Huml v. Vlazny

• Decision Date: 07 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004AP36.,2004AP36.
• Citation: 2006 WI 87,716 N.W.2d 807
• Parties: Theresa HUML, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert W. VLAZNY, Defendant-Appellant, Todd J. Cecchi, Roy Cecchi, The St. Paul Companies, Inc., a/k/a St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and St. Paul Insurance Company of Illinois, Defendants.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 807

716 N.W.2d 807

2006 WI 87

Theresa HUML, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert W. VLAZNY, Defendant-Appellant Todd J. Cecchi, Roy Cecchi, The St. Paul Companies, Inc., a/k/a St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and St. Paul Insurance Company of Illinois, Defendants.

No. 2004AP36.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 2, 2006.

Decided July 7, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by John C. Thomure, Jr., Timothy M. Hansen, Jonathan C. Wertz, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Timothy M. Hansen and Jonathan C. Wertz.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Michael J. Jassak, Kristin M. Cafferty, Racine, James P. Martin, Lake Geneva, and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., and oral argument by Kristin M. Cafferty.

¶ DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (2003-04).¹ It addresses the relationship between the restitution order in a criminal case and a subsequent settlement agreement in a civil case. The Walworth County Circuit Court, John R. Race, Judge, dismissed Robert Vlazny's (Vlazny) motion to enforce a settlement agreement to preclude Theresa Huml (Huml) from enforcing a judgment derived from a criminal restitution order, after Vlazny was released from probation.

¶ 2 We are presented with two issues. First, may a civil settlement agreement between a crime/tort victim and a criminal defendant/tortfeasor preclude the victim from collecting unpaid restitution that the defendant was ordered to pay in the criminal proceeding, after the defendant's probation ends and the unpaid restitution is reduced to a civil judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r)? Second, did the settlement agreement between Theresa Huml and Robert Vlazny preclude Huml from enforcing the civil judgment derived from the restitution order?

¶ 3 Vlazny argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b) requires a court to enter a civil judgment for the amount of unpaid restitution when probation ends. When this occurs, he contends, an existing settlement agreement between the defendant and the victim may preclude the victim from enforcing the judgment. He claims that his settlement agreement with Huml bars her from enforcing the judgment.

¶ 4 Huml responds that Vlazny's position is contrary to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r), which provides that after probation terminates, unpaid restitution "is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the victim[.]" She contends that the phrase "in the same manner as a civil judgment" indicates that it is not a civil judgment. Huml reasons that her interpretation is consistent with the notion that a restitution judgment is criminal in nature and should not be extinguished by a civil settlement agreement. Therefore, Huml concludes, her settlement agreement with Vlazny cannot preclude her from enforcing the restitution order once it is reduced to a judgment.

¶ 5 We conclude that a civil settlement agreement can have no effect upon a restitution order while the defendant remains on probation, unless the circuit court finds that enforcing the restitution order in addition to the settlement agreement would result in a double recovery for the victim. After a defendant is released from probation, however, and any unpaid restitution under the restitution order is converted to a civil judgment, a settlement agreement between the victim and defendant may — depending upon its terms — preclude the victim from enforcing the judgment. We conclude that the global settlement agreement that Huml entered into with Vlazny precludes her from enforcing the judgment converted from the restitution order.

¶ 6 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 On June 20, 1993, Vlazny seriously injured Huml when the automobile he was driving collided head-on with Huml's car. Prior to the accident, Vlazny had been drinking. On November 11, 1993, Vlazny was convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a). The circuit court sentenced Vlazny to two years imprisonment but stayed the sentence and placed him on three years probation.² As a condition of probation, the circuit court initially ordered Vlazny to pay $500,000 in restitution to Huml. Subsequently, the circuit court amended the restitution order after Vlazny and Huml stipulated, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c), that restitution should be set at $140,000, payable for the duration of probation in monthly installments of $425.

