Huggins v. United States
| Decision Date | 24 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 03–91–SLR,Civ. No. 11–737–SLR |
| Citation | 69 F.Supp.3d 430 |
| Parties | Andre M. Huggins, Movant/Defendant, v. United States of America, Respondent/Plaintiff. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Andre M. Huggins. Pro se movant.
Shannon Thee Hanson. Assistant United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for respondent.
Andre M. Huggins (“movant”) is a federal inmate currently confined at the Fairton Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, New Jersey. Movant timely filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (D.I. 358; D.I. 368) The government filed an answer in opposition. (D.I. 383) For the reasons discussed, the court will deny movant's § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
The case against movant arose out of a joint investigation conducted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”). Federal law enforcement officers became interested in movant while investigating a used car business named 1800 Motor Cars in Wilmington, Delaware. The IRS suspected that 1800 Motor Cars was accepting large payments of cash from drug dealers without reporting such transactions to the IRS, as required by federal law. Movant was a client of 1800 Motor Cars, and law enforcement officers believed he was dealing drugs as his primary source of income. As part of the investigation, law enforcement officers used a variety of techniques to investigate movant, including surveillance, wiretaps, and a pen register. The agents also conducted undercover operations, using a confidential informant to attempt to purchase drugs from movant.
The law enforcement officers sought and received authorization to search movant's home for evidence of drug trafficking. Movant agreed to speak with three law enforcement officers while his home was being searched, and he confessed that he was involved in distributing large amounts of cocaine with Jermaine Franklin, Ricardo Rogers, James Bestman, and Ricardo Barnaby. Movant was arrested that same day.
A third superseding indictment charged movant with seventeen counts. Count I charged that movant and Ricardo Rogers, a separately indicted co-conspirator, and others engaged in a conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base between November 2001 and June 2002, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts II through XI charged movant and Rogers with distributing cocaine or cocaine base on specific dates between February 21, 2002 and June 4, 2002. Count XII charged that movant and Jermaine Franklin, a previously indicted co-conspirator, and others conspired to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count XIII charged that movant and Franklin knowingly managed and controlled a building, room, and enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully storing and distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 856(a)(2), (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count XIV charged movant and Franklin with knowing possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute on May 28, 2003. Finally, Counts XV through XVII charged movant with money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2, premised on transactions involving a Cadillac Escalade on December 3, 2001, a GMC Denali on August 14, 2002, and the same GMC Denali on February 3, 2003.
At trial, the government presented the testimony of the three law enforcement officers who interviewed movant at his home and obtained his confession: Special Agent Greene of the IRS, Special Agent Miller of the DEA, and Task Officer Collins of the DEA Task Force. Ricardo Rogers, one of the individuals movant identified in his confession as involved in distributing drugs with him, also testified for the government at trial. Rogers testified that he sold cocaine and crack cocaine from November 2001 to June 2002, and that movant supplied him with cocaine in four and a half ounce quantities. During his testimony, Rogers stated he saw an individual named Melvin Barner at movant's store on February 19, 2002, and described how movant told him Barner was trying to buy drugs and asked if Rogers “could take care of hm.” Rogers testified about that particular drug transaction with Barner, and also testified that he made subsequent sales of drugs to Barner and other individuals during the relevant time period.
Barner testified for the government during movant's trial, and explained that he worked as a paid confidential informant for the DEA in the spring and summer of 2002. Barner testified about the conversation he had with movant at his store on February 19, 2002 about buying cocaine, and how he obtained Rogers' name from movant and completed a drug deal with Rogers the next day. Barner also described seven subsequent drug transactions he had with Rogers in the spring and summer of 2002.
Jermaine Franklin testified at trial about his relationship with movant, Franklin described how movant offered him approximately $1000 per week to allow movant to use his apartment to stash drugs. After agreeing to this arrangement in April 2003, movant began bringing a bag to Franklin's apartment once a week and leaving it, and that movant would retrieve items from his apartment more frequently than once a week. Franklin testified that he saw the contents of the bags and believed they contained kilograms of cocaine in a rectangular shape. Franklin testified that movant stopped dropping off drugs in July of 2003. Franklin also testified that he picked up drugs from someone named “Pop” from April to July 2003.
