Hughes v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-00238 |
| Parties | JEFFREY HUGHES, Plaintiff, v. ZANE DUNCAN, GARY M. FAULCON, TIM GOBBLE, MAE BEAVERS, ROBERTA NEVIL KUSTOFF, and BARRETT RICH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
While Jeffrey Hughes was serving a 27-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Corrections, the Reentry Success Act of 2021 was passed by the General Assembly. That Act amended the parole eligibility requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-503 by providing that “there is a presumption that an eligible inmate must be released on parole, except for good cause shown, upon the inmate reaching the inmate's release eligibility date or any subsequent parole hearing.” 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 410, § 12. Because Hughes was eligible for release on September 30, 2021, but was not released until December 27, 2021, and because he alleges good cause was not shown for that delay, he sues each member of the Tennessee Board of Parole (“Board”) in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hughes seeks damages “in an amount of not less than $1 million,” plus attorney's fees and costs for the violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process and for having to spend an additional three months in prison. (Doc. No. 1 at 12). Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. No 21).
On July 22, 2020, the Board held an initial parol hearing for Hughes, denied parole, and set the next hearing for sometime in July 2022. However, based on the Reentry Success Act, Hughes submitted a petition to the Board on June 21, 2021, requesting that he be given another parole hearing before his eligible release date. The Board took the position the Act did not apply retroactively, with counsel for the Board explaining:
The Reentry Success Act applies to parole determinations made on or after the effective date. It does not retroactively apply such that the Board must rehear the thousands of offenders that were previously heard and declined but may be eligible under the Act upon reaching their review dates. Unfortunately, the Board does not have the ability or resources necessary to identify and reconsider all of those cases including Mr. Hughes.
(Doc. No. 1-2 at 3-4).[1] On June 23, 2021, two days after the petition was filed, counsel for Hughes appeared at an administrative meeting of the Board and requested that the Board “afford Mr. Hughes a parole hearing before his eligible release date in compliance with the Reentry Success Act of 2021.” (Id. at 4). The Board took no action on that request and was not scheduled to meet again until
January 26, 2022 - months after Hughes' eligible release date. (Id.).
Hughes then filed a Writ of Certiorari petition with the Davidson County Tennessee Chancery Court “seek[ing] a review of the Board's action, or lack thereof, at the June 23, 2021 meeting when asked to set a parole hearing for Mr. Hughes consistent with his release eligibility date.” Id. at 6. On September 24, 2021, Chancellor Martin entered a decision in Hughes' favor.
Acknowledging that “the Act constitutes a sea change in how parole matters are to be handled in Tennessee for eligible inmates,” and recognizing the Board's concern that retroactive application of the Act ‘will require it to set hearings for inmates who have upcoming release eligibility dates outside of the ordinary course of the hearing schedule,” Chancellor Martin nevertheless found that eligible inmates “are entitled to a parole hearing within a reasonable time of their release eligibility date, as well as a presumption of parole release except for good cause shown, which must be reduced to writing with an explanation regarding what the inmate can do to improve his or her chances.” (Id. at 8, 9) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(i) & (j)). More specifically, Chancellor Martin ruled that the “plain meaning” of language of the Act “is that an eligible inmate is entitled to parole consideration upon reaching his or her release eligibility date.” Id. at 8 (citation omitted, emphasis in original). To hold otherwise, in her opinion, would be “inconsistent with all principles of due process and of the obligation of the State to ‘follow the laws of the State of Tennessee as well as its own rules, and that inmates are entitled to whatever due process arises as a result of the proper application of state statutes and the rules.'” (Id. at 7-8) (quoting Greenwood v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, 547 S.W.3d 207, 214-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017)).
As it pertained to Hughes, Chancellor Martin found that:
the Board failed to adhere to the requirement of the Act, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(i) and (j), when it denied Mr. Hughes' June 23, 2021 request for a parole hearing earlier than July of 2022 and in reasonable proximity to his release eligibility date. The Board's action denied Mr. Hughes the opportunity to exercise his substantive rights at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner as due process requires.
(Id. at 9). Accordingly, she remanded the matter to the Board to set a parole hearing within sixty days of Hughes' release eligibility date. (Id. at 10). The Board did not appeal Chancellor Martin's decision.
On November 29, 2021, the Board held a hearing and found that Hughes was eligible for parole. However, the Parole Certificate issued by the Board, stated that Hughes was not entitled to release until December 27, 2021, and he was paroled from the Department of Corrections on that date.
Defendants move to dismiss on three grounds. First, as parole board members, they assert that they are entitled to absolute immunity. Second, even if absolute immunity does not apply, Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Third, Defendants argue that because “the complaint contains essentially no allegations of any individual actions of Defendant,” it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
After thorough review of the filings, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to immunity and, therefore, need not reach Defendants' alternative argument that the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations to state a claim. Prior to reaching the immunity issues, however, the Court must first address Hughes' contention that the immunity defenses are barred by res judicata or judicial estoppel based upon the proceedings before Chancellor Martin.
“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Consequently, “[i]n deciding whether res judicata or the full faith and credit statute lend preclusive effect to a particular state court decision, federal courts look to the state's law to ‘assess the preclusive effect it would attach' to that decision.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1537 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Burda Bros., Inc. v. Walsh, 22 Fed.Appx. 423, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2001) () “An analysis of res judicata or collateral estoppel by a prior state court proceeding in a federal § 1983 action must thus begin with a consideration of whether relitigation of the issue or claim would be barred under state law.” Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946, 965 (6th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, “federal law then provides a check on the state process by requiring that the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted has had a ‘full and fair opportunity' to raise or litigate the issue decided by the prior state court litigation.” Id. (citing Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313(1983); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102 (1980)).
Under Tennessee law, “[t]he party asserting a defense predicated on res judicata or claim preclusion must demonstrate (1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) that the same parties or their privies were involved in both suits, (3) that the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits, and (4) that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App.1998)). “A party asserting a res judicata defense may generally prove its defense with a copy of the judgment in the former proceeding.” Regions Bank v. Prager, 625 S.W.3d 842, 848 (Tenn. 2021).
Here, Hughes relies upon Chancellor Martin's Memorandum Opinion, but that decision fails to establish either the second or third elements necessary for res judicata. As for the second element, Hughes also cites his own Complaint to show privity, even though the Defendant in the Chancery Court was the “Tennessee Board of Parole Board,” and the Defendants here are the Board members in their individual capacities. This is a distinction with a huge difference. Hughes's position would require the Court to adopt “a transitive theory of capacities,” Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2013), while at the same time ignoring the rule of differing capacities.
In the context of claim preclusion and res judicata, “privity . . . means a successor in interest to the party, one who controlled the earlier action, or one whose interests were adequately represented.” Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller, 973 F.2d 474, 481 (6th Cir.1992)....
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