Hughes v. Oklahoma State Election Bd.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 41943,41943
• Citation: 413 P.2d 543,1966 OK 67
• Parties: William T. Bill HUGHES, Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Gene F. Blake, Chairman, Mather M. Eakes, Vice Chairman, and Basil R. Wilson, Secretary, Defendants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 543

413 P.2d 543

1966 OK 67

William T. Bill HUGHES, Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Gene F. Blake, Chairman,

Mather M. Eakes, Vice Chairman, and Basil R.

Wilson, Secretary, Defendants.

No. 41943.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 5, 1966.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

When a person is convicted of an offense against the United States which may be punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and such offense constitutes a felony under the laws of Oklahoma, such conviction by the federal court renders such person ineligible to be a qualified elector in this State by virtue of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution, which prescribes that no person shall be a qualified elector in this State who is adjudged guilty of a felony.

A protest was filed challenging the qualifications of William T. Bill Hughes to be a candidate for the office of Commissioner of Labor, on hearing the State Election Board removed the name of Mr. Hughes as such candidate and in this original proceeding Mr. Hughes seeks a writ of mandamus directing the State Election Board to reinstate his candidacy for such office. Writ denied.

C. W. Schwoerke, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff.

Charles Nesbitt, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma, Harvey H. Cody, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

After William T. Bill Hughes had filed his Notification and Declaration for the office of Commissioner of Labor of the State of Oklahoma, a proper protest was filed with the Oklahoma State Election Board challenging the qualifications of Mr. Hughes to be a candidate for such office. The protestant alleged that Mr. Hughes had been convicted for the crime of Embezzlement of Postal Funds in violation of Section 225 of the Federal Penal Code; that such crime was a felony; and such conviction had never been pardoned and still remained in full force and effect. A copy of the judgment and sentence was attached to and made a part of the protest.

On hearing, and after making certain findings sustaining the protestant's allegations, the State Election Board held that 'the felony conviction disqualifies Mr. Hughes to be a candidate for the office of State Commissioner of Labor of the State of Oklahoma and hereby orders that his name shall not be placed on the ballot for the nomination of the democratic party at the forthcoming primary election.'

In this original proceeding Mr. Hughes seeks a writ of mandamus directing the State Election Board to place his name on the election ballot for the office of Commissioner of Labor. William T. Bill Hughes will be referred to as Petitioner or by name and the State Election Board will be referred to as Board.

The conviction which formed the basis for the protest was adjudicated by the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma. Mr. Hughes appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth District, and in Hughes v. United States, 4 F.2d 686, which affirmed the conviction, we find the following:

'* * * William T. Hughes, hereinafter called defendant, was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced for embezzlement of postal funds under section 225 of the Penal Code (U.S.Comp.St. § 10395, 35 Stat. 1133), which provides:

"Whoever, being a postmaster * * * shall * * * use, * * * or convert to his own use, * * * except as authorized by law, any money or property coming into his hands or under his control in any manner whatever, in the execution or under color of his office, employment, or service, whether the same shall be the money or property of the United States or not, * * * shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement.'

'The defendant was postmaster at Ft. Cobb, Okl. On April 19, 1923, his office was checked by a post office inspector and he was found to be short $404.72. The shortage was due to the fact that the defendant had made collections on certain C.O.D. packages and had used the moneys so collected in payment of his personal obligations. Defendant admitted the shortage but offered as a defense that he had intended to resign as postmaster, had arranged a sale of the office furniture to his successor, and from the procees of the sale had expected to make good the post office money which he had appropriated to his own use.'

Petitioner and Board both concede that by virtue of Title 26 O.S.1961, § 162, Mr. Hughes would not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of Commissioner of Labor unless he is a qualified elector of the State of Oklahoma. Therefore, the basic issue to be determined in this original proceeding is whether Mr. Hughes is or is not a qualified elector of the State of Oklahoma.

