Huggins v. Castle Estates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1975
• Citation: 369 N.Y.S.2d 80,330 N.E.2d 48,36 N.Y.2d 427
• Parties: , 330 N.E.2d 48 Eric H. HUGGINS et al., Respondents, v. CASTLE ESTATES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 80

369 N.Y.S.2d 80

36 N.Y.2d 427, 330 N.E.2d 48

Eric H. HUGGINS et al., Respondents, v. CASTLE ESTATES, INC., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 3, 1975.

Donald E. Keinz, Utica, for appellant.

Earle C. Bastow and John E. Hunt, Utica, for respondents.

WACHTLER, Judge.

The plaintiffs-respondents own residential properties in a tract known as Castle Estates in the Town of New Hartford, New York. The Castle Estates development consists of some 126 one- and two-family homes which were erected by the defendant-appellant on property that it owned. The homeowners took title to their respective houses by deeds dated August 13, 1968 and November 22, 1968. These deeds were executed by the developer and contained no metes and bounds dimensions of the lots; rather the deeds referred to the property by lot and section number of Castle Estates as shown on a duly filed plat map which the deed incorporated by reference. These conveyances were made 'subject to all restrictions, covenants, easements and rights-of-way of record.'

At issue here is the legal and equitable effect of these deeds and the plat map; specifically, whether these homeowners may impose a negative eastement upon adjoining land by virtue of a notation found on the plat map.

The plat map in question encompassed section VI of the Castle Estates subdivision and showed the definitive boundaries of the lots, the streets and utilities, and the set-back lines for the houses. The map also included the land across the street from the homeowners' property which was also owned by Castle Estates and, for convenience, will be referred to as the Ibbotson property. Significantly, the Ibbotson property was identified on the plat in the following manner:

'CASTLE ESTATES INC. R--2 ZONING'

In 1968 'R--2' was the existing zoning for section VI and permitted the construction of two-family residences. Sometime during the next year, the Town of New Hartford conducted a general zoning revision of all property within the town which resulted in changing the Ibbotson property from 'R--2' (residential) to 'B--2' (commercial).

On November 18, 1971 Castle Estates, Inc. entered into a contract with Ibbotson Motors, Inc. for the sale of the tract across the street from the plaintiffs' residences. A few months later Ibbotson applied for a building permit to erect an automobile showroom and repair facility on the Ibbotson property. The plaintiffs objected to this use of the property and instituted this action against Castle Estates seeking to enjoin them from using the Ibbotson property for any purpose other than residential, and from conveying these premises to any purchaser for other than residential purposes.

At trial, the plaintiffs contended that a negative equitable easement restricting the Ibbotson tract to residential use had been created in their favor by virtue of the 'R--2 Zoning' notation on the plat map and the oral representations as to future residential development made to them by one Robert Kenny, the president of Castle Estates, Inc. The defendant raised, Inter alia, the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. The trial court concluded that the Statute of Frauds requirement had not been satisfied here, nor was the theory of equitable estoppel established so as to circumvent the requirement of a writing.

The Appellate Division reversed in a three-two decision (44 A.D.2d 25, 352 N.Y.S.2d 719), finding that the deed coupled with the 'R--2 Zoning' notation on the plat map was a sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and that any ambiguity was resolved by the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses as to Mr. Kenny's representations. The dissenters urged that there was a lack of clear proof as to intention, nothing that had the plaintiffs placed any importance on the future development of the Ibbotson lot they would have sought more formal assurances by way of an explicit writing. We agree with the result reached by the trial court and would reverse.

At the outset we note that the policy of the law is to favor the free and unobstructed use of realty (Premium Point Park Assn. v. Polar Bar, 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E.2d 360) and that covenants restricting the use of property will be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce them (Buffalo Academy of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42). The burden of proof is on the party endeavoring to enforce a restrictive covenant and must be met by more than a doubtful right (Single v. Whitmore, 307 N.Y. 575, 122 N.E.2d 918). Only where it has been established by clear and convincing proof will our court impose such a restriction. Here despite the fact that incorporation by reference of a plat map may create an easement expressly or by implication, the homeowners have failed to satisfy that burden.

A negative easement is one which restrains a landowner from making certain use of his land which he might otherwise have lawfully done but for that restriction (Trustees of Columbia Coll. v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440). Such easements arise principally by express grant or by implication (see, generally, Thompson, Real Property (1961 ed.), §§ 330, 382). If established expressly, a negative easement must comply with the requisites of the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 24A, § 5--703; Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31; H.H. Apts. v. Beachcliff Realty Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 760, 201 N.Y.S.2d 777).

While a conveyance with reference to a plat map may comprise a written memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (Seamans v. Gulf Refining Co., 237 App.Div. 202, 206 N.Y.S. 876, aff'd 264 N.Y. 433, 191 N.E. 500) this is only true where the agreement is subscribed and contains all the terms of the agreement so as to manifest a definite intent to create the restriction. Thus, in Spinella v. Rindenello, 19 N.Y.2d 1010, 281 N.Y.S.2d 845, 228 N.E.2d 824 we recognized an easement arising from a plat map notation delineating a specific area 'for street purposes only'. That case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.

Our conclusion that the 'R--2 Zoning' notation failed to create a negative easement is founded on the presence, in both the deed and the plat, of language sufficiently clear to create similar easements and the conspicuous absence of such language as to the easement presently asserted. Among the easements...