Hull v. Berkshire St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1914
• Citation: 104 N.E. 747,217 Mass. 361
• Parties: HULL v. BERKSHIRE ST. RY. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

217 Mass. 361

104 N.E. 747

HULL

v.BERKSHIRE ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

March 31, 1914.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Berkshire County; Crosby, Judge.

Action by John B. Hull against the Berkshire Street Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Clarence P. Niles, of North Adams, and Frederick M. Myers, of Pittsfield, for plaintiff.

Henry W. Ely and Jos. B. Ely, both of Westfield, for defendant.

DE COURCY, J.

[1] The accident happened on the highway that runs northerly from Williamstown to Bennington; and the single track of the defendant is located on the westerly side of the way. There was evidence from which the jury could find the following facts: The electric car, which was coming in a southerly direction and downgrade, was running at a speed of from 40 to 50 miles an hour and was swaying from side to side; and the plaintiff, in his automobile, was going in a northerly direction and exercising reasonable care. The trolley wheel left the wire when the electric car was about 400 feet distant from the automobile; the trolley pole, after some violent movements up and down, was broken off near the base, hurled into the air and thrown against the left forward wheel of the automobile, causing it to be turned sharply to the right, toward a bank; and the plaintiff, expecting that his machine was about to ‘turn turtle,’ jumped out and was injured. The electric car was not brought to a stop until it had gone 200 or 300 feet beyond the automobile. Plainly this made a case for the jury, and the defendant's first request could not be given. Steverman v. Boston Elev. Ry., 205 Mass. 508, 91 N. E. 919;Uggla v. West End St. Ry., 160 Mass. 351, 35 N. E. 1126,39 Am. St. Rep. 481.

[2][3] The second and third requests presumably were intended to present the same claim, which was in substance that no inference of negligence could be drawn from the fall of the trolley pole under the circumstances. They were rightly refused, and the instructions of the court on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were correct. Unless some explanation was offered, the fact that the iron trolley pole, while being used for the purposefor which it was designed, broke and was thrown violently from the car would warrant an inference that reasonable care had not been taken to make the apparatus safe; and that the negligence prima facie was that of the defendant, which had exclusive control and...