Article 3, Section 1, as amended, Oklahoma Constitution, prescribes the qualifications of an elector of this State, and also prescribes who shall not be a qualified elector. The prohibitory language contained in said constitutional provision which is pertinent to the issue in the instant proceeding is as follows: 'No person shall be a qualified elector of this state who is adjudged guilty of a felony, * * *.' This language became a part of our Constitution on May 5, 1964, by adoption of State Question No. 412, Referendum Petition No. 138.

Prior to Petitioner's conviction and the amendment of Sec. 1, supra, such section contained a proviso that '* * * no person adjudged guilty of a felony * * * shall be entitled to register and vote.'

Petitioner contends that since the amendment to Art. 3, Sec. 1, Okla.Const., was adopted in 1964, and the same does not refer to the future or the past, that it could refer only to a conviction for a felony after its adoption in 1964. Petitioner argues that the constitutional proviso, now in force and effect, could not be applicable in the case at bar which is based upon a conviction in 1923. Petitioner cites no authority whatsoever to sustain this contention.

In our opinion, the language 'who is adjudged guilty of a felony' does not have the restrictive or narrow meaning as proposed by Petitioner. To sustain such proposed construction would be tantamount to holding that such constitutional amendment removed all disabilities attendant to a conviction of a felony prior to the date of its adoption. Without question, the people in adopting such constitutional amendment did not intend to, nor did said proviso, remove such disability.

Petitioner further contends that his conviction of a felony under the federal penal code does not constitute a felony within the meaning of Sec. 1, supra, which provides that 'no person shall be a qualified elector of this state who is adjudged guilty of a felony * * *.' Petitioner argues that the prohibitory proviso is applicable only to a conviction of a felony in an Oklahoma State court and is not applicable to a federal court conviction. In this connection, petitioner cites Title 21 O.S.1961, § 5, which provides that a felony is a crime which is or may be punishable with death or by imprisonment in a State prison; and the case of Crothers v. Jones, 239 La. 800, 120 So.2d 248, promulgated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1960.

In the Louisiana case, Jones had been convicted by a federal court in Arkansas relative to the Use of the United States Mails to Defraud. The question was presented as to whether such conviction disfranchised Jones in Louisiana under the terms of its Constitution which provided that a person shall be disfranchised who has been convicted of any crime which may be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The Louisiana Court was of the opinion that if it were to extend the disqualification by confinement in a federal penitentiary or in the penitentiary of another state, that Louisiana would be adopting the policy of Congress and that of other states with regard to great moral turpitude. It was of the opinion that if such construction was placed on its Constitution, a person could be disfranchised in Louisiana when the act for which he was convicted under the federal code or laws of another state, should be performed under the laws of Louisiana.

There is a distinction between the facts presented in the Louisiana case and the facts in the instant proceeding. In the Louisiana case the federal conviction was in the State of Arkansas and there was no showing that the offense committed in Arkansas constituted a crime under the laws of Louisiana. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was convicted was committed in Oklahoma and, as will be hereinafter shown, such offense constitutes a felony under the laws of Oklahoma.

Therefore, the issue to be determined is: 'If a person is convicted of an offense against the United States which may be punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and such offense constitutes a felony under the laws of Oklahoma, does such conviction by the federal court render such person ineligible to be a qualified elector in this State under Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution, which prescribes that no person shall be a qualified elector of this State who is adjudged guilty of a felony.

In Yocham v. Horn, 201 Okl. 647, 207 P.2d 919; and Elder v. County Election Board of Cherokee County, Okl., 326 P.2d 776, we held:

'Defendant's pleas of guilt in a federal court for possession of a still and distilling apparatus and for possession of spirituous liquor upon which tax had not been paid, constituting offenses under the laws of the United States, which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, neither of which constitutes a felony under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, did not render him ineligible to the office of county commissioner under the prohibition contained in Title 19 O.S.A. § 132.'

In Briggs v. Board of County Com'rs. of Muskogee County, 202 Okl. 684, 217 P.2d 827, 20 A.L.R.2d 727, Briggs had been convicted by a federal court of conspiring to operate a wholesale liquor business without paying the...