Huffman v. McBride
| Decision Date | 29 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:93cv0492AS.,3:93cv0492AS. |
| Parties | Steven HUFFMAN, Petitioner, v. Daniel McBRIDE, and Indiana Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Steven Huffman, pro se.
Laurel Twinney, Indianapolis, IN, for respondents.
On July 14, 1993, pro se petitioner, Steven Huffman, an inmate at the Westville Correctional Center, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The response filed by the respondents on October 29, 1993, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The petitioner filed a response on November 12, 1993.
This § 2254 petition concerns prison disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner was charged and found guilty of engaging in trafficking and was deprived of ninety (90) days of earned credit time. See IC XX-XX-X-X.
On April 21, 1993, a prison official believed that he observed the petitioner and an employee of the Lakeside Correctional Unit "had possibly been in the E-1 staff restroom/locker room together." Communication and interaction of this nature between prison staff or officials and inmates is prohibited. Both parties were apparently warned of this prohibition. Both denied any involvement. Subsequently, a prison investigator obtained the phone records of the prison employee. In the Report of Conduct, the facts are alleged in the following fashion:
Superintendent Timothy Todd received a telephone call from Karl Swihart, an Internal Affairs Officer at the Indiana State Prison, in reference to Catherine Myers and Steven Huffman communicating with each other via telephone. A copy of Catherine Myers' home telephone bill was obtained and it showed that twenty one calls had been placed to her residence from LCU dormitory offender phones between March 20, 1993 and March 29, 1993. These calls ranged in time from 1 minute to 119 minutes, with an average time of 51 minutes. On April 21, 1993, Catherine Myers was presented with the evidence and admitted to her involvement in this incident. Ms. Myers also stated that it was offender Huffman that had placed the calls to her residence.
See Conduct Report.
The Conduct Adjustment Board at the Lakeside Correctional Unit held a hearing on April 23, 1993. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of engaging in trafficking and also testified at the hearing. The petitioner testified that he had no knowledge of anyone calling Catherine Myers. The CAB report also indicates that the petitioner had a lay advocate. No other witnesses testified for the petitioner at the hearing. The Conduct Adjustment Board found the petitioner guilty of trafficking and issued the following explanation of the proceeding:
Based on conduct and offender statement and statements from the lay advocate offender is guilty of trafficking specifically giving messages.
See Respondents' Brief Exhibit D.
Following the CAB hearing, the petitioner exhausted the applicable administrative remedies as quantified in Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir.1992). In seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner asserts several claims. First, the petitioner claims that he was denied due process by the Conduct Adjustment Board. Next, the petitioner maintains that the Disciplinary Review Manager failed to consider Catherine Myers' letter denying that she received any telephone calls from the petitioner. Finally, the petitioner asserts a claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
In this case, the court is required to determine whether the Constitution of the United States was violated in a disciplinary proceeding before a Conduct Adjustment Board (CAB) under the mandates of Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992), Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1992), Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.1992), and Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990). See also Billops v. Wright, 803 F.Supp. 1439 (N.D.Ind.1992). The constitutional dimensions of this court's review are outlined in Supt., Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). It also needs to be said that this proceeding is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In addressing the petitioner's claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Attorney General explains that "under the Adult Disciplinary Policy Procedures ("ADPP"), the offense of Engaging in Trafficking (# 238) is a Class B Offense...." See Return to Show Cause at 7. The Attorney General explains further that "the ADPP uses the definition of trafficking set forth in the Indiana Code Section 35-44-3-9...." Id. Indiana Code 35-44-3-9 defines that offense as follows:
See I.C. XX-XX-X-X.
In evaluating this issue, this court has found three cases involving the statute in the state courts of Indiana. See State of Indiana v. Owings, 622 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.1993); Perkins v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind.1985); and Sureeporn Roll v. State, 473 N.E.2d 161 (Ind.App.1985).
In Owings, supra, the Indiana Supreme Court indicated that the defendant "delivered balloons filled with cocaine to her son while he was an inmate...." Id. In Perkins, supra, the court indicated that the defendants "carried marijuana into the prison." Id. Sureeporn Roll, supra, involved a similar arrangement. In Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988), the Seventh Circuit evaluated an inmate's right to marry and in the process discussed I.C. XX-XX-X-X. Specifically, the court explained:
Id. (emphasis provided).
In order to protect due process rights in the context of a prison disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court in Supt., Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), outlined and explained the requisite standards for evaluating the proceedings. In Hill, a prison guard discovered an inmate who had been assaulted and observed three inmates fleeing the area. All three inmates were found guilty of assault based on the prison guard's report of the event. Clearly, the prison disciplinary officials could fit the abovementioned facts into a plethora of scenarios. In resolving this quandary, the Hill Court explained:
The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due process in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made by the disciplinary hearing. Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of the three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence so that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.
Id. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775.
In finding that the evidence adduced at the prison disciplinary hearing met the due process requirement, the Court concluded:
We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. ..." Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require the examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.
Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2773-74 (citations omitted).
Recently, in Lasley v. Godinez, 833 F.Supp. 714 (N.D.Ill.1993) and Harms v. Godinez, 829 F.Supp. 259 (N.D.Ill.1993), Judges Aspen and Plunkett outlined the judicial parameters of the sufficient evidence concepts as elucidated in Hill, supra. Both Judges Aspen and Plunkett reviewed the recent Seventh Circuit opinion on this issue written by Judge Manion in Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, (1992) (en banc). In Harms, Judge Plunkett explained:
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...by Mr. McCoy in his Traverse, there is no basis for relief shown here under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court has reviewed Huffman v. McBride, 853 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D.Ind. 1994), and the reasoning and result, as well as the particular circumstances of that case, did not become binding authority t......