Humphrey v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 18 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. S12A0154.,S12A0154.
• Citation: 12 FCDR 1910,291 Ga. 202,728 S.E.2d 603
• Parties: HUMPHREY v. LEWIS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

291 Ga. 202

728 S.E.2d 603

12 FCDR 1910

HUMPHREY

v.LEWIS.

No. S12A0154.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 18, 2012.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard Tangum, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for appellant.

Paul E. Greenwalt, III, Ann H. MacDonald, Heidi Oertle, Schiff Hardin, LLP, Chicago, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Christopher K. Lewis was convicted of malice murder, burglary, and other related offenses in 1998, and he was sentenced to death for the murder. After reversing and remanding for a new hearing on Lewis' motion for new trial, see Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. 194, 565 S.E.2d 437 (2002)( Lewis I ), this Court unanimously affirmed Lewis' convictions and sentences in 2004. See Lewis v. State, 277 Ga. 534, 592 S.E.2d 405 (2004)( Lewis II ). After Lewis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the habeas court granted Lewis habeas relief with respect to his malice murder conviction and death sentence. See Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 768, 692 S.E.2d 580 (2010)( Lewis III ). The warden appealed only the habeas court's grant of relief as to Lewis' murder conviction, and this Court reversed that portion of the habeas court's order and remanded the case to the habeas court for consideration of several unresolved claims that Lewis had raised in his amended petition. See id. at 784(II)(D), (III), 692 S.E.2d 580. In accordance with the directions from this Court, the habeas court on remand ruled on Lewis' remaining claims in an order filed on August 17, 2011. The habeas court again granted Lewis habeas relief, this time vacating all of Lewis' convictions on several grounds. The warden appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the habeas court's ruling and reinstate Lewis' convictions.

I. Factual Background

The evidence adduced at trial showed the following. Lewis and the victim, Cheryl Lewis, were married but had been living apart for approximately a year, and there were several incidents of domestic violence over that time. Ms. Lewis and her two children from a previous marriage, 13–year–old Kellee Dunn and 10–year–old Sean Dunn, were staying with a friend in her apartment. On December 19, 1996, the children were alone in the apartment while Ms. Lewis was attending a Christmas party with a male co-worker, Robbie Epps. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Lewis began banging on the apartment door, cursing and yelling, but the children did not open the door pursuant to their mother's instructions. Eventually, the banging ceased, and the children went to sleep.

At 1:45 a.m., Kellee was awakened by her mother's screams and went to a bedroom, where she saw Lewis holding a knife over her mother, who was on the floor. Kellee ran next door to call the police. When the police arrived, they found Epps standing in the parking lot. Appearing frightened and intoxicated, Epps told police that there was a man in the apartment. Police discovered Ms. Lewis' body inside. She had suffered 42 injuries and had bled to death because her carotid artery and jugular vein had been severed. After Kellee identified Lewis as her mother's attacker, police went to Lewis' apartment complex and arrested him in the parking lot. DNA taken from bloodstains on Lewis' shoe and pants matched Ms. Lewis' DNA profile.¹

II. Standard of Review

“In reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for habeas corpus, this Court accepts the habeas court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the law to the facts.” (Citation omitted.) Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 536(2), 697 S.E.2d 798 (2010).

III. Brady Claim

The warden contends the habeas court erred in granting Lewis relief on his claim that the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The habeas court found the State violated Brady in its suppression of two pieces of evidence, namely: (1) notes reflecting an out-of-state investigator's interview with Ms. Lewis' roommate, Kimberly Silinzy, regarding Lewis' relationship with Ms. Lewis; and (2) a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) report stating that Lewis' shoe did not make a bloody shoe print found at the crime scene.