In addition to these witnesses, the jury heard tape recordings of calls between movant and Franklin, which Franklin identified as calls where movant would notify Franklin that he was coming to his apartment to pick up drugs.
Chris Malatesta, the sales manager at 1800 Motor Cars, testified that he sold five cars to movant and explained the falsified financing and titling arrangements. Movant's grandmother (Ruby Spielman) and father (Donald Jones) testified about their knowledge of the purchases.
On January 24, 2005, the jury convicted movant of counts II, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVII of the third superseding indictment. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count I, and returned a verdict of not guilty on counts III–XI, and IV. Extensive post-trial motions followed, as well as litigation of the forfeiture allegations in the indictment. On November 4, 2005, movant moved for a new trial on the basis of allegedly newly discovered evidence. (D.I. 207) The evidence involved an affidavit purportedly authored by government witness Melvin Barner, wherein Barner recanted his trial testimony. The court denied the motion after conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding that the Barner affidavit had been falsified. (D.I. 259)
The court sentenced movant on August 21, 2006 to a term of twenty years of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. (D.I. 276) The court also entered a final order of forfeiture, subjecting movant to a personal money judgment and forfeiting his interest in a parcel of real property in Bear, Delaware. (D.I. 274) Movant appealed, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. See United States v. Huggins, 392 Fed.Appx. 50 (3d Cir.2010).
Movant timely filed the instant pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting the following eleven grounds for relief: (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous ways; (2) the government violated movant's due process rights by using false evidence to obtain a search warrant, arrest, indictment, and conviction; (3) movant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the warrant lacked probable cause and/or contained known perjury; (4) the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by withholding exculpatory material concerning co-conspirator Franklin; (5) the government violated movant's due process rights by obtaining personal property that was outside the scope of the search warrant and then by utilizing an administrative forfeiture procedure; (6) the government violated movant's due process rights by misleading the court into seeking a money judgment against him in order to forfeit movant's real property, and the money judgment violated the double jeopardy clause because movant suffered two punishments for the same offense; (7) the $292,000 money judgment was based on fraud and violated the double jeopardy clause; (8) the court has continuously violated movant's due process rights by basing its decisions on facts that he has proven to be false; (9) movant's convictions were obtained by prosecutorial and police misconduct; (10) movant has newly discovered evidence that shows the government knowingly presented false evidence in violation of his due process rights; and (11) movant has newly discovered evidence from the IRS showing that he had a legitimate and lawful income for the years 1997 to 2003, contradicting the government's “unexplained wealth” theory it presented at his trial.
Movant's claims are overlapping and, at times, difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the court concludes that the claims should be denied for the reasons set forth below.
Movant asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by: (1) providing deficient advice about sentencing consequences; (2) failing to conduct an appropriate investigation; (3) making deficient strategic choices during the trial; (4) failing to file a timely motion for new trial; (5) failing to contest the administrative forfeiture; and (6) representing movant while operating under a conflict...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Baskerville v. United States
...regarding what they would have testified to if a § 2255 petitioner is to establish Strickland prejudice. See Huggins v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 430, 446 (D. Del. 2014) (noting that movant did not provide an affidavit from the witness stating that he would have been available to testif......
-
Baker v. United States
...regarding what they would have testified to if a § 2255 petitioner is to establish Strickland prejudice. See Huggins v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 430, 446 (D. Del. 2014) (noting that movant did not provide an affidavit from the witness stating that he would have been available to testif......
-
Costello v. United States
...that the accused did not receive full and fair consideration of his federal constitutional and statutory claimsHuggins v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 430, 456-57 (D. Del. 2014) (citing United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1979)). 1. Palumbo Factors 1 and 2 As to the first ......
-
Jones v. United States
...may overcome his procedural default on issues not directly appealed by presenting "new reliable evidence," Huggins v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 430, 458 (D. Del. 2014), "that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted . . . ." Hodge, 554 F.3d at 379. In the 2255Moti......