Hughes v. Inland Container Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 64352,64352
• Citation: 799 P.2d 1011,247 Kan. 407
• Parties: Sharon K. HUGHES, Claimant/Appellee, v. INLAND CONTAINER CORPORATION, Respondent/Appellant, and Highlands Insurance Company, Carrier/Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1011

799 P.2d 1011

247 Kan. 407

Sharon K. HUGHES, Claimant/Appellee, v. INLAND CONTAINER CORPORATION, Respondent/Appellant and Highlands Insurance Company, Carrier/Appellant.

No. 64352.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 26, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

1. General principles of statutory construction are stated and applied.

2. In an appeal from the district court in a workers compensation case, the scope of review by an appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determine whether the district court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence.

3. Substantial evidence in a workers compensation case is evidence that possesses something of substance and relevant consequence or evidence that furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues presented can be reasonably resolved.

The test for determining permanent partial general disability is the extent, expressed as a percentage, to which the ability of the employee to perform work in the open labor market has been reduced and the ability of the worker to earn comparable wages has been reduced, taking into consideration the employee's education, training, experience, and capacity for rehabilitation.

5. In determining the extent of permanent partial general disability, both the reduction of a claimant's ability to perform work in the open labor market and the ability to earn comparable wages must be considered.

6. Under the facts of this case, the district court's finding that claimant suffered a work-related injury during the scope and course of her employment is supported by substantial competent evidence, and the district court did not err in finding that claimant suffered a permanent partial general disability as a result of her injury.

Joseph R. Ebbert, of Niewald, Waldeck, Norris & Brown, Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellants.

Michael L. Sexton, of Callen, Sexton & Shelor, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief, for claimant/appellee.

Dennis L. Horner and Keith C. Sevedge, of Horner & Duckers, Chartered, Kansas City, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Ass'n of Trial Lawyers.

John M. Ostrowski and Jan L. Fisher, of McCullough, Wareheim & LaBunker, P.A., Topeka, and Thomas E. Hammond, of Render & Kamas, Wichita, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas AFL-CIO.

Kip A. Kubin, of Payne & Jones, Chartered, Overland Park, was on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Ass'n of Defense Counsel.

ALLEGRUCCI, Justice:

This is an appeal by the employer, Inland Container Corporation, and its insurance carrier, Highlands Insurance Company, from the judgment of the district court awarding compensation to the claimant, Sharon K. Hughes. The administrative law judge had denied the claim. The director of the Kansas Division of Workers Compensation had affirmed this decision. In an appeal to the district court, the district court found and awarded benefits for a permanent partial general disability of 48.25%. The employer and its insurance carrier appealed, and the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3017.

Claimant alleges that she was injured while working for appellant Inland Container Corporation (Inland) at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 9, 1987. She had been working for Inland about three weeks and was working in her third job assignment. As a bailer, she gathered scraps of waste and fed it into a bailer that shredded, compacted, and wrapped the waste. In performing this work, she had to lift stacks of waste weighing approximately 10 pounds each and put them into an auger. She had to pick up a 10-pound stack about every five minutes. The job required a lot of bending and lifting.

Claimant testified that she was pulling a 300- to 400-pound cart up an incline when she slipped on a piece of paper and began to fall. She was holding onto the cart and did not fall all the way to the ground. At the time, she felt a pull in her left hip. She moved her hips and determined that she was able to keep working. She finished her shift, leaving at about 5:00 a.m. and went home, showered, and went to bed. After sleeping for about four hours, she awoke in pain. She went to a chiropractor she had used before, Dr. Meng, who gave her an adjustment, which allowed her to return to work. She reported for her next shift at 4:00 p.m. and did not feel any pain at that time. By 7:00 p.m., her left hip was causing her a lot of pain, and she realized she would not be able to complete the shift. She found two of her supervisors and told them she was in pain and wanted to leave. She complained of a general pain and did not advise her supervisors of a specific injury or of her visit to the chiropractor before beginning that shift.

