Huguley v. Hall, 31957
| Decision Date | 06 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31957,31957 |
| Citation | 157 So.2d 417 |
| Parties | J. W. HUGULEY, Jr., Petitioner, v. Carrie HALL, a widow, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard J. Wilson, Gainesville, for petitioner.
Reynolds & Goldin and T. E. Duncan, Gainesville, for respondent.
Petitioner seeks review, by certiorari, of a decision of the First District Court of Appeal on the ground that such decision is in direct conflict with prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida on the same point of law.
The District Court's decision consists of the single word 'Affirmed' plus four case citation preceded by the introductory signal 'See,' and a lucid dissenting opinion written by Judge Sturgis, in which all of the salient facts of this controversy are set forth. (Fla.App., 141 So.2d 595.) The respondent, Carrie Hall, by contract for deed, agreed to sell certain real property to the petitioner. The agreement provided that petitioner (buyer) was to have immediate possession of the premises and that he was to make regular monthly purchase money payments to respondent (seller). It also provided that time was of the essence of the contract and that upon the failure of petitioner to make his regular payments
'* * * this contract shall, at the option of the * * * [respondent-seller] be forfeited and terminated, and the * * * [petitioner-buyer] shall forfeit all payments made by * * * [buyer] on this contract; and such payments shall be retained by the * * * [seller] in full satisfaction and liquidation of all damages by her sustained, and the said * * * [seller] shall have the right to re-enter and take possession of the premises aforesaid without being liable to any action therefor.'
When the petitioner became $170 in arrears, the respondent (seller) filed a complaint in equity against the petitioner (buyer) and his wife, alleging fee simple title in herself, the contract for deed, and that the petitioner (buyer) was in possession of the property. The complaint also alleged petitioner's arrearages and respondent's election to rescind and terminate the agreement in accordance with the language quoted above.
The complaint concluded by praying that the contract be rescinded and terminated and that petitioner be directed to deliver possession of the property to the respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action which was denied. Respondent then moved for a summary judgment, whereupon petitioner moved to transfer the case to the law side of the court on the ground that the complaint shows on its face that the cause of action is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. After hearing said motions, the trial court entered a summary final decree for the respondent and denying petitioner's motion to transfer the cause to the law side. The court adjudged the contract 'to be null and cancelled and to be foreclosed.' The judgment barred the petitioner 'from any right, title or interest in said premises,' and gave him ten days to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent. As the dissenting opinion points out:
'The decree did not, however, contain any provision for sale of the subject property in the manner provided for foreclosure or otherwise afford the defendant [buyer] and opportunity to assert an equity of redemption in the property.'
In response to our initial conviction that the Supreme Court had direct conflict jurisdiction either as an exception to the general rule enunciated in Lake v. Lake, Fla.1958, 103 So.2d 639 or more appropriately because this case represents an entirely...
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Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Const. Co.
...Co., 284 So.2d 205 (Fla.1973); Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So.2d 359 (Fla.1973); Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So.2d 474 (Fla.1970); Huguley v. Hall, 157 So.2d 417 (Fla.1963). Apparently the notion of dissent conflict arose innocently enough in Huguley, where the dissenting opinion set forth the onl......
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Jenkins v. State
...jurisdiction could be founded on a dissenting opinion to a per curiam majority decision rendered without opinion. Huguley v. Hall, 157 So.2d 417 (Fla.1963). This position was adopted by a majority of the Court without discussion or rationale and has been subsequently followed without amplif......
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Hoffman v. Semet
...as are prescribed in relation to mortgages'. Mid-State Investment Corporation v. O'Steen, 133 So.2d 455 (1st DCA Fla.1961); Huguley v. Hall, 157 So.2d 417 (Fla.1963) (dicta); H & L Land Company v. Warner, 258 So.2d 293 (2nd DCA Fla.1972); Fla.Stat. § 697.01 (1973). Thus, a vendee under an a......
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Cinque v. Buschlen, 83-976
...Corporation v. O'Steen, 133 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), cert. denied, 136 So.2d 349 (Fla.1961) (same). See also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So.2d 417 (Fla.1963); Cain & Bultman, Inc. v. Miss Sam, Inc., 409 So.2d 114 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Because a mortgage is "held to be a specific lien on the p......