Hufstedler v. Glenn
| Decision Date | 10 April 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 8143.,8143. |
| Citation | 82 S.W.2d 733 |
| Parties | HUFSTEDLER et al. v. GLENN. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Bell County; Few Brewster, Judge.
Action by H. C. Glenn, receiver, against E. K. Hufstedler and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Reformed and affirmed.
Chas. Nordyke, of Lubbock, for appellants.
Jno. B. Daniel, of Temple, and Critz & Woodward, of Coleman, for appellee.
Appellee sued appellants for the balance due on a note for $3,200 executed by them on October 22, 1931, payable in monthly installments of $53.12 each, and for foreclosure of a deed of trust lien on two lots in Lubbock, Tex., given by the makers to secure the payment of said note.
The defenses made by appellants in the trial court were that said property constituted their business homestead; that the note and lien sued upon were executed to take up, renew, and extend, three other sets of notes which were secured by mechanic's and materialman's liens on the property given for improvements made on said property; that the several contracts whereby such mechanic's and materialman's liens were sought to be fixed upon said property were so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to be unenforceable had they been breached, and therefore did not and could not constitute a valid lien upon said property; and that because of its homestead character, appellee therefore obtained no valid lien upon said property by assignment from the holders of such purported liens, and that consequently its deed of trust fixed no lien on said property.
Lots 24 and 49, adjacent to each other, in block 1 of Dupree addition to the city of Lubbock are here involved. They were purchased by appellants in March, 1931, from W. Thomas and T. K. Thomas, who owned same separately, and who had theretofore executed paving notes and liens upon said lots in 1930, payment of which was assumed by appellants. As to these notes and liens therefor, being outstanding against the property before any homestead interest of appellants ever attached, no such exemption can apply.
The major portion of said indebtedness, however, was incurred by appellants to one Boles, contractor, for the erection of improvements on the property to be used as a business homestead. It is not controverted that a written contract, signed by Hufstedler and wife, privily acknowledged, describing the land, the general character of improvements to be made, etc., had been duly executed before any material was furnished or labor done on the premises, as required by the Constitution (article 16, § 50) and by article 5460, R. S. 1925. The contention here made is that such contract between appellants and Boles was too vague and indefinite to fix a lien on said property. This is predicated largely upon the fact that only the dimensions, material, and general character of the building to be erected were set out in said contract; and that, though the contract provided that the building was to be erected, "in accordance with the plans and specifications agreed upon by the parties and signed by them for the purpose of identification," no such specifications were ever prepared in writing, nor signed by the parties. Whatever bearing this failure to sign specifications might have had upon the rights of the contractor had he failed to perform his contract is, we think, rendered immaterial by the fact that after the building was completed appellants accepted it by written instrument, duly sworn to, stating that said building had been completed in full compliance with said contract.
But regardless of any irregularity in the transaction as between appellants and Boles, the contractor, whereby they undertook to fix a mechanic's and materialman's lien on the property in favor of Boles, it is now well settled that where the owners of homestead property induce another to lend money to take up and extend such debt against it upon the representation that a valid lien exists upon the property to secure such debt, they thereby estop themselves thereafter to assert its invalidity. And that is true even as to a lien originally void. Garrett v. Katz (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S.W.(2d) 436, 438, and cases there cited; Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Muhl (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S.W.(2d) 316, 320 (writ ref.). When, therefore, appellants, in their application to Temple Trust Company for the loan evidenced by the note here sued upon, represented that the lien they had given to Boles on said property was valid and outstanding, they estopped themselves to set up prior...
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Henry v. Williams
...et al. v. Nelson et al., Tex. Civ.App., 223 S.W. 543; Harrison et al. v. MacGregor, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 1095; Hufstedler et al. v. Glenn, Tex.Civ. App., 82 S.W.2d 733; Shonaker et al. v. Citizen's Loan & Investment Co., Tex.Civ. App., 8 S.W.2d 566—are not in point. These authorities, m......
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In re Moore, Bankruptcy No. 187-10247-11
...Gebhard, 85 Tex. 610, 22 S.W. 1033, 1035 (1893). The same rule applies to impressing homestead character on business property. Hufstedler v. Glenn, 82 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.App. — Austin 1935, no writ). It is well-settled that a homestead estate is dependent upon some title or interest in th......
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Stricklin v. Southwest Reserve Life Ins. Co.
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Graves v. Hallmark
...be orally agreed to in such a case and may be shown by parol provided a lien contract is in writing and in proper form. Hufstedler v. Glenn, Tex.Civ.App., 82 S.W.2d 733. It is our opinion under the authorities cited that the lien contract in the case at bar was executed in compliance with t......