Claimant's supervisors stated that when she met with them, she complained of soreness from the new job activity and did not mention a particular accident or injury. They advised claimant that they were short of help and that she could not leave unless she turned in her tools, in other words, that she quit. Her supervisors indicated that when she quit, claimant did not request medical care, walked normally, and acted happy to quit. Claimant testified that when she quit, she thought she would be able to return to her job if she had a doctor's excuse.

According to claimant, the pain intensified that night, keeping her from sitting or lying down. The next morning, she saw an orthopedic surgeon, who immediately admitted her to a hospital. He diagnosed a herniated L-5/S-1 disc. The hospital contacted Inland that day, inquiring about claimant's insurance. When Inland indicated claimant had no insurance because she had quit her job that day, the hospital informed Inland that she had been admitted complaining of an "industrial accident." Inland then sent claimant to its physicians, the Business and Industry Health Group. Following the hearing on her claim for workers compensation, the administrative law judge denied compensation on June 27, 1989, finding that "claimant has not met the burden of proof by substantial credible evidence that she sustained an accidental injury in the course of her employment with respondent around July 9, 1987." The director affirmed the finding by the administrative law judge. In the appeal to the District Court of Wyandotte County, the Hon. William M. Cook reversed the administrative law judge's decision, ruling that claimant had sustained an injury in the scope and course of her employment with Inland. The trial court found that claimant had sustained a permanent partial general disability of 48.25%.

The first issue on appeal is whether the record contains substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that claimant received an accidental injury during the scope and course of her employment.

In a workers compensation proceeding, the claimant has the burden of proof to establish her right to an award of compensation and to prove the various conditions on which the claimant's right depends. K.S.A.1989 Supp. 44-501(a). The burden of proof is "the burden of a party to persuade the trier of facts by a preponderance of the credible evidence that such party's position on an issue is more probably true than not true on the basis of the whole record." K.S.A.1989 Supp. 44-508(g). The scope of review by a district court in a workers compensation case is by trial de novo on the record. The district court hears no new or additional evidence, but makes an independent adjudication of the facts and law based upon the transcript of the proceedings before the director of workers compensation. Reeves v. Equipment Services Industries, Inc., 245 Kan. 165, 176, 777 P.2d 765 (1989).

In an appeal from the district court in a workers compensation case, the scope of review by an appellate court is to determine whether the district court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, and, if substantial evidence supports the district court's factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or reverse the final order of the district court. In workers compensation cases, the term "substantial evidence" means "evidence that possesses something of substance and relevant consequence or evidence that furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues presented can be reasonably resolved." Baxter v. L.T. Walls Constr. Co., 241 Kan. 588, 591, 738 P.2d 445 (1987) (citing Crabtree v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 229 Kan. 440, 442, 625 P.2d 453 [1981]; see, e.g., Maxwell v. City of Topeka, 5 Kan.App.2d 5, 6, 611 P.2d 161, rev. denied 228 Kan. 807 (1980). Substantial competent evidence is also defined as evidence that is relevant and that carries enough weight to allow one to conclude that the judgment is proper. Harris v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 9 Kan.App.2d 334, 335, 678 P.2d 178 (1984) (citing Hardman v. City of Iola, 219 Kan. 840, 844, 549 P.2d 1013 [1976].

Inland argues that the record in the present case does not contain substantial competent evidence to establish claimant's injuries occurred during the course of her employment with Inland. In support of its argument, Inland notes that claimant did not report an accident to her employer through her supervisors or to Dr. Meng, the first chiropractor she visited. Claimant was treated by Dr. Meng less than two weeks before this alleged accident, and her visit of July 9, 1987, is not reported in Dr. Meng's records as resulting from any new injury. Further, claimant did not report her injury when she returned to work the next shift. After working only three hours, claimant told her supervisor that she was sore from new work activity and again reported no incident of slipping or other injury.

Further, Inland argues that the only evidence in support of a finding that the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment was claimant's...