1928
Docket Number12489.
Citation144 S.E. 157,146 S.C. 436
PartiesHUFFMAN et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Original application by C.J. Huffman and others against the City of Columbia and others to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance. Petition dismissed.

Timmerman & Graham, of Lexington, for plaintiffs.

C. S Monteith and I. F. Belser, both of Columbia, for defendants.

WATTS C.J.

This is an application by petitioners to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance passed by the city of Columbia. The return of the city of Columbia sets forth the reason of the passage of the ordinance in question, and contends:

That the ordinance in question "is a valid exercise of the police power vested in the city of Columbia, and is fully justified by the public convenience and necessity. The fundamental basis of the city's exercise of this power is that the use of the streets of the city for the purpose of carrying on the business of operating motor vehicles for hire is a privilege, and not an inherent right of its citizens. This privilege, therefore, if exercised, must be subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by the city."

"The burden of the petition in this case is that the ordinance is unreasonable and confiscatory, because it requires the jitneys to operate on prescribed routes and schedules." So the question to be determined is: Has the city the right to route and schedule all forms of motor vehicle transportation over its streets? We find the following acts of the Legislature:

(a) Act 1871-section 10, from an act to alter and amend the charter of the city of Columbia, approved March 2, 1871:
"Sec. 10. That the mayor may, as often as occasion may require, or whenever requested so to do, in writing, by three aldermen, summon the aldermen to assemble in council; and that the said mayor and aldermen shall have, and they are hereby vested with, full and ample power, from time to time under their common seal, to make all such ordinances, rules and regulations, relative to the streets and markets of the said city, as they may think proper and necessary, and to establish such by-laws, not inconsistent with the laws of the land, as may tend to preserve the quiet, peace, safety and good order of the inhabitants thereof. ***" 14 Stat. p. 572.

(b) Commission Form of Government Act-section 4727, Code 1922:

"(4727) Sec. 9. Powers of Council.-The council shall have, possess and exercise all executive, legislative and judicial powers and duties conferred upon such city, or theretofore belonging to it, with the power to establish such subordinate officers as they may see fit and assign to them appropriate duties, subject to the council. Each member of the council shall give to the duties of his office all the time that may be needed for the most efficient conduct of the affairs of the city." Page 1428.

(c) Acts of 1928, p. 1229:

"An act providing for the control by cities of more than thirty thousand and less than fifty thousand inhabitants of transportation by motor vehicles.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of South Carolina:
Section 1. That the city council of any city which at the last preceding United States census had a population of more than thirty thousand and less than fifty thousand inhabitants shall be and are hereby granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over any and all motor-propelled vehicles (which term shall not include vehicles usually operated upon or over rails) used for the transportation of persons or property for hire on any of the streets of said city (except buses operating on regular schedules and routes between such city and other points not less than ten miles distant therefrom), with full power and authority to make and enforce such rules, regulations and classifications governing the operation of such vehicles as they may deem necessary or desirable; to confine such vehicles, or special classes thereof, to particular streets or routes, and to exclude such vehicles, or special classes thereof, entirely from the streets; to fix the rates, fares and charges of such motor vehicle carriers; and to prescribe the license to be paid to the city by such carriers, and the amount and character of bond which they may be required to give.
Sec. 2. *** That the city council shall have power to enforce the provisions of this act, the powers hereby granted, and such rules and regulations as may be adopted pursuant thereto, by appropriate penalties.
Sec. 3. That all acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Sec. 4. That this act shall become effective immediately upon its approval by the Governor."

We find on this question the following authorities:

Henderson v. City of Bluefield, 98 W.Va. 640, 127 S.E. 492, 42 A. L. R. 279, holding (syllabus):

