Hulse v. Brantley

• Decision Date: 16 February 1892
• Citation: 14 S.E. 510,110 N.C. 134
• Parties: HULSE v. BRANTLEY et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

14 S.E. 510

110 N.C. 134

HULSE v. BRANTLEY et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 16, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Beaufort county; HENRY R. BRYAN, Judge.

Action by Jonah Hulse against William Brantley and others. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MERRIMON, C.J.:

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The plaintiff alleged that he was, on the 1st day of November, 1888, in the rightful possession of the locus in quo; "that on said day, and on various occasions between that day and the beginning of this action, and while the plaintiff was in the lawful, adverse possession of said land, the said defendants unlawfully and forcibly broke and entered upon the plaintiff's land," and committed the trespass complained of, etc. The defendants broadly denied that they cut timber or trespassed otherwise on the plaintiff's land. They admitted that they entered upon a part of the land described in the complaint, "but deny that the plaintiff has any right, title, or interest in the land whereon they have entered." They allege that they have "been in the actual, exclusive, and notorious possession twenty-five years, under known and visible boundaries, as shown by deed," etc.; that the plaintiff has trespassed on their lands, etc. On the trial the court submitted this issue to the jury, and it was responded to in the negative: "(1) Was the plaintiff in possession of the land described in the complaint at the time of the alleged trespass?" The plaintiff put in evidence a deed from Thomas H. Brantley and his wife to him, dated the 13th day of January, 1886; and a deed from Bryan Whitford to said Brantley, dated March 26 1861; and both these deeds embraced the land described in the complaint. He further produced evidence tending to prove that he had possession of this land. It did not appear that the title to the land was out of the state. The defendants put in evidence several deeds, but these deeds were not made to them, or any of them. They also introduced evidence tending to prove that they were in the actual possession of the locus in quo at the time specified in the complaint, and ever since, and many years before, that time. At the close of the testimony the plaintiff moved for judgment, upon the ground that the evidence produced by the defendants was not sufficient to rebut that of the plaintiff, and, if true, they had offered no deed to themselves embracing any part of the land claimed by him. The court denied the motion, and the plaintiff excepted. The court gave the following, among other, instructions to the jury: "(1) Actual possession of land consists in exercising that dominion over it, and making that profit from it, of which it is susceptible in its present state; but these must be characteristic of ownership and they will not be sufficient if they are done at such long intervals and are consistent with the character of a trespasser. (2) In this case the burden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy you that he was in possession of the land; these issues are to be decided according to the weight of the testimony, and not from caprice, whims, or upon mere speculation." The plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff moved for a new...