Hughes v. LOCAL NO. 11 OF INTERNAT'L ASS'N OF BRIDGE, ETC.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 13328.,13328.
• Citation: 287 F.2d 810
• Parties: Henry HUGHES, Appellant, v. LOCAL NO. 11 OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRONWORKERS, AFL-CIO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

287 F.2d 810 (1961)

Henry HUGHES, Appellant, v. LOCAL NO. 11 OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRONWORKERS, AFL-CIO.

No. 13328.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued December 9, 1960.

Decided March 9, 1961.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John J. Bracken, Newark, N. J. (Bracken & Walsh, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellant.

Nathan Duff, Perth Amboy, N. J., for appellee.

Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.

BIGGS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the court below dismissing an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant, Hughes, against Local 11 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO, on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. The following appears from the complaint, the answer, and from affidavits filed in this case in the court below. The plaintiff is a member in good standing of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (the International). He is also a member in good standing of Local 489 of the International, located at Scranton, Pennsylvania. On or about October 1, 1951, he moved from Scranton to Mine Hill, New Jersey, which lies within the district allocated by the International to Local 11. Since that date the plaintiff has performed work within the jurisdiction of Local 11 with that Local's knowledge and consent. On or about October 3, 1957, the plaintiff requested a transfer from Local 489 to Local 11. At this time he requested the International to give him aid and information in effecting the transfer and was informed that the matter was entirely one of "local jurisdiction" to be effected, however, in accordance with the requirements of the constitution of the International. He was given an "informal permit" to work by Local 11 pending his transfer. This informal permit was evidenced by a brass pin given him by Local 11, but he was not given a formal permit of the kind set out in the constitution of the International. He has attempted to surrender his membership book showing his good standing in Local 489 to Local 11. He has paid his dues to Local 11 and has attemped to effect his transfer to that Local by appeals both to it and to the International. The Secretary of Local 11, by a letter dated June 22, 1959, directed him to appear before a meeting of the Executive Board of Local 11 to be examined as to his qualifications as a journeyman ironworker but, insofar as the present record shows, nothing has come of this. He received a letter, dated January 21, 1960, from the Business Agent of Local 489, stating, "There is no trouble at all involved in getting a transfer to another local. Simply contact Local 11 and if they accept your transfer they will contact us and I will issue the transfer card from Local 489 to Local 11." No transfer has been forthcoming despite the fact that "Plaintiff has fulfilled all the requirements of the International's constitution for transfer to Local 11". It is asserted that Local 11's inaction is in disregard of International's constitution by which "defendant is required to permit plaintiff to become a member of defendant. * * *" It is sufficiently pleaded that the plaintiff has no effective administrative remedy or relief available to him within the Locals or within the International. It is conceded that the plaintiff is allowed to attend the meetings of Local 11 but he cannot take any part in the meetings or vote at them.

On these facts Hughes asserted in the court below and asserts in this court that he, as a member of the International and as a person who has fulfilled all of the requirements for membership in Local 11, is being denied equal rights and privileges within Local 11 in contravention of Section 101(a) (1)¹ of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The relief asked by the plaintiff is a decree granting him membership in Local 11 with all the rights and privileges incident to such membership. Local 11 contends, on the other hand, that Section 101(a) (1) only secures rights to persons who have been admitted to membership in labor organizations and that Hughes is not a member of Local 11 within the meaning of the Act. Local 11 argues that the plaintiff is attempting to gain a right of transfer into Local 11 and that the right of transfer is not secured by Section 101(a) (1) of the Act.

Local 11 moved to dismiss Hughes' complaint for lack of jurisdiction asserting that it did not set out a valid claim arising under the Act. The court below granted this motion reasoning that "Section 101(a) (1) in its provisions for equal rights and privileges presumed membership in a particular labor organization and for the purposes of this suit that would be Local No. 11. But the difficulty with which we are met is whether or not the plaintiff is a member of this Local. Formally he is not as he is still carried on the roster of Local 489. However, he contends that he must be considered as a member of Local 11 since he has `fulfilled the requirements for membership' in that organization, as membership is defined in Section 3(o) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 402(o)².

"It seems to this court that Section 3(o) refers only to such persons as are or have been members of the specific organization, and has no relation to extrinsic matters such as the right to transfer to or from an organization. That right is determined by the constitution of the International and is not included in the rights specifically protected by Section 101(a) (1) above referred to." The court dismissed the complaint, D.C., 183 F.Supp. 552, 553. The appeal at bar followed.

Initially, we must point out that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was not proper under the circumstances. Section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 412,³ provides that an action for appropriate relief may be brought in a United States district court by "Any person whose rights * * * have been infringed * * *." The court below apparently read this language as granting it jurisdiction to adjudicate only valid claims arising under the Act. Under such a construction a district court could not determine that it had jurisdiction until it had judgment for the plaintiff, and a judgment for the defendant would necessarily result in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The well established practice, on the other hand, has been that the assertion of a substantial claim under a federal statute gives a United States court jurisdiction of that claim even though that court may determine ultimately that no cause of action on which relief could have been granted was alleged. See, e. g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1959, 358 U.S. 354, 359, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. North-western Public Service Co., 1951, 341 U.S. 246, 249, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912. The language of Section 102 is not such a clear statement to the contrary to demonstrate an intention on the part of Congress to create an exception to the general and long standing practice as to the power, the jurisdiction of a United States district court to determine a controversy pending before it. We hold, therefore, that a United States district court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of any substantial claim asserted under the "Bill of Rights" subchapter of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 even though it may determine ultimately that the claim is not one upon which relief may be granted.

It follows that the order of the court below must be treated on this appeal as one dismissing Hughes' complaint on the ground that it does not assert a claim upon which relief can be granted. This court has held that "there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 3 Cir., 1942, 130 F.2d 631, 635.

Section 101(a) (1) of the Act, pursuant to which the plaintiff, Hughes, claims relief, secures certain equal rights and privileges to members of a labor organization within such organization. Hughes, in seeking membership in Local 11 is asking for the rights and privileges of a member of a labor organization within such labor organization. The plaintiff's allegations that he has not been recognized by Local 11 as one of its members must be deemed to be the equivalent of an assertion that he is not being accorded the equal rights and privileges within Local 11 secured to members of labor organizations by Section 101(a) (1). But this is not the critical question. The pivotal issue in the present case, as the court below clearly recognized, is whether Hughes has sufficiently alleged that he is a member of Local 11, the labor organization in which he demands equal rights and privileges. If Hughes is a member of Local 11 there can be no doubt that he is entitled within that organization to the rights secured to members by Section 101(a) (1).

In determining whether Hughes, assuming the truth of his allegations, is a "member" of Local 11 we cannot look only to the ordinary meaning of the term or solely to its meaning as derived from its context in the section but must look first to the definition of the word "member" provided by the Act. Section 3(o) states, in substance, that a "member" of a labor organization is any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in that organization. This definition of the term "member" does not impart to that term, as it is used in the Act, its ordinary, everyday meaning. Ordinarily, we would not conclude that every person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in an organization is in fact a...