Hughes v. Frito Lay, Inc., No. COA07-1510 (N.C. App. 7/1/2008)
| Decision Date | 01 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. COA07-1510,COA07-1510 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JENNIE HUGHES, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRITO LAY, INC., Employer, RSKCO, Carrier, Defendants-Appellees. |
Tania L. Leon, P.A., by Tania L. Leon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by Zachary C. Bolen, for Defendants-Appellees.
Jennie Hughes (Plaintiff) appeals from an opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) filed on 7 September 2007 upon remand from our Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
The Commission entered an opinion and award on 27 August 2004, in which it recited the parties' stipulation that Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident on 28 August 2001. The Commission made the following finding of fact regarding whether Plaintiff's psychological problems were caused by her compensable injury:
25. Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, [P]laintiff's need for treatment for her psychological problems, which, according to Dr. Carter, primarily related to her frustration with efforts to return her to work and her lack of control over her medical care and return-to-work situation, flowed directly from and was a direct and natural result of conditions related to her compensable injury. Plaintiff's psychological problems were not disabling. Plaintiff continued to work while receiving psychiatric consultations and by 26 July 2002, her generalized anxiety disorder had nearly resolved. No weight is given to Dr. Carter's opinion that [P]laintiff was not capable of returning to work due to impaired concentration and focus.
However, the Commission concluded as follows:
2. Because the compensability of [P]laintiff's original injury is not in dispute, [D]efendants have the burden of proving that [P]laintiff's musculoskeletal problems, including pain in her back, knee, hip, arm, and shoulder are not the result of or causally related to her original injury by accident. Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540, 485 S.E.2d 867 (1997). Based on the greater weight of the evidence, [D]efendants have met this burden only as to [P]laintiff's psychological problems.
The Commission also concluded:
5. Plaintiff is entitled to the payment of medical expenses incurred or to be incurred for the treatment of the injury to her back, right knee, right hip, right arm, and right shoulder and her psychological condition related to her injury so long as such treatment is reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, and/or lessen [P]laintiff's disability.
As to the issue of disability, the Commission found:
27. As a result of her 28 August 2001 injuryby accident to her back, right knee, right hip, right arm, and right shoulder and related conditions, [P]laintiff has been unable to earn wages in any position with [D]efendant-[E]mployer or in any other employment for the period from 7 March 2002 through the present and continuing.
The Commission concluded:
4. As a result of her 28 August 2001 injury by accident and related conditions, [P]laintiff is entitled to be paid by [D]efendants ongoing total disability compensation at the rate of $620.00 per week for the period of 7 March 2002 through the present and continuing until further order of the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29.
Plaintiff and Defendants appealed to our Court.
On appeal, Defendants argued that "the Commission's Opinion and Award [was] inherently contradictory on the issue of psychological causation and that the Commission erred by finding and concluding [P]laintiff's psychological condition was causally related to her elbow injury." Hughes v. Frito Lay, Inc., 176 N.C. App. 189, 625 S.E.2d 916 (2006) (unpublished). Plaintiff cross-appealed and argued that "the Commission erred in finding [P]laintiff's psychological problems [were] not disabling and in finding and concluding that [Defendants had] met their burden of showing [P]laintiff's psychological problems [were] not the result of her original compensable injury." Id. Our Court held:
Because it is not possible to divine the true intent of the Commission based upon the record before this Court, we must remand this issue back to the Commission so that it may make proper findings of fact that are not inherently contradictory and that adequately support its conclusions of law.
Id. Defendants also argued that "the Commission erred when it found [P]laintiff was totally disabled because of her injury at work." Id. Our Court recognized that it was "unclear from the record whether [P]laintiff [had] shown that, due solely to her physical conditions, she [was] unable to earn the same wages she had earned before the injury, either in the same employment or in other employment." Id. Our Court further recognized that the "only support found in the record for an award for total disability is Dr. Carter's opinion that [P]laintiff was not capable of returning to work due to her impaired concentration and focus." Id. However, our Court held as follows:
As discussed above, the Commission's findings regarding [P]laintiff's psychological disability are inconsistent and cannot support a finding of total disability. As the Commission's findings on [P]laintiff's disability are inconsistent, and it is unclear from the record before this Court whether [P]laintiff met her burden of establishing her ongoing total disability, we must also remand this issue back to the Commission so that it may make proper findings of fact that adequately support its conclusions of law.
Id. Defendants also argued the Commission "erred in concluding [P]laintiff was entitled to ongoing total disability benefits because [D]efendants failed to offer [P]laintiff any job after her completion of jury duty in June of 2002." Id. As to this issue, our Court held as follows:
In the instant case, it is unclear whether [P]laintiff met her initial burden and so whether suitable employment was offered or refused is not at issue. Therefore, as in Issue III, supra, we remand this issue back to the Commission to determine whether, after making proper findings of fact as to disability, this issue is relevant.
On remand, the Commission issued an opinion and award on 7 September 2007. Regarding the issue of causation, the Commission determined in finding of fact number 27 that "[P]laintiff's need for treatment for her psychological problems was not a direct and natural result of conditions related to her compensable injury." As to disability, the Commission found that "[t]here is insufficient evidence in the record from which to determine [P]laintiff's disability after 9 July 2002, although Dr. Taub continued to provide treatment after that date." The Commission concluded as follows: "[P]laintiff has the burden of proving disability, and [P]laintiff has not shown she made reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment or that seeking suitable employment would be futile or that due to her injury she has obtained employment earning less than pre-injury wages." The Commission ordered Defendants to pay to Plaintiff total disability compensation at the rate of $620.00 per week from 28 August 2001 through 9 July 2002. The Commission also determined that Plaintiff was "entitled to permanent partial disability compensation at the rate of $620.00 for a period of 36 weeks for the fifteen percent (15%) rating to her right arm." The Commission further determined that Defendants were entitled to a credit for wages Plaintiff earned during the periods she returned to a modified job and for any overpayment of temporary total disability compensation Plaintiff had received. The Commission ordered Defendants to pay for "all related medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by [P]laintiff in the future, for the treatment of her back, right knee, right hip, right arm, and right shoulder so long as such treatment is reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, and/or lessen [P]laintiff's disability." Plaintiff appeals.
Review by this Court of an opinion and award of the Commission is limited to a determination of "whether any competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether [those] findings . . . support the Commission's conclusions of law." Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). If supported by competent evidence, the Commission's findings are conclusive, even if the evidence also might have supported contrary findings.Jones v. Candler Mobile Village, 118 N.C. App. 719, 721, 457 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1995). Our review "`goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.'" Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)), reh'g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). "[E]vidence tending to support [the] plaintiff's claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff, and [the] plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence." Id.; see also Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968) (). However, we review the Commission's conclusions of law de novo. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2 695, 701 (2004).
Plaintiff argues that finding of fact number 27 is not supported by competent evidence. Finding of fact number 27 reads as follows:
Based upon the...
To continue reading
Request your trial