Humphrey v. Petitioner
| Citation | 36 W.Va. 11 |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
| Decision Date | 26 January 1892 |
| Parties | Humphrey et al v. Spencer et al. |
A deed from a husband conveying land directly to his wife, though void at law and passing no title, is valid in equity to pass a substantial estate.
struction op Statutes.
Such deed is valid in equity notwithstanding the words, "from any person other than her husband," in section 8, c. 66, Code 1868. That section, as it was before amendment in 1891, did not touch such deed, but left it as before the enactment of said section.
of Actions.
A voluntary conveyance, merely for that cause, can not be avoided by suit brought after five years from its date.
Money expended by a husband in permanent improvements on land which is the wife's separate estate, though expended without fraudulent intent in fact, may be charged on such land for debts existing when such improvements were made. Interest should be allowed on such money only from the commencement of suit to charge it.
In the absence of actual fraudulent intent, the value of the property, less the value of permanent improvements made with the husband's means, should be ascertained, as also the value of such improvements; and in case of sale, and inadequacy of its proceeds to pay both values, the creditors and wife should share therein, ratably, on the basis of such values.
J. G. McGluer and Lewis § Tavenner for appellants, cited 5 W. Va. 272; 26 Gratt. 354; 35 Ind. 181; Sch. Dorn. Eel. 286; 94 Ind. 138; 66 Ala. 151; 27 W. Va. 306; 10 Pet. 583; 4 Rand. 282; 14 Johns. 498; 3 Johns. Ch'y 378; 26 Gratt. 354; 22 W.Va. 357-370; 10 W. Va. 87; 19 Ill App. 398; 34 Kan. 22; 2 Warr. Vend. 629; 2 Lorn. Dig. 432; 11 Wheat. 199; 2 Rob. 341; 10 S. E. Rep. 637; Code (1891) e.104, s. 14; 23 W. Va. 130; 27 W. Va. 468; 26 W. Va. 345; 4 Rand. 282.
J. A Hutchinson and, 7. 5. Jackson for appellees, cited 7 Leigh 366, 369; 29 W. Va. 441; Id. 622; Id. 389; 37 W. Va. 206-209; 32 W. Va. 212; Id. 452; 13 W. Va. 29; 11 W. Va. 137.
Appeal by Sarah M. Neal and Cora Spencer from a decree of the Circuit Court of Wood county in a chancery suit brought by Charles Humphrey, executor of Selden Humphrey, deceased, and others, against said appellant and others. W. J. Hill, as sheriff of Wood county, appointed J. II. Spencer his deputy, and took a bond, dated 9th of January, 1871, conditioned for the faithful discharge by Spencer of his duties as such deputy sheriff, in which bond W. C. Keever, M. B. Pennybacker, H. 1ST. Crooks, Jr., W. A. Cooper, A. Congrove, B. R. Pennybacker, Paul Neal, H. W. Buckley, Selden Humphrey, and John Flinn were sureties. Spencer did not faithfully perform his duties as deputy sheriff, and thus arose a liability in favor of Hill, the sheriff, upon said bond. Hill, having himself become embarrassed, assigned his assets to J. B. Jackson for the benefit of his creditors; and Jackson instituted suit upon said bond in the name of Hill, for his use as assignee, and recovered a judgment, on December 14, 1886, for seven thousand, eight hundred and thirty three dollars and eighty eight cents against said Spencer, iNeal, and others. The executor of Selden Humphrey, and others who were debtors under said judgment, paid it, and then brought this suit for the purpose of collecting it from J. IT. Spencer, as principal debtor, or on failure to do this, to enforce contribution from Paul Neal and others, as sureties in said bond, who had not contributed in paying said judgment.
Among other things in the bill not pertinent here, the bill attacked as void as to said liability, because voluntary, and made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, and because in violation of section three of chapter sixty six of the Code of 1868 a deed from PaulKeal to his wife, Sarah M. ISTeal, for a tract of fifty one and three fourths acres of land, dated 11th of April, 1876, acknowledged same day, and recorded 19th of February, 1877. The decree avoided said deed, and subjected said land to said liability; and this is the ground of the appeal by Sarah M. Neal.
