Huffman v. Huffman
| Decision Date | 22 February 2000 |
| Citation | 11 S.W.3d 882 |
| Parties | (Mo.App W.D. 2000) . Michael Richard Huffman, Respondent, v. Irma Q. Huffman, Appellant. WD56858 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Henry County, Hon. Raymont T. Huesemann
Counsel for Appellant: Michael X. Edgett
Counsel for Respondent: George R. Lilleston
Opinion Summary:
Irma Huffman appeals a judgment modifying child custody, visitation, and support.
REVERSED.
Court holds:
The trial court's decision to modify the child custody arrangement was not supported by substantial evidence. For modification of a child custody decree, section 452.410 requires a change in circumstances of the custodial parent or the child and serves the best interests of the child. A child's age and desire to spend more time with one parent are not sufficient reasons to change a prior custodial arrangement. Additionally, a custodial parent's interference with visitation is a relevant factor, but not a conclusive factor in a decision to modify child custody.
The trial court is ordered to reinstate the previous custodial arrangement, and to hold a hearing on the issues of visitation and child support.
Irma Q. Huffman (appellant) appeals from the Henry County Circuit Court's judgment dated January 13, 1999, which modified a prior dissolution decree regarding child custody, visitation and child support. The judgment changed the custody arrangement from being one of joint legal custody with appellant as the primary physical custodian of the three children to one of joint legal and physical custody between appellant and Michael Richard Huffman (respondent). On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that a substantial and continuing change in circumstances existed to justify modification of the previous order as it relates to the custodial arrangement and financial support of the children.
At the time of dissolution, appellant and respondent had three minor children: Joshua Huffman, born on May 12, 1983; James Huffman, born on September 17, 1985; and Jason Huffman, born on September 14, 1987. On October 2, 1991, the Circuit Court of Henry County issued a Judgment of Dissolution pursuant to the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties. The judgment provided that the parties would have joint legal custody, with appellant having actual physical custody of the three children. The judgment also provided for "reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable times including the Husband having visitation each week to commence on Thursday at 6:00 p.m. and end Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. and one weekend to begin on Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. and end on Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m." In addition, respondent was granted visitation on some major holidays, Father's Day, sharing the children's birthdays and for two separate two-week periods during the summer months. Respondent also received one week to take the children to their paternal grandparents. Under the judgment's child support provisions, respondent was obligated to pay $233.33 per month for each child to appellant for child support, and maintain health insurance for their three children.
On April 24, 1998, appellant filed a motion to modify the October 2, 1991 judgment. In her motion, appellant alleged that there had been substantial and continuing changes in the parties' circumstances with regard to the support provisions, and she made various allegations to justify an increase in child support. On June 16, 1998, respondent filed an answer and cross-motion to modify the original judgment of dissolution. In his cross-motion, respondent alleged that there had been a "substantial and continuing change in circumstances since the Judgment Entry of October 2, 1991 was entered so as to make the terms thereof relating to child custody, visitation and child support unreasonable." In support of this contention, respondent asserted, among other things, the following:
(a) That since the date of the Judgment Entry of October 2, 1991, the minor children have aged nearly seven (7) years and desire to spend more time with their natural father and to fish, camp, canoe, bike ride and engage in other activities with their father;
(b) That [respondent] has remarried and has a nurturing, loving, caring and supportive environment in which to raise the children;
(c) That [appellant] has repeatedly failed to cooperate with [respondent] pertaining to matters affecting the minor children, including decision making and allowing an equal voice on all material issues regarding the children's health, education and welfare;
(d) That [appellant] has repeatedly interfered with [respondent's] visitation with the minor children, and has attempted to manipulate and has manipulated matters so as to reduce the time that [respondent] has been able to spend with the minor children;
(e) That it would be in the best interests of the minor children that their care, custody and control be transferred to the [respondent], subject to [appellant's] right of visitation;
(f) That [respondent] will, unlike [appellant], afford frequent and meaningful contact between the children and [appellant]
On November 12, 1998, a hearing on the matter was conducted before the Circuit Court of Henry County, the Honorable Raymond T. Huesemann, presiding. At trial, it was adduced that: (1) appellant worked for the same employer as she did at the time of dissolution, although her work hours had increased; (2) the children lived with appellant in the same home that they did at the time of dissolution; and (3) the children had the same doctor and dentist that they did at dissolution. However, on January 13, 1999, the circuit court entered a judgment giving the parties joint legal and physical custody of the children. In the custody arrangement, appellant and respondent alternate custody with the children every seven days. In the only language concerning the court's reasons for modifying its prior judgment, this judgment stated:
The Court finds there has been a substantial and continuing change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of the Court's prior order regarding child custody, visitation and support in that the children are older and desire to spend more time with their father. The Court finds it is in the children's best interest that they do so.
The trial court's judgment was appealed.
The standard of review of a judgment entered by a trial court sitting without a jury was established in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). We will reverse the court's judgment only if there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or if it erroneously declares or applies the law. Tilley v. Tilley, 968 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998). The trial court's determination is given greater deference in child custody cases than in other cases. Buschardt v. Jones, 998 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). Under Rule 73.01(a)(3), "[a]ll fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found according to the result reached." Tilley, 968 S.W.2d at 211.
In her first point, appellant argues that the trial court erred in modifying the physical custody arrangement provided for by its original judgment in that respondent failed to show any change in the circumstances of her, the custodial parent, or of the children since the time of that original judgment. Furthermore, appellant contends no evidence was presented to show that a change would benefit the welfare of the children. Section 452.410 RSMo 1994 provides in pertinent part, the following:
[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless . . . it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
Thus, a significant change in the circumstances of the children or the custodial parent must occur before a child custody decree may be modified. In re Marriage of Holden, 977 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998). "Once custody has been adjudicated, it should be transferred only where the change of circumstances is such that the welfare of the child requires it." Id. at 958.
In its judgment modifying custody, the trial court stated that "the children are older and desire to spend more time with...
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