Hughes v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 January 1925 |
| Docket Number | No. 6606.,6606. |
| Citation | 4 F.2d 387 |
| Parties | HUGHES v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
A. M. Beets, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Paul G. Darrough, of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
W. A. Maurer, U. S. Atty., and J. W. Scothorn and James A. Ingraham, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant in error.
Before SANBORN, Circuit Judge, and TRIEBER and PHILLIPS, District Judges.
The plaintiff in error was indicted in two counts for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. 41 Stat. 324 (10418d, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923).
The first count charges transportation of an automobile car, which is fully described, and which it is charged had been stolen from E. Scabo Brun, at Casper, Wyo., from Cloud Chief, in the Western District of Oklahoma, to Safford, in the state of Arizona, knowing that the same had been so stolen, and again from Safford in the state of Arizona, to Cloud Chief, Okl.
As he was acquitted of the second count, and only found guilty on the first, it is unnecessary to set it out. The bill of exceptions does not set out the evidence, so the only question before us is the sufficiency of the indictment. The contention of counsel for the plaintiff in error is that, as the indictment charges that the stolen car, after having been transported by him to the state of Arizona, was again transported from the state of Arizona to Cloud Chief in the Western District of Oklahoma, therefore it was not transported in interstate commerce. That transportation from one state to another is interstate commerce has been the settled law ever since the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 188, 6 L. Ed. 23; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 490, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Sloan v. United States (C. C. A.) 279 F. 562, decided by this court. In United States v. Winkler (D. C.) 299 F. 832, it was held that a stolen automobile transported from one point in the state to another point in the same state, but moving in its course through another state, constitutes an interstate transportation, within the meaning of this act.
The contention of counsel is that the transportation must have been for the purpose of engaging in some act of commerce. If that is a correct construction of the act, it would practically be unenforceable, for how can the pleader state and on the trial prove the intent of the person who...
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United States v. Holder, Crim. No. 407.
...to another, and there is no requirement that the transportation be for the purpose of engaging in an act of commerce. Hughes v. United States, 8 Cir. 1925, 4 F.2d 387, cert. denied 268 U.S. 692, 45 S.Ct. 511, 69 L.Ed. 1160; Whitaker v. United States, 9 Cir. 1925, 5 F.2d 546, cert. denied 26......
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Mortensen v. United States, 12531.
...held, under a similar definition of interstate commerce in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, in Hughes v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F.2d 387, certiorari denied 268 U.S. 692, 45 S.Ct. 511, 69 L.Ed. 1160, that the taking of a stolen automobile on a circular trip from Clo......
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