Kerr v. Heckler, C-1-82-1295.
Decision Date | 30 August 1983 |
Docket Number | No. C-1-82-1295.,C-1-82-1295. |
Citation | 575 F. Supp. 455 |
Parties | Harold KERR, Plaintiff, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Lawrence R. Fisse, Batavia, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Joseph E. Kane, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.
This matter is now before the court upon a claim by the plaintiff for an award of attorney fees and expenses (doc. 9).1 The above action was one to review an adverse decision of the Secretary terminating the benefits which the plaintiff had been receiving under Title II of the Social Security Act. On May 16, 1983, this Court found that the termination of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence (doc. 6). Pursuant to the review statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we remanded this matter back to the Secretary for calculation and award of benefits.
The plaintiff here is applying for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 504 et seq. Though not so stated, we believe the plaintiff to be advancing a claim for fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), enacted as Title II, §§ 201-208, of the Small Business Export Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325. We note that the EAJA has been codified in two separate sections of the United States Code. Sections 201 and 202, the introductory sections and section 203, dealing with fee awards in agency proceedings, are codified as part of the Administrative Procedure Act under Title 5. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1980). Section 204 of the Act, dealing with fee awards in civil actions, is codified as part of the Judicial Procedure Act under Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1980). This split codification no doubt accounts for the plaintiff's erroneous statutory citation in this case. In any case, we treat this application as an application made under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
The EAJA amended Titles 5 and 28 effective October 1, 1981. This Act appears to rest on the premise that certain individuals and organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable governmental action due to the expense involved in protecting their rights. The purpose of the Act is, therefore, to reduce existing deterrents by entitling certain prevailing parties to recover an award of attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United States, except in those cases in which the government's action was substantially justified.
For purposes here the relevant statutory provisions would appear to be 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). These provisions hold:
The EAJA has been thoroughly considered in a social security disability context. See, Cornella v. Schweiker, 553 F.Supp. 240 (D.S.D.1982); Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 612 (M.D.Tenn. 1982); McDonald v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 327 (N.D.Ind.1982); Ulrich v. Schweiker, 548 F.Supp. 63 (D.Idaho, 1982); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F.Supp. 383 (D.N.H.1982); Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F.Supp. 897 (D.D.C.1982); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F.Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F.Supp. 420 (D.Idaho 1982); and Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F.Supp. 1149 (N.D.Ill. 1982). Looking for guidance, we have carefully reviewed the decisions in each of these cases.
We note first that there has been some question concerning the applicability of the EAJA to social security cases. It appears, though, that the conditional language of the EAJA was meant only to prevent the Act from applying in those instances in which other federal statutes already permit a fee award against the federal government. Application of the EAJA would not be foreclosed here since the attorney fee provision set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406, only permits an award to be made out of the claimant's own award of past-due benefits. A separate award from the government is not permitted under that statute. This was the reasoning expressed in Hornal, McDonald, Ocasio and Wolverton. Although we find such reasoning to be persuasive, we need not decide this question at this time, as we can dispose of this matter on other grounds. Accord, Cornella; Bennett.
We observe also that in these cases there is much discussion concerning the appropriate standard to be used in deciding applications under the EAJA. As was pointed out in Berman, the standard created by the statute is a new one, one not in line with either the common law exceptions to the American rule restricting the award of attorney fees, or other statutory standards allowing attorney fees against the United States. 531 F.Supp. at 1153-54. Indeed, as the legislative history makes clear, the standard is intended to serve as a "middle ground" between an automatic award to the prevailing party and an award available only if the government was arbitrary or frivolous. H.R.Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4953, 4993 (House Report). As stated in the committee report:
House Report, supra, at 4889-90.
From all of the foregoing, we conclude that the standard to be used is essentially one of reasonableness. Accord, Cornella, supra; Bennett, supra; Berman, supra.2 To be more precise, we believe that the issue properly framed is, consistent with the aforementioned legislative history, whether the position which the government took in the matter had a reasonable basis in law and fact.3 We are strengthened in our conviction that this is the proper approach by the fact that the Sixth Circuit has, in a very recent case, interpreted the EAJA "substantial justification" language to call for the application of a reasonableness standard. Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir.1982). In Wyandotte, the Sixth Circuit based its conclusion that a reasonableness standard was in order on the legislative history previously discussed herein. See also Broad Avenue Laundry and Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1982). It is, of course, true that Wyandotte did not involve a claim for social security disability benefits. That fact, however, makes no difference, as the standard to be used will clearly be the same in every case in which the EAJA is held to apply.
Obviously, for purposes of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we have already found that the Secretary's position in the underlying litigation lacked "substantial evidence" (doc. 6). We would stress, however, that this finding does not require a concurrent finding by this Court that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified. As was pointed out in Wolverton, supra, to hold otherwise would mean that EAJA fees would be allowable in every case where the court found an absence of substantial evidence, a result clearly not intended by Congress. Accord, Cornella, supra; Bennett, supra.
We must emphasize, therefore, that although both tests are semantically couched in terms of "reasonableness", the legislative history makes it absolutely clear that the substantial evidence inquiry and the substantial justification inquiry are two distinct inquiries. It is the firm belief of this Court that Congress only contemplated a separate award of fees under the EAJA in those cases where it could be fairly said that it was unreasonable for the government to contest the claim. Of course, as long as there was at least some evidence to support a non-disability position, then we would find the government's actions in contesting the claim to be reasonable and thus substantially justified.
In this case, upon a careful review of the record filed herein, and upon a review as well of our prior decision based on that record, we find that the position of the United States in...
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...in defending an appeal to the district court. Jones v. Schweiker, 565 F.Supp. 52, 56 (W.D.Mich.1983). Compare Kerr v. Heckler, 575 F.Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.Ohio 1983) ("as long as there was at least some evidence to support a non-disability position, then we would find the government's action ......
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...finding that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified within the meaning of the EAJA. See, e.g., Kerr v. Heckler, 575 F.Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.Ohio 1983). Hornal v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 612, 617 (M.D.Tenn.1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, supra, 533 F.Supp. at 425 & n. 14. Rathe......
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