Hughes Village Restaurant, Inc. v. Village of Castleton-On-Hudson

• Decision Date: 13 December 2007
• Docket Number: 502358.
• Citation: 2007 NY Slip Op 09839,46 A.D.3d 1044,848 N.Y.S.2d 384
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: HUGHES VILLAGE RESTAURANT, INC., Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF CASTLETON-ON-HUDSON et al., Respondents.

46 A.D.3d 1044

848 N.Y.S.2d 384

2007 NY Slip Op 09839

HUGHES VILLAGE RESTAURANT, INC., Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF CASTLETON-ON-HUDSON et al., Respondents.

502358.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Third Department.

Decided December 13, 2007.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ceresia, Jr., J.), entered March 6, 2006 in Rensselaer County, which, among other things, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Peters, J.

Plaintiff, a privately held corporation, owned an apartment building located on 28-30 South Main Street in the Village of Castleton-on-Hudson, Rensselaer County, which was managed by Joseph Hughes, the husband of its sole shareholder. On January 13, 2002, a tenant of the building called 911 to report the smell of an electrical fire. When Hughes arrived at the building, he was met by representatives of numerous fire departments and municipal agencies, including Robert Mantaski, Fire Chief for defendant Village of Castleton-on-Hudson, and Bret Crandall, building inspector for the Village. They determined that a leaking pipe in the basement was spraying water onto exposed electrical connections of several hot water tanks, causing a fire. During the course of an investigation, Crandall observed, among other things, plumbing leaks, a defective furnace responsible for servicing all units in the building and multiple uncovered electrical boxes. Upon smelling gas in the basement, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation was called to test carbon monoxide levels.¹ Defendant Paul Felts, code enforcement officer for the Village, was also summoned to the building. Once Hughes learned that the fire resulted from a leaking pipe, Hughes turned off the water to the building and fixed the leak. Notwithstanding this repair, and despite Hughes' vehement objections, Crandall decided to close the building, ordering that the water and electrical circuits be turned off and that all tenants be removed. Hughes warned him that such actions would effectively destroy the building since the pipes would freeze.

Two days later, the Village issued an "order to remedy violation" to Hughes, stating that he was in violation of the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code (see Executive Law art 18) because the electrical wiring and equipment in the building was a fire hazard and source of ignition; the order directed plaintiff to remedy these conditions by January 21, 2002 or face a possible fine, imprisonment, or both. Although a hearing was held in February 2002 before the Justice Court (Peter, J.), this hearing addressed unrelated charges.

Hughes did not take any steps to remedy the defects since he believed that the building had already been destroyed.² After filing a notice of claim, plaintiff commenced this action alleging a violation of its procedural due process rights under 42 USC § 1983 and trespass. After issue was joined and discovery completed, defendants moved for summary judgment based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity; plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Supreme Court granted defendants' cross motion and dismissed the action, finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 USC § 1983. Plaintiff appeals.³

With no dispute that the actions taken by defendants were under color of state law or that plaintiff possessed a property interest entitled to constitutional protection, Supreme Court focused on the alleged procedural due process violations. It became "necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate" (see Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113, 126 [1990]). In reaching this determination, claims predicated upon an established state procedure must be distinguished from those arising from "random, unauthorized acts by state employees" (Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v City of New York, 101 F3d 877, 880 [1996], cert dismissed 521 US 1140 [1997]; see Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 533 [1984]). If they result from an established state procedure, predeprivation hearings are necessary to satisfy due process, whereas postdeprivation remedies will be sufficient if the claims are based on random, unauthorized acts by state employees (see Hudson v Palmer, 468 US at 532-533).

Here, plaintiff's contention that the closing of the building resulted from the established procedure of the Village, as embodied in chapter 106 of the village code (see Code of Village of Castleton-on-Hudson § 106-5 [1973]), is not borne out by the record. Agreeing with Supreme Court that the closure resulted from random, unauthorized acts of Village officials, we next consider whether plaintiff had available a meaningful postdeprivation remedy (see Hudson v Palmer, 468 US at 534-535).⁴

Such remedy was available through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. An article 78 proceeding is a vehicle through which challenges may be made to determinations rendered by governmental bodies and agencies which are "in violation of lawful procedure, ... affected by an error of law, or [are] arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion" (CPLR 7803 [3]). Damages which may be awarded in such a proceeding "must be incidental to the primary relief sought by the petitioner, and must be such as he [or she] might otherwise recover on the same set...