Hull v. Bowen, C87-1086.
Decision Date | 05 October 1990 |
Docket Number | No. C87-1086.,C87-1086. |
Citation | 748 F. Supp. 514 |
Parties | Grace M. HULL, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
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Edward A. Icove, Lustig, Icove & Lustig, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.
William K. Redmond, Sp. U.S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.
Presently pending before this Court is an application for attorney fees filed by plaintiff's counsel ("counsel"). Counsel seeks attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and the Social Security Act ("Act"). 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), (2).1
Plaintiff previously applied for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. Plaintiff alleged an onset date of October 31, 1985. The Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary")2 denied plaintiff's application for DIB because it was determined that plaintiff did not suffer from a severe impairment. Having exhausted her administrative remedies, plaintiff sought judicial review of the Secretary's decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3 This Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the Secretary's decision, holding that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence through June 8, 1986, but was unsupported by substantial evidence beginning on June 9, 1986.4
This Court notes that much confusion and inconsistency exists among the various district courts when attorneys seek concurrent attorney fee awards under both the EAJA and the Act. Therefore, this Court shall examine both statutes in detail, and discuss the interaction between them when concurrent fee applications are made, while at the same time, keeping in mind Congress' intent as to the effect each statute should have when concurrent fee applications are made.
The EAJA provides in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).5
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgement in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that a party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection.... The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based)....
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The conditional language of the EAJA in the first sentence to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) does not conflict with a district court's authority to award attorney's fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
The legislative history makes clear that the conditional language of the EAJA is meant only to prevent it from applying where other federal statutes already authorize fee awards against the federal government.
Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F.Supp. 1320, 1322 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (emphasis original).
This section 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is not intended to replace or supersede any existing feeshifting statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Civil Rights Acts, and the Voting Rights Act in which Congress has indicated a specific intent to encourage vigorous enforcement, or to alter standards or the case law governing those Acts. It is intended to apply only to cases (other than tort cases) where fee awards against the government are not already authorized.
Ocasio at 1322 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4953, 4997) (emphasis supplied in Ocasio).
H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 132, 133.
Ocasio at 1321 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1418 at 4991) See also Kerr v. Heckler, 575 F.Supp. 455 (S.D.Ohio 1983) ( ).
As noted above, in order to recover attorney fees under the EAJA one must be the "prevailing party" to the action and the position of the United States must not have been "substantially justified." As to the "prevailing" requirement, it is satisfied notwithstanding the fact that the claimant's suit "resulted in partial recovery on a claim previously denied in full," Philpott v. Gardner, 403 F.2d 774-75 (6th Cir.1968); See also McCoach v. Bowen, 672 F.Supp. 807, 809 (D.N.J.1987) ( ); Sterner v. Department of Army, 711 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir.1983) (similarly Philpott) , but a court remand does not automatically render the applicant a "prevailing party" (unless benefits are awarded), rather the Secretary must, after reviewing a case as directed by the district court, file its findings with the reviewing court as mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). H.R.Rep. No. 120 at 148 (citations omitted).
With regard to the "substantial justification" element, the Sixth Circuit has held that the standard "is essentially one of reasonableness," and the pertinent inquiry is whether the position maintained by the Secretary "had a reasonable basis in law and fact." Kerr, at 457. A finding that the Secretary's position was unsupported by substantial evidence does not automatically require the district court to rule that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified, Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (citing Kerr at 458). However, the Third Circuit has stated:
agency action found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually certain to not to have been substantially justified under the Act. Only the most extraordinary circumstances could permit such an action to be found substantially justified under the Act.
Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 313, 319 (3rd Cir.1987) (citations omitted).7
The relevant section under the Act is 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(a), (b). Concerned that some attorneys were charging exorbitant fees, and that unnecessary delay would result in a windfall to attorneys with contingency fee agreements due to the accrual of back benefits,8 Congress enacted a new subsection in the Social Security Amendments of 1965:
Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 313, 320-21 (3rd Cir.1987) (quoting Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub.L. 89-97, Title III § 332; 79 Stat. 286, 403; 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1982)).
In 1967, Congress amended section...
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Ringel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
...time period confirms that cost-of-living adjusted hourly rates for EAJA awards ranged from $100–125. See e.g., Hull v. Bowen , 748 F.Supp. 514, 526 n. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1990).26 See Drenning v. Com'r , 2014 WL 4705113, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2014) (concluding that an unopposed motion for 4......
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Ringel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
...time period confirms that cost-of-living adjusted hourly rates for EAJA awards ranged from $100-125. See e.g., Hull v. Bowen, 748 F. Supp. 514, 526 n. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 26. See Drenning v. Com'r, 2014 WL 4705113, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2014)(concluding that an unopposed motion for 4......
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Kling v. SECRETARY OF DHHS, C87-2649.
...is satisfied if the plaintiff's suit resulted in a partial recovery on a claim which was previously denied in full. Hull v. Bowen, 748 F.Supp. 514, 518 (N.D.Ohio 1990). The plaintiff here succeeded in recovering part of the disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits he a......