¶ 8 At a January 24, 1994, restitution hearing, Court Commissioner Paul Barrett noted that the parties' agreed-upon restitution schedule would leave the majority of the ordered restitution unpaid at the end of Vlazny's probation.³ Assistant District Attorney Steven Watson informed the commissioner that Huml planned to initiate a civil suit against Vlazny, and that any restitution payments would be set off in the civil suit.

¶ 9 On May 16, 1995, Huml filed a civil action against Vlazny and the insurer of the car he was driving, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St.Paul). Watson, who had left the district attorney's office, represented Huml in her civil suit. Huml settled her suit against Vlazny and St. Paul on December 12, 1996. The settlement agreement provided:

The parties agree that in consideration of the full discharge of past, present and future claims arising out of the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint . . ., as a result of the alleged actions or omissions of Defendants, Insurer agrees to pay the sum hereinafter specified. . . .

This Settlement Agreement and Release shall apply to all claims, whether known or unknown, on the part of all parties to this Agreement. In consideration of the payments called for herein, Plaintiff completely releases and forever discharges Defendants, Insurer, and their agents . . . from any or all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, including court costs, legal expenses and attorneys' fees which the undersigned now has or had or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way arising out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries . . . resulting from the accident, casualty or event listed in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Emphasis added.)

In exchange for releasing Vlazny and St. Paul, Huml received an initial lump sum payment of $548,000, monthly payments for the rest of her life in increasing amounts, and larger periodic payments paid on average every 16 to 18 months.

¶ 10 Meanwhile, Vlazny remained on probation. Because his restitution payments were sporadic, his probation was twice extended by the court. In August 2002, more than eight years after Vlazny was sentenced, his probation agent recommended that Vlazny be released from probation and that the unpaid restitution be reduced to a civil judgment. The circuit court terminated Vlazny's probation in December 2002. He had paid $33,705 to Huml, leaving a balance of $107,900.46. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(b), the circuit court entered judgment for Huml against Vlazny for the amount of unpaid restitution.

¶ 11 When Huml attempted to enforce the judgment against Vlazny, Vlazny filed a motion in the criminal court to vacate the judgment or reduce it to zero, arguing that the settlement agreement precluded Huml from enforcing the judgment. The criminal court ruled that the matter became a civil matter when the restitution order was reduced to judgment, and it directed Vlazny to proceed in civil court. Accordingly, Vlazny filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in civil court.

¶ 12 The circuit court denied Vlazny's motion to reduce the judgment to zero, concluding that the settlement agreement had no effect upon Huml's ability to enforce the judgment. Vlazny appealed and the court of appeals certified the following question: "Whether a written settlement agreement and release discharging a defendant from civil liability for all past, present and future claims arising out of his or her criminal conduct precludes the crime victim from enforcing a subsequent judgment for unpaid restitution entered after the defendant has been released from probation." Huml v. Vlazny, No. 2004AP36, 2005 WL 2219627, unpublished certification (Wis.Ct.App. Sept. 14, 2005).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 The issue presented requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(b) and 973.20(1r), which we do independent of the circuit court's analysis. State v. Sweat, 208 Wis.2d 409, 414-15, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997). Additionally, we must review the settlement agreement to determine whether the parties intended it to encompass the restitution judgment. Contract interpretation and whether a contract is ambiguous are both questions of law we review de novo. Wis. Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, ¶¶ 22, 23, 233 Wis.2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276.

III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

¶ 14 In statutory interpretation, we begin with the language of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous after considering the text of the statute, its context, and any policies evident from the text, our analysis ordinarily stops and we give effect to the intent of the legislature as set forth in the plain language of the statute. Id., ¶¶ 46, 48, 681 N.W.2d 110. In the absence of ambiguity, we do not look to extrinsic sources to ascertain legislative intent, except to bolster the plain meaning interpretation. Id., ¶ 51, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶ 15 A statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id., ¶ 47, 681 N.W.2d 110. "Ambiguity can be found in the words of the statutory...