Huffman v. Southern Underwriters

• Decision Date: 17 May 1939
• Docket Number: No. 7414.,7414.
• Citation: 128 S.W.2d 4
• Parties: HUFFMAN et ux. v. SOUTHERN UNDERWRITERS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

128 S.W.2d 4

HUFFMAN et ux. v. SOUTHERN UNDERWRITERS.

No. 7414.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 17, 1939.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of First Supreme Judicial District.

Suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the Southern Underwriters to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board in favor of James Otis Huffman, Sr., and wife, for compensation for the death of their son, James Otis Huffman, Jr. Judgment for the defendant was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, 114 S.W.2d 926, and the defendants bring error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and judgment of the trial court affirmed.

Grindstaff, Zellers & Hutcheson, of Weatherford, for plaintiffs in error.

Battaile, Burr & Holliday, of Houston, for defendant in error.

SHARP, Justice.

The precise question presented here is whether the legal beneficiaries of a minor seventeen years of age, who was killed while operating a truck under an unrevoked and uncancelled driver's license issued to him by the Railroad Commission, can recover compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Article 8306 et seq., Revised Civil Statutes, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq.) for his death.

This suit was brought in the district court by the Southern Underwriters, to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board on the claim of J. O. Huffman, Sr., and wife for compensation for the death of their son, J. O. Huffman, Jr. The case was tried before a jury; and, based upon the findings of the jury, the trial court entered judgment for $4,447.76. The case was appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at Galveston, and the judgment of the trial court was set aside and judgment rendered for the Southern Underwriters. 114 S.W.2d 926. A writ of error was granted.

The controlling facts are that Zack Brooks was a trucking contractor, operating under what is known as a special commodity permit, obtained from the Railroad Commission, J. O. Huffman, Sr., was the foreman for Brooks, and had been for many years. He had charge of the trucking operations for Brooks, and employed the men to drive the trucks. As foreman he employed his son, J. O. Huffman, Jr., who was 17 years old, to work for Brooks as a truck driver. Brooks knew of the employment of J. O. Huffman, Jr., and obtained a written consent from J. O. Huffman and his wife to employ their son.

On April 5, 1936, J. O. Huffman, Jr., was sent as a truck driver with a load from Greggton, in Gregg County, Texas, to a place near Corpus Christi. He arrived at his destination with his load; and after unloading same, and acting under instructions from the home office, he loaded his truck with oil field equipment, and started to return to East Texas with same. While on his return trip his car was accidentally wrecked, the truck burned, and J. O. Huffman, Jr., was burned to death.

On February 19, 1935, J. O. Huffman, Sr., executed and delivered to Brooks a statement, which, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:

"It is my wish to have my son, J. O. Huffman, Jr., a minor, to work for you if you should have any opening for his services.

"I hereby release you, your heirs and assigns, for any liability or claim that might arise, should he become injured in any way while in your employ."

A decision of this case turns on the construction of Section 12i of Article 8306 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306, § 12i. The Honorable Court of Civil Appeals held that when this section of the Workmen's Compensation Act is construed in connection with Article 911b, Vernon's Ann. Civ.St., and Article 6687 of the Revised Civil Statutes, and Penal Code, art. 813; art. 827a, § 9 and art. 1690b, Vernon's Ann. P.C., and Rule 3 of the Railroad Commission, Huffman and wife are not entitled to recover compensation for the death of their son, on the following grounds: (1) That the son's employment was in violation of the law and the rule of the Railroad Commission; and (2) that they waived their rights, if they had any, by the execution of the waiver copied above. The Court of Civil Appeals held that, since the compensation awarded to Huffman and wife was community property, the waiver signed by the husband also bound the wife.

Section 12i in part reads: "A minor who has been employed in any hazardous or other employment which is prohibited by any Statute of this State, shall nevertheless be entitled to receive compensation under the terms and provisions of this Act. Provided, that this Section shall not be construed to excuse or justify any person, firm or corporation employing or permitting to be employed a minor in any hazardous or other employment prohibited by any Statute of this State. (As amended Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 259, ch. 154, § 1.)"

