Huggins v. Campbell, 17230
| Decision Date | 20 September 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 17230,17230 |
| Citation | 130 Colo. 183,274 P.2d 324 |
| Parties | Phoebe Ann HUGGINS, Plaintiff in Error, v. Charles C. CAMPBELL, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duane O. Littell and Robert W. Mesch, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Fancher Sarchet, Fort Collins, Bryant O'Donnell, Denver, for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error, as petitioner, on September 15, 1952, filed a petition in contributory dependency in the juvenile court in the City and County of Denver, alleging therein that she was an expectant mother, in the third calendar month of pregnancy; and that defendant in error, respondent, was the father of the unborn child, and as such, had failed and refused to provide for the support or care of petitioner and her unborn child as provided by statute. Respondent answered the petition by a denial of each and every allegation thereof and requested a trial by jury. Petitioner gave birth to the baby in question, which had been designated in the petition as Douglas Nathaniel Campbell, on February 11, 1953.
After what would seem to be an unusual length of time, and on July 10, 1953, trial was had to a jury, which returned a verdict finding that respondent was not the father of the child involved and not guilty of contributing to its dependency. Petitioner, relying almost entirely on alleged errors in the admission of improper testimony and exhibits, together with prejudicial remarks of counsel for respondent in the opening statement to the jury, now seeks reversal of the judgment based on the verdict of the jury.
Prior to the opening of the trial, at a hearing in chambers, the question of admissibility of acts or relations of petitioner with other men, if any, occurring prior to the period of gestation, was determined by stipulation that respondent would be permitted to show petitioner's relationships with other men only from May 1, 1952. There were two admitted acts of intercourse between petitioner and respondent on July 12 and July 14, 1952, upon which petitioner relied. The record unmistakably shows, from the testimony of two attending physicians, that the birth was premature and of approximately seven months' development. Hospital records and other testimony, convincingly and without dispute, discloses that petitioner entered a hospital in Montana on July 1, 1952, for surgery in the removal of a breast tumor, and it is undisputed that on that date and at the time of the operation, she was menstruating.
Petitioner and respondent, as children, lived in the same neighborhood in Kalispell, Montana; that prior to the winter of 1950 and 1951, their relationship was casual; that during the early part of 1951, they became more interested in each other, until the summer of 1951, when respondent was called for duty in the air force. Considerable correspondence passed between them while he was in the service and until he returned on furlough in July of 1952, during this furlough period they saw each other constantly; the admitted intercourse occurred on the dates hereinbefore mentioned; and respondent left for Denver, Colorado, on July 19, 1952, where he was stationed. Soon thereafter he began receiving letters from petitioner showing concern over the possibility of being pregnant due to the admitted acts of intercourse with respondent. Finally, as a result of this correspondence and telephone calls, arrangements were made between the two for petitioner to come to Denver, where they might get married. On arriving in Denver, petitioner stayed with respondent at a hotel and sexual relations again followed. Respondent had previously made arrangements for an apartment in a private home where he moved the petitioner. The testimony is conflicting as to whether they cohabited at the apartment. In a few days the attitude of respondent with reference to all arrangements for a marriage seemed to change, which disturbed petitioner to the extent that she attempted to commit suicide. She pressed him for his reasons for not marrying her, and it developed that he changed his mind on account of her previous relations with other men, of which he was well aware by direct information from her sometime previous to his arranging for her trip to Denver for the marriage. The promiscuous relationship with other men, which was known to him, was all prior to July 1, 1952. This conduct was tantamount to a recognition of the paternity of the unborn child. Upon this complete reversal of respondent's attitude in connection therewith, petitioner instituted this proceeding in dependency.
At the opening of the trial counsel for respondent, in addressing the jury, stated that the evidence would show that petitioner, according to a well-laid plan, had lured respondent from his base in Denver and had intercourse with him during the time of his furlough for the purpose of trapping him as a father of the child she was pregnant with at the time, and further stated that respondent wanted to use contraceptives at the time of the intercourse, but petitioner did not want him to; all of which counsel for respondent did not attempt to prove at any stage of the trial, especially the matter of the contraceptive. Counsel for petitioner now contend that these remarks, although not objected to at the time, were well calculated to prejudice the jury against petitioner, and we agree with them in saying that it cannot be said that the remarks were harmless.
Following this improper statement to the jury, apparently well known by counsel for respondent that it could not be established, a lengthy jury trial ensued, creating a record of more than one thousand folios of testimony largely injected into the case by counsel for respondent through cross-examination of petitioner and direct examination of respondent concerning sexual relations between petitioner and other men prior to the period of gestation, and prior to the period that had been agreed upon by stipulation before trial, all over the continuous and repeated objections of counsel for petitioner. This testimony was permitted by the court to be in the record on the theory and contention of counsel for respondent that it...
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People v. Ashton, 80CA0017
...and that the evidence of it should be omitted from the testimony because of its highly prejudicial character. See Huggins v. Campbell, 130 Colo. 183, 274 P.2d 324 (1954). As such, it cannot be used to attack the credibility of the witness on cross-examination. Montgomery v. People, 117 Colo......
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People v. Crawford, 26439
...(13th ed. 1972). However, such impeachment may not be upon matters wholly irrelevant and immaterial to issues at trial. Huggins v. Campbell, 130 Colo. 183, 274 P.2d 324; Montgomery v. People, 117 Colo. 118, 184 P.2d The scope and limits of cross-examination are within the sound discretion o......
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