The bill also averred that the father of Cora Spencer, the wife of J. H. Spencer, had conveyed a small lot of land to her, and that her husband had, with his means, erected a valuable building upon it, costing from one thousand dollars to one thousand two hundred dollars and sought to charge said house and lot with said liability because of Spencer's application of his means in the erection of the house. The decree charged the property with a certain sum, and this is the ground of the appeal by Cora Spencer.
As to Sarah M. Neal. The bill suggests as a ground for the invalidity of the deed from Neal to his wife for the fifty one and three fourths acres of land that it is in violation of section three, chapter sixty six, Code 1868, though the brief does not insist on this point. It may be that the idea here is that as that section enables a married woman to "take by inheritance or by gift, grant, devise or bequest from any person otlter than her husband," the legislature intended to enact that conveyances from husband to wife should be void, and that she could not have a separate estate in property thus conveyed, but the conveyance should be no longer valid, even in a court of equity; in other words, to put upon it the seal of invalidity by express enactment for all purposes. This is not the proper construction of the section. This is a statute designed to remove, in harmony with the spirit and progress of the times and the advance of civilization, that harsh and even cruel feature of the English common-law, which gave to the husband, however improvident or unworthy, all his wife's personalty, in absolute estate, and her real estate for his life, so that either his dissipation or his creditors could render her and her children penniless. This statute was intended to enable her to hold her estate, owned at her marriage or afterwards coming to her, free from the husband and his debts. Such was the evil to be remedied, and we must not give the act a construction narrowing her powers, whereas the general purposes of the statute was to enlarge them. We must not give the statute an operation to carry us backward and deprive a wife of a right which the benignity and liberality of courts of equity had before its enactment conferred upon her, to get rid of that fixed rule of common-law declaring void a conveyance from husbaud to wife, direct. That was the-common-law rule; but equity upheld such conveyance. Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gratt. 259; MeKenzie v. Railroad Co., 27 W. Va. 306; Sayers v. Wall, 26. Gratt. 354; 2 Bish. Mar. Worn. § 717.
Such was the case before the enabling statute. Surely, it was not designed to render her condition worse than before, but it was intended to ameliorate it. The statute was designed to empower her to take property from persons other than her husband, and hold it as separate estate, free from her husband's coutrol and liabilities a capacity which she needed and leave conveyances from her husband just as they were, untouched by the act; to stand as before. And, moreover, there are no negative words, declaring that conveyances from husband to wife shall not be valid. Perhaps another aim in the use of the words "other than her husband" was to repel any inference that she might hold property conveyed from her husband against creditors, out of abundant caution. 2 Bish. Mar. Worn. § 363, says: "Of course, therefore, the direct conveyances which were good in equity, under the unwritten law, will be sustained in equity, under the late statutes." Such must have been the construction of the act by this Court, else it would not have upheld a deed from a husband to wife under the Code of 1868 in MeKenzie v. Railroad Co., 27 W. Va. 306. See Kelly, Cont Mar. Worn. p. 140, c. 6. § 10; Lockwood v. Cullin, 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 134. I notice that the legislature of 1891 struck out the words in question.
Thus, this deed, simply because it is between husband and wife, is not void, leaving the land in the husband; but while the legal title may have remained in him in the eye of a court of law, the substantial estate vested in the wife in the eye of a court of equity. But, of course, if such deed is in fraud of creditors, it is void.
The consideration for this conveyance is stated in it as five dollars, but the evidence of Neal and his wife is that it was four hundred dollars, paid in 1856 into his hands, arising from the wife's interest in the estate of her mother, and other sums coming from the same source. This money, however, under the then law, was absolutely his. Of course, outside the rights of creditors, he could treat it as hers, and pay it in money or property. No note was given for it, audit was never repaid to her until 1876, in the conveyance of the land. It could not be considered a valid consideration, as against creditors. Being his money in law, it could not make her a purchaser for valuable consideration, but the conveyance must be looked upon as voluntary, though it may very properly be considered as bearing on the question whether the deed was fraudulent in fact, and is a circumstance tending to repel that charge. Both he and she say that she loaned it to him, he promising repayment, and when asked by her for it, lie replied that he had no money but would convey her the land. Thus this conveyance is voluntary.
Was the conveyance fraudulent in fact? No evidence of any kind was given to show that it was, but it is claimed that as the liability existed at the date of the deed, and the parties being husband and wife, the law presumes it to have been made with actual fraudulent intent. Both Neal and wife state on oath that they did not know that...
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