Hughes v. Hess

• Decision Date: 26 May 1943
• Docket Number: No. 8070.,8070.
• Citation: 172 S.W.2d 301
• Parties: HUGHES v. HESS et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

172 S.W.2d 301

HUGHES v. HESS et al.

No. 8070.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 26, 1943.

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1943.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Robert Hughes, independent executor of the estate of Mrs. Emma Cornell, deceased, against D. L. Hess and others to recover on certain vendor's lien notes and foreclose the lien. A judgment for plaintiff against named defendant for the amount of the notes, but denying foreclosure, was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, 166 S.W.2d 718, and plaintiff brings error.

Judgments reformed in part, and affirmed as reformed.

Hughes, Hardeman & Wilson and R. G. Hughes, all of San Angelo, for plaintiff in error.

Collins, Jackson, Snodgrass & Blanks, of San Angelo, for defendants in error.

SHARP, Justice.

This suit, on certain vendor's lien notes and to foreclose the lien securing the notes, was instituted by Robert Hughes, independent executor of the estate of Mrs. Emma Cornell, deceased, against D. L. Hess, who had assumed the notes in question, and Noah Millsap, E. F. Richardson, and Mrs. Lela Viola Millsap Richardson. Upon trial without a jury, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the amount of the notes as against D. L. Hess, but foreclosure was denied. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 166 S.W.2d 718.

The vendor's lien notes on which this suit was brought were originally executed in 1914, in part payment for 96 acres of land in Irion County, Texas. It is unnecessary to notice the transfers of the notes until October 25, 1930, on which date D. L. Hess, one of the defendants herein, assumed the balance due on said notes to the estate of Mrs. M. A. Smith, deceased, of which Jerry Monroe was then temporary administrator. This conveyance was filed for record on December 23, 1930. On December 18, 1931, by authority of the Probate Court, Jerry Monroe, Temporary Administrator, filed suit against D. L. Hess on the notes, and on the same day filed notice of lis pendens. On June 3, 1932, the suit was settled out of court by a compromise agreement, whereby D. L. Hess paid $500 interest on the notes, and executed, acknowledged, and delivered an extension agreement, which purported to extend the notes and lien, the notes to become due and payable June 1, 1934. This instrument was not filed for record until October 15, 1936. A report of this transaction, along with others, was filed in the Probate Court on September 19, 1932. This report was never, as far as the record shows, formally approved by the Probate Court. In fact, the Probate Court in 1936 refused to approve the final account of Jerry Monroe as administrator. However, on June 9, 1937, with the express approval of the Probate Court, the then permanent administrator sold the notes, along with other assets of the estate, to the present owners. If the agreement of June 3, 1932, is valid as an extension agreement, the note and lien would not have been barred until after June 1, 1938. The present suit was filed in 1937.

The title asserted by the defendant Mrs. Lela Viola Millsap Richardson (who is the real party defendant in so far as the foreclosure sought is concerned, Noah Millsap and E. F. Richardson being merely parties pro forma) arose in this manner: On February 6, 1933, Mrs. Richardson (then Lela Viola Millsap) recovered a judgment against D. L. Hess in a personal injury suit. An abstract of this judgment was issued and filed in Irion County on August 14, 1934. On January 8, 1935, the judgment lien having been kept in force, Mrs. Richardson caused an alias execution to be issued under her judgment against D. L. Hess, and the land involved in this suit was levied upon and purchased by Mrs. Richardson on February 5, 1935, for $250, which amount was credited on her judgment.

As stated above, suit was first filed on these notes and for foreclosure in 1937. In the first trial of the case, judgment was for the plaintiff in the trial court. On the first appeal the Court of Civil Appeals, in an opinion reported in Richardson v. Hughes, 146 S.W.2d 255, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case, holding that, in the light of the record then before the court, the temporary administrator was without authority to enter into the extension agreement of June 3, 1932, and that, consequently, the extension agreement was void. Since the court felt that the case had not been fully developed in the trial court as to the authority of the temporary administrator, it was remanded. On this first appeal the case was "Dismissed—Correct Judgment," by the Supreme Court.

On the second trial of the case the plaintiff amended his pleadings, setting up as an alternative pleading that the purported extension agreement was effective as an acknowledgment in writing by the debtor of the justness of the debt, sufficient to toll the statute of limitation. He also set out an additional extension agreement, dated February 25, 1941, duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded, in which the maturity date of the notes was recited to be June 1, 1941.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Mrs. Richardson, who purchased the lands involved at the execution sale by crediting the amount of her bid on her judgment against D. L. Hess, did not take title to the lands subject to the right of the debtor Hess and the holder of the vendor's lien to renew and extend such lien so as to retain the priority of same over the rights and title acquired by Mrs. Richardson at the execution sale, such lien being of record in the proper county and not being barred by limitation at the time said abstract of judgment was filed.

The instrument in writing signed by the debtor, Dr. D. L. Hess, dated June 3, 1932, and acknowledged before a notary public, describes the vendor's lien notes in controversy as being payable to the order of Mrs. Mattie A. Monroe (now Mrs. M. A. Smith), and recites that "Dr. D. L. Hess is the person obligated to pay said notes," and concludes with the statement "that the said parties do agree and contract that the dates of maturities of said notes are hereby extended to and shall hereafter read and be the 1st day of June, 1934, and that such vendor's lien shall continue and be in force for four years after the maturity of said notes as so renewed and extended."

Article 5520, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, provides, among other things, that actions for foreclosure of vendor's liens on real estate shall be commenced and prosecuted within four years, subject to certain exceptions.

Article 5522, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, prescribes the general rule regarding how a debt and lien may be continued in force, and in part reads as follows: "Provided the owner of the land and the holder of the note or notes may at any time enter into a valid agreement renewing and extending the debt and lien, so long as it does not prejudice the rights of lien holders or purchasers subsequent to the date such liens became barred of record under laws existing prior to the taking effect of, or under this Act; as to all such lien holders or purchasers any renewal or extension executed or filed for record after the note or notes and lien or liens were, or are, barred of record and before the filing for record of such renewal or extension, such renewal or extension shall be void."

Article 5539, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, reads as follows: "When an action may appear to be barred by a law of limitation, no acknowledgment of the justness of the claim made subsequent to the time it became due shall be admitted in evidence to take the case out of the operation of the law, unless such acknowledgment be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby."

In the case of Novosad v. Svrcek, 129 Tex. 34, 102 S.W.2d 393, 395, in construing Article 5522 of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, this court said:

"The rule is now settled that the vendee may execute an extension to the holder of the original vendor's lien notes without the consent of a party who holds a subsequent lien on the land, and said agreement is binding on the junior lien holder. Caffarelli Bros. v. Pearce et al., Tex.Com.App., 34 S. W.2d 813; Howell et al. v. Townsend, Tex. Civ.App., 217 S.W. 975, writ refused, and authorities cited therein; Wilkinson et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Crosbyton, 118 Tex. 202, 13 S.W.2d 346. It has also been held that where a party acquires a junior lien when the senior lien was in full force, and while the junior lien was in force, the first lien became barred by limitation and it was renewed and extended in writing, duly acknowledged and recorded, said renewal of the first lien would be binding on the junior lien holder. Caffarelli Bros. v. Pearce et al., supra; Howell et al. v. Townsend, supra; T. A. Hill State Bank of Weimar et al. v. Schindler et al., Tex. Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 833; Watson et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Coleman, Tex.Com....