The warden correctly points out that the habeas court failed to address the fact that Lewis' Brady claim was procedurally defaulted, at least as an initial matter, because he did not raise it at trial or on direct appeal. See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997); OCGA § 9–14–48(d). However, a petitioner may overcome procedural default by satisfying the cause and prejudice test. See Todd, 268 Ga. at 824(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900. We need not decide whether Lewis can show cause to excuse the procedural default to his Brady claim, see id. at 824–827(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900 (finding cause to excuse a procedural default where the State breached a “constitutional duty” to disclose information forming the basis of the claim), because we are satisfied that Lewis has failed to establish the requisite prejudice. See Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 829–830(II)(B), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (rejecting a petitioner's attempt to avoid procedural default regarding certain alleged Brady violations because prejudice was not established).

“Because [Lewis'] underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.” (Citation omitted.) Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851(2), 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). For the reasons discussed below, Lewis cannot prevail on the merits of his underlying Brady claim, and therefore, his claim remains procedurally defaulted.

To prevail on his Brady claim, Lewis must show, inter alia, that the allegedly-suppressed evidence was material to the defense. “ ‘The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Upton v. Parks, 284 Ga. 254, 255(1), 664 S.E.2d 196 (2008).

A. Silinzy Notes

Lewis claims the State suppressed handwritten notes regarding an out-of-state investigator's interview with Silinzy. The investigator spoke with Silinzy when he served her with a witness subpoena shortly before Lewis'trial began. Quoting from the notes in its order, the habeas court found that the notes indicated the investigator learned that Lewis “ ‘came to [the] apartment,’ ” that Ms. Lewis “ ‘left w[ith] him,’ ” and that “ ‘she slept w [ith] him 2 weeks prior to [her] murder.’ ” The habeas court also found the notes reflected that Silinzy told the investigator that she had “ ‘never heard any threats' ” made by Lewis to Ms. Lewis and that Ms. Lewis told Silinzy that “ ‘she was scared of [Lewis], but that she still loved him.’ ” The habeas court further found that, as a result of the State's suppression of this evidence, Lewis was deprived of “critical third-party evidence of the true nature of the relationship between him and his wife” that would have led competent counsel to investigate a voluntary manslaughter theory rather than the “unsupported” theory of actual innocence that trial counsel pursued at trial. The habeas court concluded that “on its own the Silinzy evidence create[d] a reasonable probability that the jury would have decided Mr. Lewis's case differently” in that it would have returned a voluntary manslaughter verdict.

However, the same information contained in the investigator's notes is also contained in Silinzy's affidavit submitted by Lewis in his habeas proceeding. In Lewis III, this Court thoroughly addressed whether there was a reasonable probability that presenting the testimony in Silinzy's affidavit at Lewis' trial would have affected the outcome of the trial. Considering Silinzy's affidavit in the context of the entire evidence presented at trial and in the habeas court and assuming Lewis could establish the admissibility of any hearsay evidence, we specifically held that, for various reasons, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Lewis' trial would have been different had trial counsel presented the testimony contained in Silinzy's affidavit, including her testimony that she never witnessed any domestic violence by Lewis against Ms. Lewis, that Lewis and Ms. Lewis had sexual relations approximately two weeks before the crime, that Ms. Lewis loved Lewis but did not want to live with him when he was on drugs, and that the couple had an “on-going” relationship. See Lewis III, 286 Ga. at 776–778(II)(C)(2), 692 S.E.2d 580. Therefore, the habeas court's current finding that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Lewis' trial would have been different if the defense had possessed the Silinzy evidence conflicts with this Court's holding in Lewis III.²

Nevertheless, the habeas court did not find our decision in Lewis III to be determinative of Lewis' Brady claim regarding the Silinzy notes for the reason that this Court “only considered the Silinzy evidence in isolation, not the chain of evidence that would have been uncovered had the defense investigated a voluntary manslaughter defense.” However, the habeas court failed to specify what additional evidence would have resulted from Lewis' possession of the Silinzy notes at trial.

Moreover, in Lewis III, the warden appealed the habeas court's finding that Lewis' appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise on appeal trial counsel's ineffectiveness in not choosing to pursue a voluntary manslaughter theory, and thus, our analysis required us “to determine whether, but for the alleged deficiencies of Lewis' trial counsel, there [wa]s a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a voluntary...