Humbert v. Larson
| Citation | 68 N.W. 703,99 Iowa 275 |
| Parties | L. H. HUMBERT, Appellant, v. T. J. LARSON, et al |
| Decision Date | 17 October 1896 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Adams District Court.--HON. W. H. TEDFORD, Judge.
ACTION at law, upon three promissory notes, made and executed by the defendants, in payment for a certain stallion, purchased by them of plaintiff. Defense: Failure of consideration, and fraud practiced upon them by the plaintiff. Trial to a jury. Verdict and judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Dale & Brown for appellant.
Davis & Wells and W. S. Hefling for appellees.
This is the second time this case has been before us. The opinion on the first appeal will be found in 89 Iowa 258 (56 N.W. 454). A somewhat extended and correct statement of the issues will be found in this first opinion, and they need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say, that after the case was remanded to the lower court, the plaintiff amended his petition, by including all the notes given for the stallion and asked judgment for the full amount thereof. Otherwise the issues remained the same as upon the first trial.
I. Appellant's first contention is that the court erred in its instructions to the jury on the subject of rescission, in this: that they were misleading, as applied to the undisputed facts of the case. No serious complaint is made of the abstract propositions of law announced in the charge, and if such complaint was made, it would be without merit. The contention of appellant, as we understand it, is that there was such delay on the part of defendants, after they discovered the alleged fraud of the plaintiff, as that they cannot be heard to say they rescinded the contract of purchase. Briefly stated, the defenses interposed by defendants were: (1) That there was a failure of consideration for the notes, because the stallion was of no value whatever for breeding purposes. (2) That plaintiff made certain fraudulent representations regarding the breeding qualities of the stallion, which he knew to be false and untrue; that the horse was barren and impotent, and of no value for breeding purposes; that the whole transaction connected with the sale of the animal was a fraud upon the defendants; and that they were damaged by reason thereof in the sum of the amount of the notes they gave to plaintiff. The defendants do not specifically plead that they rescinded the contract for this alleged fraud, but the case was tried without objection, upon the theory that there was such an issue, and no point is now made by appellant regarding this omission. All parties considered the question of rescission for the alleged fraud as one of the issues in the case, and the plaintiff asked a number of instructions with reference to the rights and duties of the defendants in making rescission. The case will now be treated as if the answer set forth this defense. The evidence shows that the plaintiff had sold the stallion to Wagner & Sexauer previous to his sale to defendants, and that he was obliged to rescind this sale and receive back the animal, because he was not a sure foal-getter, as represented. It is claimed in argument that the defendants were informed of these matters some time in April or May of the year 1889, and that they did not offer to rescind their contract until about January 25, 1890; that by reason of their delay, they elected to stand by and perform their contract; and that their rescission came too late. Counsel agree, that rescission for fraud must be made in a reasonable time, and that, if the article purchased be retained for an unreasonable length of time, the law will regard it as an acceptance, and a waiver of the right to return the property. They disagree upon the question as to who is to determine what is this reasonable time, and upon the effect to be given the evidence adduced, with reference to this matter. As to the first point in dispute, it is sufficient to say, that what is a reasonable time within which to return property, in order to accomplish a rescission for fraud, is a mixed question of law and fact, and no rule can be given which would be applicable to every state of facts. Each case must depend upon its own peculiar circumstances. The character of the property, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances existing at the time the attempt to rescind is made, must all be taken into account. There are cases, of course, where the delay may be so long that the court will as a matter of law, consider the offer to rescind too late. In this case, the court submitted the matter to the jury, and virtually told them, that if they found that defendants discovered in April or May, of 1889, that the horse had been taken back from the first purchasers, by the plaintiff, because he was not a sure foal-getter, then the rescission made by them in January was too late. In answer to special interrogatories the jury found that the defendants did not learn of the fact that plaintiff received the horse back from the former purchasers because he was not a sure foal-getter, until some time after the commencement of this suit. The instructions, as we have already said, announced correct rules of law; and the dispute between the parties is narrowed down to the one inquiry, is the special finding to which we have referred, without support in the evidence? We are satisfied that the defendants knew shortly after their purchase, that the horse had been sold to Wagner & Sexauer, and resold by them to...
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