Hughes v. State
Decision Date | 10 May 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 3295,3295 |
Citation | 302 S.W.2d 747 |
Parties | Jack HUGHES, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
McMahon, Smart, Walter, Sprain & Wilson, Abilene, for appellant.
Theo Ash, Lee Sutton, County Atty., Abilene, for appellee.
This is a condemnation proceeding brought by the State of Texas to acquire for road purposes approximately 20 acres of land adjacent to U. S. Highway 80 belonging to Jack Hughes. Commissioners were appointed, a hearing was had and an award of $81,766 was duly made and filed. Hughes, not being satisfied with the amount of the award, appealed to the County Court of Taylor County claiming only that the amount of the award was not the fair value of the land taken and asking for no damages to the remaining land. Upon the trial Hughes admitted that all of the prior proceedings in the condemnation were regular and that the State had a right to condemn the land. Based upon a jury finding as to the value of the land taken, the court entered judgment for Hughes in the amount of $59,655. Hughes has appealed.
Appellant contends the court erred in permitting appellee to introduce evidence of enhancement in value of appellant's remaining land. It is the well settled law of this state that where the landowner does not ask for damages for a decrease in value of his remaining land by reason of the taking of the strip in question that evidence as to the enhancement of the value of the land not taken is not admissible. State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 979; Steele v. City of Anson, Tex.Civ.App., 229 S.W.2d 948.
Appellant called as a witness Wade Crawford, an engineer for the Texas State Highway Department. He proved by this witness that the witness had made a map of the land taken and of the surrounding land and the roads that had been constructed and were to be thereafter constructed thereon. Counsel for appellee upon cross-examination of the witness Crawford elicited the following:
No objection was made to the introduction of this evidence at the time it was offered; however, appellant later did object to said evidence and filed a motion asking the court to strike it from the record and to instruct the jury not to consider it because it tended to show enhancement of the value of the land not taken.
Appellee offered as a witness J. D. Zuber. Upon re-direct examination of said witness counsel for appellee elicited the following testimony:
Counsel for appellant objected to said evicence on the ground that it was an improper element to be considered because it showed an enhancement of the remainder of the land. We believe that reversible error is not shown by the introduction of the evidence about which complaint is made because the same or similar evidence was put into the record by the appellant. As has been heretofore stated appellant introduced a map which showed the roads that had already been constructed adjacent to said land and also showed the roads that were to be thereafter constructed. This map disclosed the amount of frontage that appellant was losing by reason of the taking of the twenty acres of land in question and also disclosed the frontage that appellant would gain when the new roads were constructed. Furthermore, counsel for appellant upon the cross-examination of the witness Zuber elicited the following:
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It will thus be seen that there is evidence in the record, placed there by appellant, which tends to show that the building of the new road will enhance the value of the land not taken. It is well settled that a party on appeal may not object to the admission of incompetent evidence which he offered or brought out which related to an issue which he first injected into the case. It is further well settled that he may not complain of improper evidence introduced by the other side where he, himself, has introduced the same evidence or evidence of a similar character. Farmers' Petroleum Co. v. Shelton, Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W. 194 (Writ Ref.); Provident Nat. Bank of Waco v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 658; Donoho v. Carwile, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 553 (Writ Ref.); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 383 (Writ Ref.); McCaskey Cash Register Co. v. Krause, Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 858; Crespi v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 400; Price v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W.2d 804; Krider v. Hempftling, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 83; 3 Tex.Jur. 1032, Sec. 732.
It may be from an examination of the record that appellant first introduced a map which clearly showed the amount of frontage that appellant was losing by reason of the taking of the land and also showed the amount of frontage he was gaining by reason of the construction of the new road. It further shows that thereafter appellant proved by the witness Zuber that the building of the new highway would enhance the value of the property not taken. We have given this matter our careful consideration and we cannot hold that reversible error is shown under the well settled law of this state.
Appellant by other points asserts that the judgment should be reversed because of the closing argument of counsel for appellee. The argument is not set out in a bill of exception. The statement of facts consists of three volumes. The first two volumes are certified by the court reporter as containing the evidence in the case. The third volume is certified as containing the argument of counsel for both appellant and appellee. The attorneys for both appellant and appellee signed a certificate that the three volumes compose a full, true and complete transcript of the 'evidence'. Upon submission we called attention of counsel to the fact that the agreement of the attorneys was probably not broad enough to cover the argument. Appellee raised no question in its original brief...
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