Hufford v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1908
• Citation: 130 Mo. App. 638,109 S.W. 1062
• Parties: HUFFORD v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

109 S.W. 1062

130 Mo. App. 638

HUFFORD v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 6, 1908.

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1908.

1. CARRIERS—STREET RAILROADS—INJURIES TO PASSENGERS—EVIDENCE—INSTRUCTIONS.

Where, in an action for injuries to a street car passenger while alighting, caused by the sudden starting of the car, the evidence showed that, on the approach of the car to a street crossing, plaintiff rang the bell, preparing to alight; that the car stopped before it reached its usual stopping place; that plaintiff attempted to alight;

and that the car suddenly started—an instruction that if the car, while plaintiff was in the act of stepping down, was suddenly moved, and by reason thereof plaintiff was injured, the verdict should be for plaintiff, was sufficient.

2. SAME.

The conductor in charge of a car called the name of a street. A passenger gave a signal for the car to stop. The car stopped before reaching its usual stopping place, but near to it, and the passenger attempted to alight, when the car suddenly started, causing injury to her. Held, that the passenger had the right to assume that the car had stopped for the purpose of letting her alight, and it was the duty of the conductor to learn whether any passengers were preparing to alight before starting the car.

3. DAMAGES — PERSONAL INJURIES — INSTRUCTIONS.

An instruction, in an action for personal injuries, that the jury will assess plaintiff's damages in such sum as they may believe will fairly compensate her for the injuries, and for loss occasioned thereby, and for such pain and suffering as they may believe she will suffer in the future, as the reasonable result of the injuries, is not bad, and defendant, on desiring a more explicit charge, must request it.

4. EVIDENCE—EXPRESSION OF OPINION—CONCLUSION OF WITNESS.

The answer of a physician testifying as an expert in a personal injury action that the injury described could cause only a portion of the trouble complained of by the person injured, stating what part could be caused by the injury, and what part could not, is admissible as an expression of an opinion, and is not objectionable as a conclusion of the witness.

5. APPEAL — VERDICT — CONCLUSIVENESS — CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.

An appellate court is not authorized to pass on the credibility of the witnesses.

6. SAME—AMOUNT OF RECOVERY—APPROVAL OF TRIAL COURT.

Where the trial court did not think that the verdict in a personal injury action was excessive, and there was nothing to show that it abused its discretion, the court on appeal would not disturb the verdict.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Henry L. McCune, Judge.

Action by Annie L. Hufford against the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John H. Lucas, for appellant. A. S. Lyman, Walsh & Morrison, for respondent.

BROADDUS, P. J.

The plaintiff's suit is to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been the result of defendant's negligence. The alleged grounds of negligence are that on the 14th day of February, 1905, at 6:45 a. m., the plaintiff while a passenger on one of the defendant's cars going south on Grand avenue, and while she was attempting to alight therefrom after the car reached Eighteenth street and had stopped, was thrown from the car by its sudden starting to the pavement, and severely injured. The defendant contends that there is no evidence to support the allegation of negligence. In a general way the evidence tends to show that, on the approach of the car to Eighteenth street, the plaintiff rang the bell preparatory to getting off, but it seems that from some cause or other the car stopped before it arrived at the usual place for that purpose. The motorman who was in charge at the time testified in answer to a question as to how the plaintiff got hurt, as follows: "Well, after we passed Seventeenth street, I commenced applying my brake to stop for Eighteenth street, and the car kept gaining speed, and before we got to Eighteenth—probably 150 feet—I reversed the car, and the car stopped in 35 or 40 feet of Eighteenth street, and I shut the current off and turned the car loose, and attempted to stop it by the hand brake, and by the time I got it stopped with the hand brake it had run 12 or 15 feet further, perhaps 20." The evidence tends to show that it was when the car first stopped a few seconds that plaintiff attempted to alight, but the car started before she had time to do so. This point was not the usual place for the car to stop to let off and take on passengers, which was some few feet further on. The plaintiff testified that the conductor called out Eighteenth street, and that she gave the signal for stopping, went to the platform preparatory to getting off, and that the car stopped, and, as she was attempting to alight, it started and threw her to the pavement below. There is other evidence besides her own and that of the motorman that the car did stop for a short time. The defendant's evidence is in conflict with that of plaintiff, and to the effect that she stepped off the car while it was in motion, or that she was thrown therefrom as the result of the effort of the motorman to stop the car. We cannot agree with defendant's contention that there was no evidence to support the allegation of negligence. On the contrary, it was ample and fully justified the court in submitting the case to the jury.

It is insisted that the court was in error in giving instruction numbered 1 at the instance of the plaintiff. The said instruction reads as follows: "The court instructs the jury that if they shall believe and find from the evidence in this case that on the 14th day of February, 1905, plaintiff was a passenger upon one of...