Hufstetler v. State
| Decision Date | 05 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. S01A1148.,S01A1148. |
| Citation | 553 S.E.2d 801,274 Ga. 343 |
| Parties | HUFSTETLER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
W. Donald Patten, Jr., Stockbridge, for appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, Dist. Atty., James L. Wright III, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Adam M. Hames, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
A jury found Clyde Hufstetler guilty of murdering his estranged wife, Nancy Hufstetler, two days before their divorce was to become final. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and life sentence entered by the trial court on the guilty verdict.1 1. Hufstetler did not deny that he shot and killed the victim, but claimed that he was a battered spouse who acted in self-defense. On appeal, he urges that the State failed to disprove his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prosecution introduced evidence showing that Hufstetler was the abuser in the relationship and that he had a history of assaulting and threatening the victim. An expert witness for the State offered an opinion that Ms. Hufstetler, rather than appellant, was the battered spouse. Their son was an eyewitness to the homicide, and his testimony authorized a finding that his father shot his mother in a jealous rage and then fled the scene with the intent to kill her suspected paramour. Hufstetler evaded capture for several days and, when he was arrested, he was still in possession of the weapon used to kill the victim.
The jury was not required to believe the witnesses for the defense and to discredit those produced by the prosecution. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the verdict, it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not an abused spouse and was guilty of the malice murder of his wife. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Ware v. State, 273 Ga. 16, 17(1), 537 S.E.2d 657 (2000).
2. During voir dire of the expert called by the defense, the trial court initiated a colloquy with the witness. At one point in the exchange, the trial court stated: "I'm just not sure how many syndromes we have now." Although he made no contemporaneous objection, Hufstetler urges on appeal that, by making this comment in the presence of the jury, the trial court disparaged the battered spouse claim and committed "plain error." See Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 848(3), 537 S.E.2d 58 (2000).
Taken in context, the intent of the trial court's statement was to elicit from the expert an explanation for the distinction, if any, between the battered woman syndrome and the battered person or battered spouse syndromes. After acknowledging that the relationship between the various syndromes was a valid and relevant inquiry, the expert informed the trial court that, although first recognized in the case of abused women, the numerous syndromes were not really separate but were "all under the same canopy." Upon receiving this explanation, the trial court expressly noted that it was "just doing this for information" and concluded by ruling that the witness was qualified as an expert on the battered person syndrome. Under these circumstances, no reasonable juror would have interpreted the trial court's remark as the expression of an opinion on any issue to be decided in the case. Compare Paul v. State, supra at 848(1), 537 S.E.2d 58. In fact, the colloquy had the beneficial effect of educating the jury, as well as informing the trial court, on the evolution of the syndrome upon which Hufstetler predicated his defense. As there was no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, reversal would not be authorized even if Hufstetler had made a timely objection and, thus, the "plain error" principle certainly has no application.
3. Appellant urges that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons.
Because the State's expert did not have an opportunity to perform a pre-trial evaluation of Hufstetler's battered spouse claim, defense counsel agreed that he could remain in the courtroom so that he could hear the other witnesses and formulate his opinion. According to Hufstetler, permitting the State's expert to arrive at his opinion in this manner was an instance of ineffective legal representation. However, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, would have been authorized to permit the witness to remain in the courtroom. See Jack v. State, 245 Ga.App....
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Rouse v. State
...have interpreted the trial court's remark as the expression of an opinion on any issue to be decided in the case.” Hufstetler v. State, 274 Ga. 343, 345, 553 S.E.2d 801 (2001). See also Dubose v. State, 294 Ga. 579, 586, 755 S.E.2d 174 (2014) (“Viewed in context, no reasonable juror would c......
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Ledford v. the State.
...in an “attempt to regulate the proceedings” generally are not impermissible comments on the evidence). See also Hufstetler v. State, 274 Ga. 343, 345(2), 553 S.E.2d 801 (2001) (“Under these circumstances, no reasonable juror would have interpreted the trial court's remark as the expression ......
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