"A municipal ordinance making it unlawful for drivers or proprietors of taxicabs, motor busses, and jitneys to solicit passengers for hire on the streets of the municipality, to stand or park the same in the city closer than 100 feet of any railroad passenger station or the terminus of any interurban street railway car line, *** should be upheld as having been enacted in the reasonable exercise of the police power of the municipality and its charter authority to pass ordinances for the regulation of automobiles and other vehicles within the municipality promotive of the interest or convenience of the inhabitants thereof.
The validity of the ordinance, sole question for solution, depends upon the enactment of the ordinance as being a reasonable exercise of the police power and charter authority of the city. The proper exercise of the police power permits the municipality, independent of any statutory authority conferred upon it, to regulate the use and enjoyment of the streets in the interest of the public health, general welfare, and convenience of the people. Bluefield v. Public Serv. Commission, 94 W.Va. 334, 118 S.E. 546.
A charter provision empowering municipal corporations to grant, refuse, or revoke license to owners of vehicles kept for hire therein, and to subject them to such regulation as the interest and convenience of the inhabitants thereof, in the opinion of the municipal authorities, may require, delegates to the corporation full legislative power over such vehicles. Ex parte Dickey (Dickey v. Dickey) 76 W.Va. 587, 85 S.E. 781, L. R. A. 1915F, 840, P. U. R. 1915E, 93. ***
An enactment prohibiting any hackman from permitting his horse or vehicle to stand in any public street of a village, or to walk or drive through the streets soliciting patronage, was held valid in the case of People ex rel. Van Norder v. Sewer, Water & Street Commission, 90 A.D. 555, 86 N.Y.S. 445. In
answer to the contention that the law was in conflict with the state Constitution as depriving the relator, a hackman, of property without due process of law, the opinion states:
'It seems to me a complete answer to this contention is that the relator has no legal right to conduct his business in a public street, except he does so under a lawful license authorizing him so to do. The law in question does not prohibit the relator from engaging in the occupation of a hackman, but simply lays down salutary rules, prohibiting his soliciting patronage as such hackman in the public streets.'
In modern times the power to regulate public conveyances for hire, such as hacks, taxicabs, motorbuses, and jitneys, inheres in the Legislatures of the several states, but this power may be, and usually is, delegated by the states to the various municipalities within their borders. The municipalities in pursuance of the authority delegated to them by the states, may, as a valid exercise of the police power, pass ordinances regulating the business of such conveyances. Whether a particular ordinance is reasonable for the purpose for which it is enacted is in the first instance to be determined by the municipal authorities. When they have acted and the ordinance has been passed it is presumptively valid, and, before a court will be justified in holding it invalid, its unreasonableness must be clearly made apparent. While it is true that municipal ordinances, to be valid, must be reasonable, the presumption is in favor of their validity, and it is incumbent upon any one seeking to have them set aside as unreasonable to point out or show affirmatively wherein the unreasonableness consists. Tested by this rule, we are of opinion that the ordinance in question, as a salutary regulation of traffic in the municipality, is reasonable and valid. ***"

98 W.Va. 642, 127 S.E. 492, 42 A. L. R. 280, 281, 282.

Many cases supporting the foregoing decision are likewise abstracted in the note in 42 A. L. R. 282, as follows:

"In holding that a statutory provision making it unlawful for any hackman to 'permit any horse or vehicle to stand in any public street *** for hire, or to walk or drive through the streets soliciting patronage,' did not deprive one of his property without due process of law, it was said in People ex rel. Van Norder v. Sewer, Water & Street Commission (1904) 90 A.D. 555, 86 N.Y.S. 445 that the statute did not prohibit the relator from engaging in the occupation of a hackman, but simply laid down statutory rules prohibiting his soliciting patronage as such hackman in the public streets, the court approving the forfeiture of a license where it violated an express condition embodying the language quoted.
An ordinance which imposed an additional license fee upon jitneys and similar vehicles for hire, as a condition to their being permitted to solicit or receive passengers in certain designated streets in which trolley cars were operated, was declared by the court to be practically prohibitive as to these streets in Desser v. Wichita (1915)
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6 cases
  • City of Columbia v. Tatum
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 1 Diciembre 1934
    ... ... the streets and markets of said city, as they may think ... proper and necessary. * * *" The Legislature has since ... continued and enlarged this power. It has been consistently ... recognized by all courts. The Supreme Court has affirmed it ... as recently as Huffman v. City of Columbia, 146 S.C ... 436, 144 S.E. 157 ...           [174 ... S.C. 376] No question arises here as to whether the city ... could remove the tracks in violation of a franchise contract ... right in the utility to continue its tracks and operate its ... cars along Harden ... ...
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    ...and made an oral and written argument (27 pages) in the case. The Court thereafter on July 24, 1928, handed down its decision (146 S.C. 436, 144 S.E. 157), sustaining ordinance. As a result of this decision, the right of the city to regulate the jitneys and all forms of motor vehicle transp......
  • Owens v. Owens
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 1 Abril 1940
    ... ... 260 OWENS v. OWENS, Mayor, et al. MAXWELL & QUINN REALTY CO., Inc., v. CITY OF COLUMBIA. No. 14050.Supreme Court of South CarolinaApril 1, 1940 [8 S.E.2d 340] ... the streets, such as the conduct of private business thereon ... Huffman v. City of Columbia, 146 S.C. 436, 144 S.E ... 157; Spencer v. Mahon, 75 S.C. 232, 55 S.E. 321 ... ...
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