Hugh Wallace v. Mrs Ella Adams

• Decision Date: 25 February 1907
• Docket Number: No. 260,260
• Citation: 204 U.S. 415,27 S.Ct. 363,51 L.Ed. 547
• Parties: HUGH WALLACE, Will Wallace, Verge Goodwin, et al., Plffs. in Err., v. MRS. ELLA ADAMS, for Herself and as Natural Guardian and Next Friend of Henry McSwain and Roma McSwain, Her Minor Children
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

204 U.S. 415

27 S.Ct. 363

51 L.Ed. 547

HUGH WALLACE, Will Wallace, Verge Goodwin, et al., Plffs. in Err.,

v MRS. ELLA ADAMS, for Herself and as Natural Guardian and Next Friend of Henry McSwain and Roma McSwain, Her MinorChildren.

No. 260.

Argued December 21, 1906.

Decided February 25, 1907.

Messrs. A. C. Cruce, Jackson H. Ralston, Frederick L. Siddons, William E. Richardson, W. I. Cruce, and W. R. Bleakmore for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 415-417 intentionally omitted]Messrs. George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melven Cornish(by special leave) for Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.

Mr. Justice Brewerdelivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action commenced in September, 1904, by Mrs. Ella Adams, for herself and her minor children, defendants in error, in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, to recover possession of a tract of land in that territory.Defendants answered, and, upon trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.This judgment was sustained by the United States court of appeals of the Indian territory, and, on further appeal, reaffirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit.143 Fed. 716.

The case arises out of the legislation of Congress designed to secure the disintegration of the tribal organization of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian territory, and the distribution of the property of those tribes among the individual Indians.A full r esum e of this legislation and the general litigation following it is to be found in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722, and a full statement of the facts in this case is to be found in the opinion of the United States circuit court of appeals.An entire restatement of these matters is, therefore, unnecessary.

There is but a single matter to be determined.As counsel for plaintiffs in error say:

'The assignment of errors presents but one question.If the decree of the Choctaw-Chickasaw citizenship court, in the test case known as the Riddle Case, vacated the decree that defendant, Hill, had, theretofore, procured in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, wherein he was adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe of Indians, this case should be affirmed.If it did not, it should be reversed.'

To properly appreciate and rightly answer this single question some things in the history of the legislation and litigation and also some of the facts in this case must be noticed.

In order to divide the lands of these Indian nations an enumeration of the individuals entitled thereto became necessary.By the act of March 3, 1893(27 Stat. at L. 645, chap. 209, § 16), the commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, generally known as the Dawes Commission, was empowered to negotiate and extinguish the tribal title to the lands and to make an allotment thereof to the members of the tribe in severalty.By that of June 10, 1896(29 Stat. at L. 339, 340, chap. 398), the commission was authorized to hear the application and determine the right of each applicant for citizenship in either of these tribes.The act also granted an appeal to the proper United States district court in the Indian territory to any party aggrieved by the ruling of the commission, and declared that the judgment of that court should be final.It required the commission to make a complete roll of the citizens of each of the tribes, to be 'hereafter held and considered to be the true and correct rolls of persons entitled to the rights of citizenship in said several tribes.'Hill, who is the principal defendant, applied to be enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw Nation, and his application was finally sustained by the court, and he was, on March 8, 1898, adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe by blood and entitled to be enrolled as such.The land in controversy was selected and taken possession of by him in reliance upon this adjudication of citizenship.On July 1, 1898, Congress passed an act (30 Stat. at L. 591, chap. 545) granting to the tribes an appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in citizenship cases.Under the authority of this act many of these cases were appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgments.Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, supra.On March 21, 1902, an agreement was made between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, which was confirmed by act of CongressJuly 1, 1902(32 Stat. at L. 641, chap. 1362).This agreement and act were substantially that a court known as the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court should be created, and that that court should have power, in a suit in equity brought by either or both of these tribes against any ten persons who had been admitted to citizenship or enrolment by the terms of the judgments of the several United States courts in the Indian territory, as representa- tives of all persons similarly situated, to determine whether the judgments of those courts should be annulled on account of certain alleged irregularities.The agreement and act also provided that, in case the citizenship courts should decide that those judgments should be annulled the papers in any action in those courts, wherein such a judgment had been rendered, should, upon seasonable application of either party, be transferred to the citizenship court, which should proceed to a hearing and determination of the question of citizenship.Under this agreement and act the court was established and test suit brought, in which a decree was entered to the effect that the judgments of the United States courts in the Indian territory, whereby persons were admitted to citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations under the act of June 10, 1896, were annulled and vacated.Hill was not named a party in that test suit, nor did he thereafter apply for a transfer of his case to the citizenship court.The above statement of facts is sufficiently full for an understanding of the single question presented for determination.

That single question may be divided into two.First, was the decree in the Indian territorycourt declaring Hill a citizen a finality, beyond the power of Congress to in any manner disturb?This was answered in the Stephens Case, supra.In that casewe held that Congress could authorize a review of the judgments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in citizenship cases, and this although, by the terms of prior legislation, those judgments had become final.While sustaining the act authorizing such review and providing for appeals to this court, we construed it as limiting the appeals to the question of the constitutionality or validity of the legislation, and not as bringing before us the facts in the instances of all applications for citizenship.In the opinion (page 477, L. ed. page 1052, Sup. Ct. Rep. page 734)we said:

'The contention is that the act of July 1, 1898, in extending the remedy by appeal to this court, was invalid because retrospective, an invasion of the judicial domain, and de- structive of vested rights.By its terms the act was to operate retrospectively, and as to that it may be observed that while the general rule is that statutes should be so construed as to give them only prospective operation, yet, where the language expresses a contrary intention in unequivocal terms, the mere fact that the legislation is retroactive does not necessarily render it void.

'And while it is undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of courts, compel them to grant new trials, order the discharge of offenders, or direct what steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry, the grant of a new remedy by way of review has been often sustained under particular circumstances.Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648;Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222, 8 L. ed. 665;Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160, 17 L. ed. 922;Garrison v. New York, 21...