Huffman v. State
Decision Date | 03 June 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 2D14–3462.,2D14–3462. |
Citation | 192 So.3d 687 |
Parties | David S. HUFFMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
David S. Huffman appeals the order striking his successive motion to correct illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because the postconviction record demonstrates that Mr. Huffman's life sentences imposed in circuit court case number 1985–CF–1782–NC are illegal and that failure to correct the sentences could result in a manifest injustice, we affirm the order striking Mr. Huffman's motion but remand for the postconviction court to appoint the Office of the Public Defender to file a rule 3.800(a) motion on Mr. Huffman's behalf along the lines set forth in this opinion.
In circuit court case number 1972–CF–0870–NC, a jury found Mr. Huffman guilty of rape, at the time a capital felony, and breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.1 In November 1972, the trial court sentenced him to parole-eligible life sentences for both convictions. This court affirmed both convictions and the parole-eligible life sentence imposed for the rape conviction but held that the breaking and entering offense was a second-degree felony and reduced that sentence to the statutory maximum of fifteen years' imprisonment. See Huffman v. State, 301 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). For reasons unknown, the circuit court did not enter an amended sentence until June 30, 1994.
Mr. Huffman was released on parole in 1984. While on parole, he was charged with new offenses, and a jury found him guilty of armed sexual battery, a life felony, and armed burglary, a first-degree felony punishable by life, in circuit court case number 1985–CF–1782–NC. On February 21, 1986, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent life sentences for each offense, and this court affirmed those convictions and sentences. Huffman v. State, 522 So.2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (table decision).
Mr. Huffman has filed several postconviction motions and has been prohibited by both this court and the postconviction court from filing pro se pleadings that attack his judgments and sentences imposed in case number 1985–CF–1782–NC. See Huffman v. Singletary, 696 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
In 2013, Mr. Huffman filed a motion under rule 3.800(a) challenging his fifteen-year sentence for his 1972 breaking and entering conviction. The motion alleged in part that the circuit court's failure to timely correct the sentence for his 1972 breaking and entering caused that crime to be erroneously scored on his scoresheet in 1986. The circuit court struck the motion as unauthorized under its 1999 order enjoining Mr. Huffman from further pro se filings. Mr. Huffman appealed that order, and this court appointed the Public Defender to represent him and to file a brief regarding errors apparent on the face of the 1986 scoresheet that was attached to Mr. Huffman's motion.
Mr. Huffman contends that two scoresheet errors resulted in de facto upward departure life sentences. First, Mr. Huffman's 1972 conviction for rape under section 794.01, Florida Statutes (1972), was a capital offense, and capital offenses were not scored as a prior record under the sentencing guidelines. See Stuart v. State, 536 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) . The scoresheet improperly assesses 264 points as a “life felony” for this conviction. Second, Mr. Huffman's 1972 conviction for breaking and entering was improperly scored as a first-degree felony punishable by life and not as a second-degree felony. See Huffman, 301 So.2d at 815. For that reason, the scoresheet improperly adds 211 points under prior record for a first-degree felony punishable by life instead of 159 points for two second-degree felonies and 26 points for one third-degree felony.
Mr. Huffman contends that a correct scoresheet total, i.e., 557 points, would result in a recommended range of twenty-seven to forty years' imprisonment.2 See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.988(b). State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.2005) (citation omitted). “[S]uch an error was deemed a de facto departure sentence and therefore illegal.” Id. at 114 n. 4.3 Mr. Huffman further argues that the errors appear on the face of the record and can be corrected at any time under rule 3.800(a). He asks this court to vacate his life sentences imposed in case number 1985–CF–1782–NC and to remand for resentencing within the recommended range under the 1985 guidelines.
In its response, the State points out that this court has previously addressed the scoresheet errors asserted in Mr. Huffman's current motion and held that such errors could not be raised for the first time on appeal and are not appropriate for consideration under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) because they involved questions of disputed fact. Huffman v. State, 611 So.2d 2, 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). (citing Lomont v. State, 506 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ).4 This court also determined, based on the record before it, that the alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In Lomont, the defendant contended in a postconviction motion that his five-year sentence was based on a calculation that assessed three prior felony convictions, but he claimed that he had only one prior felony conviction. 506 So.2d at 1141. The postconviction court ruled that the error should have been raised at sentencing or on direct appeal and was procedurally barred in a motion for postconviction relief. Id. This court affirmed “notwithstanding the recent supreme court opinions in State v. Chaplin, 490 So.2d 52 (Fla.1986), and State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) ” because Mr. Lomont's claim of scoresheet error was not “readily apparent from the face of the record” and would require an evidentiary hearing to resolve. Id. at 1141–42.
We are unable to discern the extent of record evidence that this court had in front of it at the time Huffman v. State, 611 So.2d 2, was decided. However, in the record presently before this court, it appears that Mr. Huffman's 1986 sentencing guidelines scoresheet is inaccurate for the reasons outlined above. Accordingly, we conclude that the error complained of is apparent on the face of the record and is amenable to correction via a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Whitfield, 487 So.2d at 1047 ( ); Chaplin, 490 So.2d at 53 ( ); see also Merchant v. State, 509 So.2d 1101, 1102 (Fla.1987) ( ).
This court has repeatedly held that the doctrines of law of the case and collateral estoppel will not apply to preclude consideration of a successive rule 3.800(a) motion when doing so would result in a defendant serving a sentence that exceeds the sentence that could have been legally imposed. See Plasencia v. State, 170 So.3d 865, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ( ); Bronk v. State, 25 So.3d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (); Brinson v. State, 995 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (); Cillo v. State, 913 So.2d 1233, 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ().
In this case, with a corrected scoresheet, Mr. Huffman's recommended range under the guidelines appears to be from twenty-seven to forty years; thus, his sentences of life imprisonment could not have been imposed absent a departure.5...
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