Miller v. Duckworth
| Citation | 963 F.2d 1002 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1681,91-1681 |
| Parties | Chad Eric MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack A. DUCKWORTH, and the Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
David Vandercoy (argued), Valparaiso, Ind., for petitioner-appellant.
Michael Schaefer (argued) and Kimberlie A. Forgey, Deputy Attys. Gen., Office of the Atty. Gen., Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents-appellees.
Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Chad Eric Miller, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his claim for relief, Miller alleged that he was deprived of his due process rights during a prison disciplinary hearing convened to determine if he was guilty of escaping a youth correctional center. The district court denied his petition. For the following reasons, we affirm.
From August 1983 to December 1986, Chad Miller was an inmate at the Indiana Youth Center (IYC) at Plainfield in Hendricks County, Indiana, where he was serving concurrent sentences for two robbery convictions. On Christmas Day, 1986, Miller managed to escape from the IYC, but he was captured the next day in nearby Marion County, Indiana. Miller was immediately taken to the Marion County Jail.
On December 31, 1986, Miller was visited at the jail by Ingrid Sleet, a screening officer for the prison's Conduct Adjustment Board. Sleet informed him that a disciplinary hearing would be held on the institutional charge of escape pending against him, and she also advised him of his rights with reference to the hearing. Having been so apprised, Miller entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and requested the assistance of a lay advocate for the purpose of presenting his defense. Both statements were noted on the prison's Notice of Disciplinary Hearing form; however, it is unclear as to whether Miller had in fact indicated that he wished to call any witnesses in his defense, for Sleet made no such notification on the form. Sleet then notified Miller that his disciplinary hearing would be convened a week later on either January 6 or 7, 1987.
On January 2, 1987, Miller was transferred to the Hendricks County Jail to await his prison disciplinary hearing and his court trial on the related criminal charges. While incarcerated at the Hendricks County jail, Miller was precluded from communicating with any inmate witnesses located at the IYC, pursuant to Indiana Code § 11-11-3-2:
(b) The department [of Corrections] may require prior approval of correspondence between a confined person and another person if the other person:
(1) is being held in a correction facility.
Ind.Code § 11-11-3-2 (West Supp.1990). Obviously, prison officials viewed Miller's requested communications as a security threat since he was in a position to inform other IYC inmates as to his method of escape.
Miller's disciplinary hearing before the Board was held at the Hendricks County Jail on January 7, 1987. No lay advocate appeared on his behalf. During the hearing, Miller made a brief statement explaining that his motive for escaping the IYC was based on family problems. He then asked that he be permitted to call three witnesses for his defense, but this request was denied. After considering Miller's statement, his conduct report and several other affidavits submitted by prison personnel, the Board found him guilty of escape and sanctioned him with 1096 days of disciplinary segregation, a transfer to the Indiana State Prison, a demotion of his credit earning class, and a loss of 628 days of good time credit.
Miller did not pursue any of the state-authorized methods for appealing Board decisions, 1 claiming that he was never provided with the forms necessary for seeking such relief, and that, in any event, such appeals would not be entertained in the Indiana state courts. Instead, he filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court on October 26, 1988. The district court subsequently appointed counsel to represent Miller, and shortly thereafter, Miller was granted leave to file an amended petition for relief. In his amended petition, Miller argued, among other things, that (1) he was unconstitutionally deprived of the assistance of a lay advocate; (2) he was not given adequate notice of the disciplinary hearing; and (3) he was unconstitutionally precluded from calling witnesses on his own behalf and cross-examining witnesses against him. Briefs on these issues were submitted by both parties.
The district court denied Miller's petition for habeas corpus. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the court found that Miller was not entitled to the assistance of a lay advocate because he was not illiterate, nor were issues he presented complex. The court also concluded that the prison officials acted within their discretion when they refused to call the three witnesses proffered by Miller. However, the court rejected the state's assertion that Miller had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to petitioning for habeas corpus relief. Nor did the court accept the state's contention that Miller had waived his right to call witnesses when he failed to identify them during his meeting with officer Sleet. The district court entered judgment against Miller on March 5, 1991. This appeal followed.
Miller raises two challenges to the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. First, he claims that he was entitled to the assistance of a lay advocate under the authority of Wolff v. McDonnell, and that by denying him such assistance, the state of Indiana deprived him of the due process right to prepare an adequate defense to institutional charges. Second, he asserts that he was unconstitutionally precluded from calling witnesses to testify in his behalf during his disciplinary hearing, again in violation of his right to due process of law. We find both arguments unpersuasive.
In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that due process entitled prisoners to certain procedural safeguards before they may be deprived of their statutorily created right to good time credits. Specifically, the Court concluded that prisoners must be provided with advance written notice of the alleged violation of the disciplinary rules, a written statement indicating what evidence the fact-finders relied upon and their reasons for the disciplinary action taken, id. at 563, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, and, if institutional safety requires the omission of...
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