Hulsey v. State
| Decision Date | 10 June 1931 |
| Docket Number | 8036. |
| Citation | 159 S.E. 270,172 Ga. 797 |
| Parties | HULSEY et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Refusal of continuance, based on affidavits of public excitement containing matters of opinion, held not abuse of discretion.
The sworn allegations of public excitement set forth in the motion for continuance were matters of opinion, and did not demand a finding that there was such public excitement, as rendered it impossible to afford the defendants a fair trial. There was no abuse of discretion in refusing a continuance on the alleged ground of public excitement.
Time for preparing for trial is within trial judge's discretion, which will not be interfered with unless abused refusal of continuance for insufficient time to prepare defense in murder prosecution held not abuse of discretion.
This ground of the motion for a continuance comes within the general rule that the time to be allowed counsel to prepare for trial is in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his discretion will not be interfered with by this court unless abused. Under the facts, there was no abuse of discretion in this instance.
Refusal of continuance, because defendant's counsel was required to appear before court of appeals three days after case was set for trial, held not abuse of discretion.
There was no abuse of discretion in overruling the third ground of the motion for a continuance, as dealt with in the corresponding division of the opinion.
Array of jurors held not subject to challenge because caption of list referred to adjourned term rather than special term; array of jurors held not subject to challenge because jurors were summoned by mail less than ten days before special term (Pen. Code 1910, § § 796, 827, 856).
The judge did not err in overruling the challenge to the array.
Prosecuting attorney's reference to large number of people attending trial, expecting to see jury do justice, held improper, but refusal of mistrial was not error, where withdrawn with instruction to disregard.
The remarks of the attorney were improper; but in view of their withdrawal, and the apology of the attorney and the remarks of the court, there was no error in refusing to grant a mistrial.
Refusal of mistrial, because of prosecuting attorney's erroneous reference to invalid child of deceased, held not error, where remarks were withdrawn with instruction to disregard.
There was no error in overruling the second motion for a mistrial as dealt with in the sixth division of the opinion.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict against both defendants, and there was no error in refusing a new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Polk County; Price Edwards, Judge.
William Hulsey and another were convicted for murder, and they bring error.
Affirmed.
Wm. G McRae, of Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.
S. W Ragsdale, Sol. Gen., of Dallas, Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., and T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
On the afternoon of June 18, 1930, Lige Harper, Ernest McCullough, and Clifford Jones were killed by pistol shots in Polk county near the residence of William Hulsey. During the ensuing night their bodies were carried in a wagon to a secluded place several miles away, and cast head foremost into an abandoned well. On the following day the bodies were discovered, and a coroner's inquest was held. William Hulsey, his two married sons Fred and Ray, his son-in-law Tom Hicks, and L. E. McCullough were arrested and confined in jail, the two first named in an adjoining county. The next regular term of court would convene on the fourth Monday in August. On June 22, an attorney was called by telephone from Atlanta. At a conference then held it was agreed that the attorney would represent William and Fred Hulsey if an indictment should be found against them. The attorney stated at the time that he thought that if an indictment should be found against them it would be the regular August term. On July 3, the attorney went again to the Hulseys, at which time they informed him "there was no use employing a lawyer and paying him unless there was a bill found against them." On July 5, the judge called a special term of court to convene July 14, "for the trial of criminal business," and ordered the grand jury "sworn and serving at the February term, 1930," to reconvene on July 11 "for the disposition of such business as may come before them." On the same day the judge wrote to the attorney, informing him of the call of the special term, and stated: The attorney was finally employed, and was paid his fee on Friday, July 11. When the grand jury reconvened, three true bills were returned on July 11, against William and Fred Hulsey, charging them jointly with the separate murders of Harper, McCullough, and Jones. The case for murder of Jones was called for trial on July 14, and the defendants filed their motion for a continuance to the regular August term. The motion was overruled, and the defendants excepted pendente lite. When the panel of jurors, from which a jury was to be selected, was about to be put upon the defendants, they filed a challenge to the array. This was overruled, and the defendants again excepted pendente lite. On the trial they were both convicted and given the death penalty. Their motion for a new trial on general and special grounds was overruled, and they excepted, assigning error on that ruling, and on the rulings excepted to pendente lite.
1. The grounds of the motion for a continuance were positively sworn to by both of the defendants. In one of these it was alleged substantially: ...
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Williford v. State
...S.E.2d 169; Benefield v. State, 140 Ga.App. 727, 730(3), 232 S.E.2d 89; Wheeless v. State, 92 Ga. 19(1), 18 S.E. 303; Hulsey v. State, 172 Ga. 797, 798(5), 159 S.E. 270. 2. An excerpt from the charge with regard to incriminatory admissions was not error for the reasons Judgment affirmed. SH......