Article 1573 of the Penal Code, Vernon's Ann.P.C. art. 1573, expressly prohibits the employment, for certain labor, of a child under 15 years of age in cities of more than 15,000 in population, and levies a heavy penalty for violation of such law. Article 1574, Vernon's Ann.P. C., expressly prohibits the employment, for certain work, of a child under 17 years of age, and imposes a heavy penalty for a violation of such statute. Article 827a, § 9, Vernon's Ann.P.C., provides in substance that it is necessary to have a chauffeur's license, as provided by Article 6687 of the Revised Civil Statutes, before operating a commercial motor vehicle. Article 6687 was amended, and it is now known as Article 6687a, Vernon's Ann.Civ. St.

Article 6687a, § 3, subd. (c), provides as follows: "Drivers of commercial motor vehicles operating under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission of Texas who are required to have a driver's license issued by that department, shall not be required to secure a chauffeur's or operator's license under the terms of this Act for the operation of such vehicles, but such persons shall be amenable to the other provisions of this law incident to the cancellation of chauffeurs' or operators' licenses."

Article 911b, § 4(b), Vernon's Ann.Civ. St., in part reads: "The Commission is hereby vested with power and authority and it is hereby made its duty to require that each driver of a motor-propelled vehicle owned or operated by a motor carrier under the provisions of this Act shall have a driver's license, which license shall be issued by the Commission pursuant to an examination testing the ability and fitness of the applicant and under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. * * * The Commission may suspend or revoke any such license for cause after notice and public hearing. It shall be unlawful for any motor carrier to operate a motor-propelled vehicle in this State unless such vehicle is operated by a driver holding an unrevoked and uncanceled license issued by the Commission."

In response to the authority conferred on the Railroad Commission, that tribunal adopted Rule 3, which reads as follows: "All drivers of motor vehicles operated by motor carrier companies in Texas, under a certificate or permit issued by the Railroad Commission, shall be not less than eighteen years of age, of good moral character, experienced in operating motor vehicles, and fully competent to carefully, safely and courteously operate the vehicles under their charge."

It is the settled policy of this State to construe liberally the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, in order to effectuate the purposes for which it was enacted. Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken et al., 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402; McClure v. Georgia Casualty Co., Tex.Com.App., 251 S.W. 800; Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S. W. 1084; Federal Surety Co. v. Ragle, Tex.Com.App., 40 S.W.2d 63; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Volek et al., Tex. Com.App., 69 S.W.2d 33, certiorari denied 293 U.S. 598, 55 S.Ct. 116, 79 L.Ed. 691.

The constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Law is sustained on the theory of tripartite agreement between employer, employee, and the insurance carrier. Their legal relation under this statute is contractual. Middleton v. T. P. & L. Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 596, 249 U.S. 152, 153, 39 S.Ct. 227, 63 L.Ed. 527; Southern Casualty Co. v. Morgan, Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 200.

Compensation laws are liberally construed in favor of the employee, as well as in favor of a claimant or beneficiary. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Volek et al., Tex.Com.App., supra; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Andrews, 130 Tex. 502, 110 S.W.2d 49.

Article 8306, § 14, of the Act provides: "No agreement by any employé to waive his rights to compensation under this law shall be valid." The decisions of this State do not look with favor upon contracts waiving rights arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law. See Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Co., Tex.Sup., 116 S.W.2d 675; Clevenger v. Burgess, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 675, writ refused.

Article 8309, § 1, in part reads: "`Employé' shall mean every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, expressed or implied. * * * `Legal beneficiaries' as used in this law shall mean the relatives named in section 8a, part 1, of this law."

Article 8309, second subdivision 4 of section 1, provides that: "Any reference to an employé herein who has been injured shall, when the employé is dead, also include the legal beneficiaries, as that term is herein used, of such employé to whom compensation may be payable."

It is obvious from a reading of Article 827a, § 9; arts. 1573, 1574, and 1576 of the Penal Code, Vernon's Ann. P.C. arts. 1573, 1574, 1576, that they do not apply to a case like the one before us.

It is true that J. O. Huffman, Sr., sought employment for his minor son with Brooks. In order to obtain such employment, he agreed to release Brooks, his heirs and assigns, "for any liability or claim that might arise should he become injured in any way," while in his employ. This release applies or relates to Brooks personally, and does not apply...