Huggins v. Field

• Decision Date: 17 November 1922
• Citation: 196 Ky. 501,244 S.W. 903
• Parties: HUGGINS v. FIELD, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

244 S.W. 903

196 Ky. 501

HUGGINS v. FIELD, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 17, 1922

Original proceedings for a writ of prohibition by Clem W. Huggins against William H. Field, Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court. General demurrer sustained, and motion for writ denied.

Ronald C. Oldham, of Richmond, for plaintiff.

Bernard B. Bailey, and Walter P. Lincoln, both of Louisville, for defendant.

THOMAS J.

Andrew P. Vogt is and was a justice of the peace in Jefferson county, and William A. Doyle is and was the constable in the same magisterial district of that county. One proceeding against Vogt and two against Doyle were instituted before defendant, William H. Field, one of the judges of the Jefferson circuit court, pursuant to the provisions of section 1758 of the Kentucky Statutes, and they were duly cited to appear before defendant to show cause against those proceedings, and to present whatever defense they had. Plaintiff, Clem W. Huggins, an attorney of the Jefferson county bar, with others, was employed by the respondents, Vogt and Doyle, to defend them, and on the day to which they were cited to appear before defendant plaintiff was absent, and one of his cocounsel tendered an affidavit in each of the three proceedings to require defendant to vacate the bench, as is authorized by section 968 of the Statutes. Defendant, conceiving that the affidavits were insufficient under the various opinions of this court interpreting and construing that section, in that they did not properly state the necessary facts to require him to vacate the bench or to disqualify him from presiding in the causes, declined to permit the affidavits to be filed and adjourned the hearing to a future day, within which time counsel were given leave to reform the affidavits so as to meet the objections urged by defendant (respondent herein) thereto. The first affidavits were tendered on July 29, 1922 and the adjournment was had to August 5, 1922; and on the latter date plaintiff herein, as one of the counsel for respondents in the then pending proceedings before defendant, in open court suggested that he would withdraw the former tendered affidavits and tender others in lieu of them, and again renewed the motion that defendant herein vacate the bench; but, he again ruled that the substituted affidavits were themselves insufficient, and declined to permit them to be filed, but let the record show that they were tendered. He furthermore held that the latter affidavits, tendered in open court, contained matter which was a direct contempt of court, and entered a fine against plaintiff herein of $30 in each of the pending proceedings, or a total of $90.

This original proceeding was filed in this court to prohibit defendant, as judge of the Jefferson circuit court, from proceeding to collect those fines upon the ground that defendant was without authority to enter them, and acted without his jurisdiction in doing so, and that each of the judgments was and is void. Copies of the tendered affidavits containing the alleged contemptuous matter are filed with the petition, to which defendant has interposed both a special and general demurrer, and, without waiving either, has filed an answer.

Briefs of counsel have gone extensively into the law relating to contempts of court, as well as the right and power of this court to review judgments in such cases either by appeal or under the jurisdiction conferred on it by section 110 of the Constitution. Under section 950--1 of the Statutes, the right of appeal to this court from judgments for contempt of court is denied, but, in the cases of Adams v. Gardner, Judge, 176 Ky. 252, 195 S.W. 412, and others referred to therein, that section of the Statutes was construed as denying the right of appeal in such cases, when the only question involved was contempt or no contempt, but that an appeal would lie, especially in criminal contempts, when the punishment inflicted was such as the law did not countenance. Under those authorities no appeal lies from the judgments entered by defendant against plaintiff herein, since the punishment of a fine of $30 in each case was authorized, if plaintiff was guilty of the contempt. The cases of Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2 J. J. Marsh. 572; Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. 619; Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 133 S.W. 206, and the Adams Case, supra, were each direct appeals to this court from judgments inflicting unauthorized punishments, and they can have no bearing upon the question of our original jurisdiction, in an application of this kind, under the provisions of the section of the Constitution referred to.

In the case of Riley v. Wallace, Judge, 188 Ky. 471, 222 S.W. 1085, 11 A. L. R. 337, the defendant in the alleged contempt proceedings applied to this court for a proper writ, restraining the lower court from proceeding with the contempt proceedings upon the ground that the facts, as set forth in the opinion, did not constitute contempt and the restraining order was granted upon that ground, which makes the case an apparent authority for issuing such restraining writs under the original jurisdiction conferred upon it by the section of the Constitution referred to (110), when the only question presented is one of contempt or no contempt, although the question of the jurisdiction of this court was neither argued, referred to, nor discussed in that opinion. If our right exists to review the proceedings on an original application made in this court in cases where the only question is contempt or no contempt, then the section of the Constitution confers the authority on this court to do something which it cannot do by direct appeal, and in the Riley Case referred to the court failed to observe or mention that fact.

There can be no doubt in the present case that the respondent had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the plaintiff in this case (he being then and there present in court), and that the fine imposed was within his jurisdiction to inflict; so that the only question involved is whether the tendered affidavits contained matter which was a contempt of court, or, in other words, it is purely one of contempt or no contempt, and that question is the only one furnishing the foundation for this application. Notwithstanding, however, the doubt which we entertain of our jurisdiction in this case, we have concluded to waive the point and to treat the particular case as one of which we have jurisdiction in this original action and determine it upon its merits, though in doing so we would not be understood as creating a precedent for similar cases in the future.

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