Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz

• Citation: 796 S.W.2d 1
• Decision Date: 27 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-SC-918-DG,88-SC-918-DG
• Parties: HUMANA OF KENTUCKY, INC., d/b/a Humana Hospital Audubon, Movant, v. Pamela V. SEITZ, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Page 1

796 S.W.2d 1

HUMANA OF KENTUCKY, INC., d/b/a Humana Hospital Audubon Movant, v. Pamela V. SEITZ, Respondent.

No. 88-SC-918-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

Sept. 27, 1990.

David R. Monohan, Jann B. Logsdon, Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, for movant.

Kenneth L. Sales, Tobe Liebert, Segal, Isenberg, Sales, Stewart & Cutler, Louisville, for respondent.

STEPHENS, Chief Justice.

The issue we decide on this appeal is whether the evidence presented by the respondent-plaintiff in this case satisfied the threshold requirements of the tort of outrageous conduct, so as to justify submitting the case to a jury. The Court of Appeals answered the question in the affirmative. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and reverse its decision.

On March 11, 1985, respondent, while a patient at movant's hospital, gave birth to a stillborn fetus. On August 8, 1985, respondent filed a suit in the Jefferson Circuit Court, claiming negligence, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following pretrial discovery, the trial judge granted a summary judgment to Humana, declaring that the acts of the hospital staff were not "so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, [as] to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." The trial court also found that the acts of the Humana staff did not take place over an extended period of time. The trial court relied primarily on Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984).

The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case with directions that the trial court should go forward with discovery and trial. The appellate court believed Craft does not require that the alleged outrageous conduct extend over a long period of time. It relied on two cases, Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971), and Hall v. May Department Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981), for the proposition that the relationship between the parties must be examined as an element of the tort. The court in Rockhill made a determination of the special duties owed by a physician to a patient. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in this case stated that the "special duties owed by a nurse to a patient are important" in deciding what behavior may be found to be extreme or outrageous.

Respondent was admitted to Humana Hospital on February 28, 1985, as a result of pregnancy complications involving a ruptured membrane. On March 10, 1985, she began experiencing pain, which she believed to be the beginning of labor. A nurse examined Ms. Seitz and informed her that she was not in labor. The pains, however, continued through the night until the early morning of March 11, 1985. Respondent contacted nurses through the bed communicator unit in her room. She was sedated and was given pain relief medicine. At about 6 a.m., she attempted to contact the nurses, but the light on her bed unit failed to come on. She "believed" the unit had been disconnected by the nursing staff. She was served breakfast and had her vital signs checked shortly after 7 a.m. After the nurse left, she felt a sharp abdominal pain. She thought she had to "go to the bathroom." Her roommate advised her not to get out of bed, but rather to use a bedpan. The roommate shut the door to the room, and at the same time, respondent began delivering the baby into the bedpan. The roommate attempted to notify the nurses on respondent's intercom, and when it did not work, she used her bedside unit. Receiving no answer, the roommate then went to the hall and yelled for help. In several minutes a cleaning woman responded.

Several minutes after that, nurses arrived and rendered assistance. During this time, one of the nurses shouted to respondent, ordering her to "shut up" because she was disturbing other patients. A few minutes later, the respondent's obstetrician came into the room, on a regular visit, and examined the fetus and respondent. He pronounced the baby dead.

A nurse wrapped the deceased baby in a sheet, and the respondent inquired where the nurse was going to take the baby. According to the respondent, the nurse said, "Honey, we dispose of them right here at the hospital."

Respondent's physician testified that, based on the history of the incident and his personal observation, the nurse "failed to demonstrate the amount of compassion that a nurse should demonstrate toward a patient. I think that it was mishandled, and that amount of trauma, emotional trauma, could have been avoided."

Based on this evidence, respondent claims that the hospital, through the conduct of its nursing staff, is liable for outrageous conduct in the handling of the above-described episode.

This Court adopted the tort of outrageous conduct in the case of Craft v. Rice, supra. In that case, Albert and Irene Craft, husband and wife, lived in the weighmaster's house of Ashland Coal Company, where Albert worked weighing coal and coal trucks. He was indicted for second-degree forgery for allegedly falsifying weigh tickets, but was acquitted. For nearly three months, presumably prior to trial, Rice, a former sheriff, kept Irene Craft under surveillance at work and at home, telling her on the "CB" radio that he was going to put Albert in jail. He allegedly drove close to her, forcing her to change traffic lanes. He allegedly talked on the CB radio to Albert Craft. This alleged harassment led to mental anguish on the part of Albert, and chronic diarrhea, colitis and nervousness on the part of Irene. No physical touching occurred. The gravamen of the Crafts' complaint against Rice was interference with their rights, causing emotional distress.

In adopting this new tort, we recognized the elements of proof necessary to sustain the cause of action:

1) the wrongdoer's conduct must be intentional or reckless;

2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality 3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress; and

4) the emotional distress must be severe.

Craft, 671 S.W.2d at 249. See also Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir.1980).

Based on the facts as stated, we declared as a matter of law that the conduct of Rice "is a deviation from all reasonable bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community. It qualifies as harassment intended to cause extreme emotional distress." Craft, 671 S.W.2d at 250.

In Craft we adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46 (1965), as part of the common law of this Commonwealth. That section provides:

"Sec. 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."

The question we must decide, therefore, is whether, as a matter of law, taking the evidence of the respondent-plaintiff as being true, that evidence falls within the purview of Sec. 46 and the four criteria we set out in Craft. Is it sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements for the tort of outrageous conduct? We believe the answer is "no."

The salient "facts" relied on by respondent are as follows:

1) her belief that her intercom was disconnected;

2) the lapse of 12-15 minutes between the beginning of delivery and when nurses actually arrived in respondent's room;

3) a nurse telling respondent to "shut up"; and

4) a nurse telling respondent that the baby would be disposed of in the hospital.

In Comment d of Sec. 46 of the Restatement, supra, it is stated:

"d. Extreme and outrageous conduct.

It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious ..., or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,'.... Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46 Comment d (emphasis added).

Certainly, as respondent's physician testified, the nurse's conduct showed a lack of compassion. We agree that a little more patience and TLC would have been desirable. However, after examining the facts as alleged by the respondent, we believe they describe conduct that falls short of the standards set out above.

First, there is no proof that the intercom by respondent's bed was turned off. Admittedly, it was only her "belief" that such occurred. "Belief" is not evidence and does not create an issue of material fact. A plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The delay in time before a nurse arrived may well be negligence, but it is hardly intentional, outrageous, or reckless conduct. All other evidence indicated that the nursing staff carefully and regularly cared for respondent from the time she began suffering pain. The time lapse, per se, would only tend to show negligence, not the tortious conduct alleged here.

The evidence of the nurse telling respondent to "shut up" likewise is not of such a nature to show that the offending nurse intentionally or recklessly caused emotional distress. Respondent was obviously distressed at giving...