United States v. Winkler

Decision Date19 May 1924
Docket Number4694.
Citation299 F. 832
PartiesUNITED STATES v. WINKLER et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

H. R Gamble, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., of El Paso, Tex.

A. M Mood, of Amarillo, Tex., and Turney, Burges, Culwell Holliday & Pollard, of El Paso, Tex., for defendants.

SMITH District Judge.

The defendants were tried and convicted upon a charge of having violated the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (U.S. Comp. St Ann. Supp. 1923, Secs. 10418b-10418f). The indictment alleged that they transported an automobile from Roswell, N.M., to El Paso, Tex., knowing same to have been stolen. The proof showed that the automobile was stolen in Amarillo, Tex., and transported by defendants by continuous journey from Amarillo, Tex., through the state of New Mexico, via Roswell, to El Paso, Tex. The defendants now present a motion for new trial, and urge as a ground therefor that the evidence did not support the allegation that the automobile was transported in interstate commerce from Roswell, N.M., to El Paso, Tex., but showed that the transportation was from Amarillo, Tex., to El Paso, Tex.-- from and to points within the same state--and that therefore the case does not come within the purview of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.

It is my opinion that the motion should be denied. The above-named act provides that:

'Whoever shall transport * * * in interstate * * * commerce a motor vehicle knowing the same to have been stolen shall be punished,' etc.

And it declares that the term 'interstate commerce,' as used in the act, 'shall include transportation from one state * * * to another state' a usual definition of interstate commerce given by legislative acts and judicial decisions.

It will be noted that the offense consists in transporting a stolen car in interstate commerce, not in the completed journey from one state to another state. It would seem that it was the evident purpose of Congress to protect interstate commerce from the entry therein of stolen motor cars; that, if the intended journey would, if completed, constitute an interstate transportation, the offense would be complete when the stolen vehicle is started on the trip.

I find myself wholly unable to agree with counsel for the motion in their contention that, inasmuch as the transportation of the automobile was by continuous journey from a point in Texas to another point in Texas, such transportation did not come within the purview of the statute; that the fact that the journey was partly through the state of New Mexico did not bring it within the statute. This contention is completely met by the following authorities: Hanley v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 187 U.S. 617, 23 Sup.Ct. 214, 47 L.Ed. 333; United States v. Erie Railroad (D.C.) 166 F. 352; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17, 41 Sup.Ct. 11, 65 L.Ed. 104; United States v. Yohn (D.C.) 275 F. 232; Yohn v. United States (C.C.A.) 280 F. 511 (same as next preceding); United States v. Moynihan, 258 F. 529, 169 C.C.A. 469; United States v. Delaware L. & W.R. Co. (C.C.) 152 F. 269. These decisions all hold that a continuous transportation from a point in one state to a point in the same state, partly by way of another state, is interstate commerce.

In the Yohn Case, supra, the sole question was whether a shipment originating in one state, and consigned to a point in the same state, but moving in its course through another state, is interstate commerce, and upon this question the court said:

'It is contended on defendant's behalf that the shipment was not of an interstate character, because the point of origin and the point of destination were in the same state. The contention is untenable. Intrastate commerce is that commerce which is, during its whole course of transportation, within the jurisdiction of a single state. Commerce which originates in a state, passes into another, and then returns to the first, is interstate, as it has gone beyond the state in which it originated, and then passed back again into it, and so has become subject to different jurisdictions in the course of its transportation. Neither state is able to protect it during the whole period of its transportation, and this fact makes federal control practically necessary, as well as legally possible.'

The case of ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Mortensen v. United States, 12531.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • November 23, 1943
    ...transportation under the White-Slave Traffic Act.3 We agree with the criticism of the Wilson case voiced in United States v. Winkler, D.C.W.D.Tex., 299 F. 832, 834, that "it seems to stand alone, without authority to sustain it, and out of harmony with all other cases upon the same subject.......
  • United States v. Yaquinta
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
    • May 1, 1962
    ...Act, to include "all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State * * *." (2) United States v. Winkler, W.D. Tex.1924, 299 F. 832 (interstate transportation of stolen vehicle). (3) United States v. Erie R. Co., N.J. 1909, 166 F. 352 (penalties of the Sa......
  • Hughes v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 28, 1925
    ...442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Sloan v. United States (C. C. A.) 279 F. 562, decided by this court. In United States v. Winkler (D. C.) 299 F. 832, it was held that a stolen automobile transported from one point in the state to another point in the same state, but moving i......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT