Jackson v. Smith
| Decision Date | 16 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. W2011–00194–SC–R11–CV.,W2011–00194–SC–R11–CV. |
| Citation | 387 S.W.3d 486 |
| Parties | Jeanette Rea JACKSON v. Bradley SMITH. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Andrea D. Sipes, Matthew E. Wright, and Bradley J. Owens, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeanette Rea Jackson.
Curtis F. Hopper, Savannah, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bradley Smith.
This appeal involves the efforts of a grandmother to obtain court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306 (2010). Shortly after the death of her daughter, the grandmother filed a petition in the Chancery Court for McNairy County seeking visitation with her granddaughter. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the grandmother's request for visitation because she had failed to prove the statutory grounds necessary to permit a court to order grandparental visitation over a parent's objection. The grandmother did not appeal this decision. After the decision became final, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute by creating a new rebuttable presumption that a child whose parent dies will be substantially harmed by the cessation of an existing relationship with a grandparent who is the parent of the deceased parent. Without alleging new facts and relying solely on the change in the statutory burden of persuasion, the grandmother filed a second petition in the trial court seeking visitation with her granddaughter. The trial court granted the child's father's motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. Jackson v. Smith, No. W2011–00194–COA–R3CV, 2011 WL 3963589 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 9, 2011). We granted the grandmother's application for permission to appeal to determine whether the intervening change in the burden of persuasion in the grandparental visitation statute provided an exception to the operation of the res judicata doctrine. We have determined that it does not and that, without some material change in the facts, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of the grandmother's petition for grandparental visitation.
Bradley Smith and Stephanie Smith were married and made their home in Corinth, Mississippi. In November 2006, Ms. Smith gave birth to a daughter. The child lived with both parents until August 2008. From August 2008 to February 2009, the child was in the custody of Ms. Smith in Burnsville, Mississippi. In February 2009, the child went to live with Mr. Smith in McNairy County, Tennessee. Two months later, on April 8, 2009, Ms. Smith died unexpectedly. Following her daughter's death, Jeanette Jackson, a resident of Alabama, requested visitation with her granddaughter on several occasions. Eventually, Mr. Smith declined to permit Ms. Jackson to visit her granddaughter.
On April 27, 2009, Ms. Jackson filed a petition in the Chancery Court for McNairy County seeking visitation with her granddaughter in accordance with Tennessee's grandparental visitation statute (“2009 petition”).1 At that time, the statute required grandparents seeking visitation with a grandchild, despite the child's parent's objection, to prove (1) that they had a significant existing relationship with their grandchild,2 (2) that the child was likely to suffer severe emotional harm or other direct and substantial harm by the loss of the relationship with the grandparent,3 and (3) that permitting grandparental visitation would be in the child's best interests.4
Following a two-day hearing, the trial court found that Ms. Jackson had visited her granddaughter frequently before Ms. Smith's death.5 However, on October 2, 2009, the trial court entered an order finding that Ms. Jackson had failed to prove that the cessation of her relationship with her granddaughter was likely to cause the child severe emotional harm or present a danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child. Ms. Jackson did not appeal this decision, and so the trial court's October 2, 2009 order became final.
During its 2010 session, the Tennessee General Assembly amended Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306 to create a new “rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship between the child and grandparent” when the child's parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of the deceased parent.6 Ms. Jackson and her lawyer played a prominent role in the General Assembly's adoption of this amendment.
The new rebuttable presumption in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306(b)(4) took effect on May 26, 2010. On July 9, 2010, Ms. Jackson filed a second petition for grandparental visitation in the Chancery Court for McNairy County (“2010 petition”). This petition did not allege any facts regarding the child, Mr. Smith, or Ms. Jackson that had not been alleged in Ms. Jackson's 2009 petition. However, the petition alleged that “[t]here now exists a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship between the subject child and the Petitioner, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36–6–306, as amended by Public Chapter 957 of the Public Acts of 2010.”
On August 9, 2010, Mr. Smith filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Jackson's 2010 petition on the ground that the trial court's final disposition of her 2009 petition on the merits precluded her from relitigating her grandparental visitation claim in the absence of a material change in the child's circumstances. Ms. Jackson filed a response to Mr. Smith's motion on October 14, 2010, in which she agreed that her 2009 petition had been fully litigated and that the judgment entered on October 2, 2009, was a final judgment. However, she insisted that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306(b)(4) amounted to a substantial change in the law and, therefore, that the doctrine of res judicata did not prohibit her from relitigating her request for grandparental visitation based on facts that had already been fully adjudicated by the court just one year earlier.
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 8, 2010, granting Mr. Smith's motion to dismiss. The trial court stated that the evidence Ms. Jackson presented to support her 2009 petition had failed to establish a danger of substantial harm to her granddaughter if visitation were discontinued. While the trial court noted the 2010 adoption of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306(b)(4), it concluded that res judicata barred the 2010 petition because Ms. Jackson did not dispute “the validity and finality” of its October 2, 2009 judgment.
Ms. Jackson appealed the dismissal of her 2010 petition to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court's September 9, 2011 opinion did not definitively decide whether the 2010 enactment of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306(b)(4) required the courts to make an exception to the customary operation of the doctrine of res judicata. After considering the “facts of this case” and the “nature of the statutory enactment,” the court decided that “the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in this case.” Jackson v. Smith, No. W2011–00194–COA–R3CV, 2011 WL 3963589, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 9, 2011). However, the court declined to review the trial court's decision that the doctrine of res judicata should be applied in this case because Ms. Jackson's failure “to meet her burden to provide an adequate record in this case” prevented the court from conducting “a meaningful review of the question of whether the First Order [the order entered on October 2, 2009] was final from a technical standpoint.” Jackson v. Smith, 2011 WL 3963589, at *11.
As a threshold matter, we turn to the question of whether the record is sufficient to enable the appellate courts to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata bars Ms. Jackson's 2010 petition seeking visitation with her granddaughter. The Court of Appeals determined that the record is fatally deficient because it does not contain a copy of the trial court's October 2, 2009 order. The appellate court reasoned that it could not determine whether this order satisfied the “technical requirements for finality of orders” without a copy of the order in the record. We share the Court of Appeals' concern regarding the parties' nonchalant approach to preserving an appellate record that contains a “fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R.App. P. 24(a). However, we have determined that Ms. Jackson's concessions regarding the proceedings relating to her 2009 petition and the October 2, 2009 order cure these deficiencies and provide the appellate courts with a sufficient foundation for deciding whether the enactment of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–6–306(b)(4) saves Ms. Jackson's 2010 petition from the customary operation of the doctrine of res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same claim with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn.2009); Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn.1989)). It is a “rule of rest,” Moulton v. Ford Motor Co., 533 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn.1976), and it promotes finality in litigation, prevents inconsistent or contradictory judgments, conserves judicial resources, and protects litigants from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits. In re Estate of Boote, 198 S.W.3d 699, 718 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005); Sweatt v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 88 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002).
The party asserting a defense predicated on res judicata or claim preclusion must demonstrate (1) that the...
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